People v. Trice

• Decision Date: 14 January 1991
• Docket Number: 1-87-2134,Nos. 1-87-2086,s. 1-87-2086
• Parties: , 160 Ill.Dec. 624 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Calvin TRICE and Sylvester Henderson, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1195

577 N.E.2d 1195

217 Ill.App.3d 967, 160 Ill.Dec. 624

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Calvin TRICE and Sylvester Henderson, Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 1-87-2086, 1-87-2134.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, First Division.

Jan. 14, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 9, 1991.

Office of State Appellate Defender, (Michael J. Pelletier, Martin Carlson, Richard C. Bollow and J. Cunyon Gordon, of counsel) Chicago, for defendant-appellant Trice.

Samuel J. Cahnman and Richard F. Faust, Chicago, of counsel, for defendant-appellant Henderson.

State's Attorney's Office of Cook County, (Jack O'Malley, Inge Fryklund, Marie Quinlivan Czech and William D. Carroll, of counsel) Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee against Trice.

State's Atty.'s Office of Cook County, (Jack O'Malley, Renee Goldfarb, Walter P. Hehner and William D. Carroll, of counsel), Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee against Henderson.

Presiding Justice MANNING delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendants Calvin Trice and Sylvester Henderson were jointly indicted on the charges of murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)), armed robbery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 18-2(a)), arson (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 20-2), and concealment of a homicidal death. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 9-3.1.) In a dual-jury proceeding, one jury found Trice guilty of murder, armed robbery and concealment of a homicidal death, and a separate jury found Henderson guilty of murder and armed robbery. The circuit court sentenced Trice to confinement for the remainder of his natural life for murder, and 30 years and 5 years, respectively, for armed robbery and concealment of a homicidal death. The court sentenced Henderson to concurrent terms of natural life for murder and 30 years for armed robbery.

Prior to trial, defendants moved to suppress custodial statements made to the police and other evidence that they claimed was obtained incident to an illegal arrest. The trial court denied the motions finding that the police had probable cause to arrest. The court made no ruling on Trice's motion in limine to preclude the State from introducing into evidence the contents of a 911 telephone call.

On appeal, both defendants assert that: (1) they were arrested without probable cause; and (2) the trial court erred when it allowed the juries to hear the contents of an inculpatory anonymous 911 telephone call made by a purported eyewitness to the homicide. In addition, Trice raises the issues whether: (1) the trial court erred when it refused to allow him to use an exculpatory letter to impeach one of the State's key witnesses; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed the testimony of a State witness who had been unavailable to the defense until the day of the witness' testimony; and (3) the court erred when it permitted the defendants to be tried simultaneously in a dual-jury proceeding. The issues presented for review on behalf of Henderson are: (1) whether the trial court improperly considered a "victim impact statement" during Henderson's sentencing hearing, and (2) whether Henderson's sentences of natural life for murder and 30 years for armed robbery are excessive.

As a result of the dual-jury proceeding, the two juries heard testimony jointly and separately. Officer Peterson, a Chicago police officer, testified on behalf of the State. On February 1, 1986, he was called to the scene of a fire in the alley at 69th and Peoria streets at about 10:00 p.m. When he arrived, firemen were extinguishing the fire on a late model van in which he saw the charred remains of a body that was later identified as police officer Schaeffer. Dr. Kalelkar, a medical examiner, testified that the victim had sustained two gunshot wounds, one to the chest, and one to the head which had been fatal, and that the victim was dead before he was burned.

The State's key testimony was elicited from Angelia Lathan, the girlfriend of Trice. On January 31, 1986, at about 6:00 p.m. she left the home of a friend, Glenda, to look for Trice when she was approached near 70th and Peoria by a white male "wanting to buy some reefer." When Trice and Henderson approached, she inquired if Trice had any marijuana and Henderson replied that he did and told her to tell the man to pull his van into the alley. When the man stepped out of the van Henderson told him "he had to have it all," but the man replied, "it's not like that" and reached into his jacket. At this point, Henderson pulled out a gun and shot the man. Then, Trice shot the man again which caused him to fall backward into the van. Although Henderson suggested that they "take out" Angelia to prevent her from "tricking" to the authorities, Trice convinced him that Angelia would not tell on them. During cross-examination, when Trice's counsel attempted to impeach Angelia's credibility with a letter she had written to him during her sequestration in Mississippi, the State objected on the ground that the letter had not been provided to them during discovery. The court disallowed use of the letter.

Detective Craig Cegielski also testified. On Monday, February 3, 1986, at about 9:30 a.m., he and his partner listened several times to a recorded tape that an anonymous caller had telephoned in on the 911 number on February 2, 1986, purporting to have information "about the murder at 69th and Peoria." The call was traced to a pay telephone a few miles from the scene of the crime. After listening to the tape, Cegielski conducted an investigation which turned up three suspects: Calvin Trice, Angelia Lathan and Sylvester Henderson, who were subsequently brought to the station and questioned.

Defendants objected to the detective's testimony concerning the 911 tape. The trial court ruled that the contents of the "911 tape" were admissible as to Henderson since his counsel's questions to Angelia suggested that she tailored her testimony to the 911 tape. The court initially commented that admission of the tape as to Trice was "close"; however, in reliance on several appellate court decisions and the fact that the jury was "left with the impression that the investigation fell out of thin air," the judge reversed his earlier ruling and allowed admission of the 911 tape in evidence to "show the continuity of the police action." In addition, Elwin "Whorl" Ward testified on behalf of the State and stated that Trice had made certain admissions to him about his (Trice's) involvement in a robbery and murder.

Trice testified that on January 31, 1986, he spent the afternoon at his mother's house except for a brief trip to the cleaners; most of the early part of the evening from about 6:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. at a friend's house, playing cards, and the remainder of the evening he went to the Surf Lounge, left for Chris' party at 68th and Aberdeen and returned to the lounge where he remained until it closed around 2:00 a.m. on Saturday, February 1, 1986. Trice presented witnesses who corroborated his version of what occurred and contradicted Angelia's testimony as to her whereabouts on the days in question. Henderson presented alibi witnesses who placed him at his home the entire evening of January 31, 1986. He also testified on his own behalf and stated that the statements he made were false and elicited as a result of coercion by the arresting officers.

We first address whether the trial court correctly found that probable cause existed for defendants' arrest. Defendants maintain that there was no probable cause for arrest because the independent corroboration of the information given by the anonymous caller was insufficient and had too few details to be reliable. They urge that the trial court misapplied the probable cause determination as set forth by the United States Supreme Court, and thus erred in denying their motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal arrest.

The State initially responds that with respect to Henderson, this issue is waived on appeal because of his failure to specify in the written post-trial motion the reason he believed he had been arrested without probable cause. Alternatively, and with respect to Trice, the State asserts that the police provided sufficient independent corroboration of the anonymous 911 telephone caller's information to establish probable cause for defendants' warrantless arrests.

This court will not set aside a trial court's disposition of a motion to suppress unless such decision is manifestly erroneous. (People v. Evans (1988), 125 Ill.2d 50, 78, 125 Ill.Dec. 790, 530 N.E.2d 1360; People v. Stewart (1984), 105 Ill.2d 22, 41, 85 Ill.Dec. 241, 473 N.E.2d 840; People v. Holmes (1989), 198 Ill.App.3d 766, 144 Ill.Dec. 861, 556 N.E.2d 539.) Neither will a trial court's ruling that there was probable cause to arrest be disturbed by a reviewing court unless it is manifestly erroneous. Evans, 125 Ill.2d at 71, 125 Ill.Dec. 790, 530 N.E.2d 1360.

A court of review must determine whether the trial court had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. (Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332-33, 76 L.Ed.2d 527; People v. Tisler (1984), 103 Ill.2d 226, 248, 82 Ill.Dec. 613, 469 N.E.2d 147.) Our courts have repeatedly found that probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances known to the police are sufficient to warrant the belief of a reasonable and prudent person that an offense has been committed and that the person arrested has committed the offense. Ill.Rev.Stat.1987; ch. 38, par. 107-2(1)(a), (c); People v. Montgomery (1986), 112 Ill.2d 517, 525, 98 Ill.Dec. 353, 494 N.E.2d 475; People v. Lippert (1982), 89 Ill.2d 171, 178, 59 Ill.Dec. 819, 432 N.E.2d 605; People v. Lekas (1987), 155 Ill.App.3d 391, 410, 108 Ill.Dec. 60, 508 N.E.2d 221.

The information relied upon to establish probable cause to arrest must be supported by some indicia of reliability. (People v. James (1987), 118 Ill.2d 214, ...