People v. Trimarchi
| Decision Date | 31 May 1921 |
| Citation | 131 N.E. 910,231 N.Y. 263 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. TRIMARCHI. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Carmello Trimarchi was convicted of burglary in the third degree as a second offense. From so much of an order of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department (193 App. Div. 968,184 N. Y. Supp. 943) as reversed the judgment of conviction and ordered a new trial, the People appeal, and from so much thereof as affirmed an order denying his motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, defendant appeals. Order granting new trial reversed, and judgment of conviction affirmed.
Defendant's appeal dismissed.
Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
James L. Kelly, of Batavia, for the People.
Grace F. Crampton, of Henrietta, William J. Baker, of Rochester, and William E. Webster, of Batavia, for defendant.
The defendant was convicted of the crime of burglary, third degree, second offense, after a prior conviction of a felony, for which he was sentenced to be imprisoned in a state's prison for the term of seven years and six months. He appealed to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, from the judgment of conviction and also from an order denying a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the order denying the motion for a new trial, from which the defendant appeals, and unanimously reversed the judgment of conviction and ordered a new trial, from which the people appeal. The reversal of the judgment of conviction was, according to the order, ‘upon questions of law only, the facts having been examined and no error found therein.’ The error of law upon which the reversal is predicated is stated in the order as follows:
‘That the defendant was not given the full benefit of the rule respecting the evidence of good character, and that the exceptions to rulings of the trial court in charging the jury upon that question are well taken.’
At the trial several witnesses were sworn whose testimony it is claimed tended to establish the good character of the defendant, and at the conclusion of the main charge the trial court was requested to charge:
‘That evidence of good character is sufficient to raise a question of reasonable doubt.’
In response to this request the court stated:
‘I will charge that the question of good character you are to consider in arriving at your verdict, and if, after considering it, it is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt, you should not convict.’
Exception was taken by defendant's counsel to the refusal to charge as requested, and also to the charge as made.
[1][2][3] The request was improper in form. Evidence of good character is not, of itself, sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt. Such evidence, in order to raise a reasonable doubt, must be believed by the jury. It then may, when considered with all the other evidence in the case, be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. This is upon the theory that good character may create a doubt against positive evidence, but this doubt against positive evidence is created only when in the judgment of the jury the character is so good as to raise a doubt as to the truthfulness of the positive evidence tending to establish guilt. I such case the defendant must be given the benefit of the doubt. This is the rule laid down in People v. Hughson, 154 N. Y. 153, 47 N. E. 1092, where the charge as made was substantially like the one here complained of. The trial court, I think, correctly stated the rule of law to be applied by the jury. See, also, People v. Gilbert, 199 N. Y. 10, 92 N. E. 85,20 Ann. Cas. 769.
[4] It is also claimed the court erred in refusing to charge the following request:
‘That the evidence in this case must be, in order to convict, of such a character as to exclude every hypothesis except this defendant's guilt’
-to which the court responded:
-to which exception was taken by defendant's counsel.
This request was...
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Howard v. McGinnis, 03-CV-6059 (VEB).
...as to guilt[.]" People v. Aharonowicz, 71 N.Y.2d at 682, 529 N.Y.S.2d 736, 525 N.E.2d 458 (citing, inter alia, People v. Trimarchi, 231 N.Y. 263, 266, 131 N.E. 910 (1921)); Pujana-Mena, 949 F.2d at 29-30. Stated another way, "the jury may not ignore the People's evidence tending to establis......
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People v. Bevilacqua
...the evidence was sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty. I hold that it was. Nothing to the contrary is found in People v. Trimarchi, 231 N.Y. 263, 131 N.E. 910, nor in People v. Suffern, 267 N.Y. 115, 195 N.E. 816, nor in People v. Woltering, 275 N.Y. 51, 9 N.E.2d 774, nor in Becher v. ......
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United States v. Asan
...but guilt, must all be consistent with and point to guilt, and must be inconsistent with innocence) (citing People v. Trimarchi, 231 N.Y. 263, 267, 131 N.E. 910 (1921)). That is the standard of proof that the fact finder must apply in a criminal case. See id. There is no contention here tha......
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State v. Ramos, 80-169
... ... Carmelo Valentin testified that the defendant was a leader in "Project Hope," an Hispanic community group that worked with young people. Valentin stated that the defendant was respected in the community for his honesty and trustworthiness. Sister Pauline Chabot, a pastor-minister in ... See People v. Trimarchi, 231 N.Y. 263, 266, 131 N.E. 910, 911 (1921); People v. Ingram, 49 A.D.2d 865, 865, 374 N.Y.S.2d 327, 329 (1975) ... The defendant ... ...