People v. Tran
Decision Date | 16 February 2018 |
Docket Number | G053424 |
Citation | 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 152,20 Cal.App.5th 561 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Andrew TRAN, Defendant and Appellant. |
David McNeil Morse, San Francisco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Randall D. Einhorn and Peter Quon, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This is a case in which we order a remand to allow appellant to prepare for a hearing 25 years in his future. It is devoutly to be hoped this will someday be viewed as a reasonable step forward in penological and cultural development rather than too little, too late.
Appellant Andrew Tran was convicted of murdering and attempting to murder two rival gang members. On appeal, he contends his conviction for attempted murder must be reversed because the trial court gave the jury a confusing and inapt instruction on the kill zone theory. We reject this contention. However, appellant was only 16 years old when he committed his crimes, and we agree with him that the case must be remanded so he can make a record of information that will be relevant to his youthful offender parole hearing in 25 years. Thus, while we affirm the judgment in its entirety, we remand for further proceedings.
On the night of March 19, 2011, appellant had a party at his house that was heavily attended by members of his gang. The party dispersed around midnight, but the revelers did not go home. Instead, they filed into several cars and headed to a pool hall in Westminster where several members of a rival gang were hanging out. Appellant drove to the pool hall in a white sedan with other members of his gang. As they were heading out, the front passenger gave appellant a gun, and he tucked it away in his car.
When appellant arrived at the pool hall, he parked by the other cars in his group. Then he and Jonathan Tieu walked up to the pool hall and made themselves visible to their rivals. It didn't take long before the two groups were exchanging hostile words in the parking lot. Witnesses to the exchange thought there was going to be a gang fight right then and there, but appellant and Tieu retreated to appellant's car, and their rivals got into their vehicles. Appellant then drove to the exit and positioned his car so he could see inside any vehicles that were leaving. When an SUV full of rivals passed through the exit, appellant said, "That's them." Appellant's front passenger Benjamin Nguyen told appellant to follow the SUV, and he did.
There were eight people inside the SUV, including passengers Scottie Bui and Roger James. As the vehicle travelled along Westminster Boulevard, appellant pulled alongside it. Nguyen rolled down his window and began yelling out gang-related taunts, and the people in the SUV did the same. Nguyen then pulled a gun and began firing at the SUV. One of the shots hit Bui in the head, killing him. Another shot hit James in the neck, but he survived. Investigators later recovered five expended cartridges at the scene.
Appellant was arrested shortly after the shooting. He initially denied any wrongdoing but eventually admitted his role in the incident, as described above. He also admitted having a history of antagonism toward James and seeing him at the pool hall when the two groups squared off before the shooting.
He was charged with first degree murder, attempted murder, shooting at an occupied vehicle and street terrorism. ( Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664/187, 246, 186.22, subd. (a).)1 The prosecution alleged as a special circumstance that the murder was carried out to further the activities of appellant's gang. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22).) It also alleged firearm and gang enhancements with respect to the first three charges. (§§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1), 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) The jury acquitted appellant of first degree murder but convicted him of murder in the second degree. It found him guilty of the remaining charges and found the gun and gang allegations true. The trial court sentenced appellant to 40 years to life in prison for his crimes.
Appellant challenges his attempted murder conviction on the basis the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the kill zone theory of liability. In appellant's view, the kill zone theory was not applicable to the facts of his case, and the trial court worded its instruction in a confusing manner that amounted to "gibberish." While the instruction was inartfully worded, it was certainly not "gibberish." We believe the kill zone theory was amply supported by the evidence, and appellant could not possibly have been prejudiced by the way the instruction was phrased. We therefore uphold his conviction for attempted murder.2
Since he was not the shooter, appellant was prosecuted under aiding and abetting principles. Specifically, the prosecution theorized appellant was guilty of attempted murder because he directly assisted Nguyen in shooting James and/or because the shooting was a natural and probable consequence of the disturbance appellant caused at the pool hall. Appellant does not challenge the trial court's instructions pertaining to these theories. Instead, he focuses on the instructions pertaining directly to the attempted murder charge.
As to that charge, the trial court told the jury, The court also instructed the jury:
Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel mentioned the kill zone theory during closing arguments. However, during its deliberations, the jury sent the trial court a note asking,
After consulting with counsel, the trial court told the jury,
The first issue we must decide is whether the kill zone theory was applicable to the facts of this case. For the reasons explained in People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107 ( Bland ), we believe it was. Like the present case, Bland involved a gang-related shooting. Following a brief conversation with the victims, the defendant and his companion fired multiple shots at their car, killing the driver and wounding his two passengers. ( Id . at p. 318, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107.) The evidence suggested the defendant may have only wanted to kill the driver, who was a gang member, and not his passengers, who were not. ( Id . at pp. 318-319, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107.) Nonetheless, the jurors were told that even if they found that was the case, they could still convict the defendant of attempting to murder the passengers on the theory of transferred intent, in which case the intent to kill the driver would carry over to the passengers. ( Id . at p. 319, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107.)
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that while the doctrine of transferred intent can be applied when the primary target is murdered and unintended victims are also killed, it does not apply when the unintended victims are only injured. ( Bland, supra , 28 Cal.4th at pp. 326-331, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107.) Thus, it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury on that doctrine. ( Ibid . ) However, Bland affirmed the defendant's convictions for attempted murder on the theory of concurrent intent encompassed in the kill zone theory. ( Ibid . )
As to that theory, the court explained, ...
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