People v. Trinidad, B184563 (Cal. App. 12/6/2006)
| Decision Date | 06 December 2006 |
| Docket Number | B184563 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JUAN FRANCISCO TRINIDAD, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. YA059932, Eric C. Taylor, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
A. William Bartz, Jr. for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and Herbert S. Tetef, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Juan Francisco Trinidad was convicted by jury of selling (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), possessing (§ 11378), and transporting (§ 11379, subd. (a)) a controlled substance. The jury also found it true that all three offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court assumed there had been a trial on an allegation that appellant had been convicted of a prior offense and taking that into account, sentenced appellant to a total of 11 years in state prison. Appellant appeals from the judgment. We affirm the judgment of conviction. We reverse only for a trial on the prior strike allegation and for resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm.
On June 30, 2004, detectives working undercover conducted a surveillance on appellant's residence. At about 8:15 p.m. that evening, appellant left his home and drove to a Home Depot where he parked his car. Edward Arquette walked over to appellant and exchanged an envelope for a baggie containing 7.03 grams of methamphetamine. After Arquette drove away, he was stopped by police officers on a traffic stop. A pat-down search of Arquette revealed $432 and the methamphetamine, which he possessed for the purposes of sale and distribution.
On August 27, 2004, Detective Antonio Marin was working undercover and conducting surveillance on appellant's residence. This was part of an on-going investigation of narcotics sales by the Gardena 13 street gang. At about 5:00 p.m., appellant drove from his residence to a laundromat where he parked next to a 4Runner. Appellant approached the 4Runner and handed its driver, Juan Gonzalez, a stack of United States currency. After Gonzalez drove away, he was stopped and arrested. A removable magnetic box was attached to the undercarriage of the 4Runner. Gonzalez's wallet contained $786 and a pay-owe sheet. Gonzalez was a Gardena 13 member. Gonzalez's wife was also in the car. She had a roll of money totaling $2,540.
On October 19, 2004, Detective Steven Swain was on surveillance of appellant's home to serve a search warrant. At approximately 5:00 p. m., appellant left his home and drove away. Detective Erick Lee tried to stop appellant. However, appellant made many furtive moves in an attempt to allude capture. Eventually, appellant pulled over. A ripped plastic bag contained 1.3 grams of methamphetamine was inside the car. The packaging showed that the methamphetamine was for sale and not for personal use. White powder was throughout appellant's car. Appellant had $395.
Searches of appellant's home and garage revealed $ 8,500 in a dresser drawer, pay-owe sheets, $56,000 in a narcotics-laced fire-proof safe under the bed in the master bedroom, a police scanner set for the Gardena Police Department's home frequency, and live ammunition and magazines for assault and semi-automatic weapons. Also, a number of items in the home and garage showed appellant was a member of the Gardena 13 street gang, including a white bandanna with his gang moniker.
The matter proceeded to trial before jury.
Appellant was convicted as charged in the three-count information of selling, possessing, and transporting a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379, subd. (a), 11378, 11379, subd. (a).) As to each of the three counts, the jury found it true that the offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) Thereafter, the trial court assumed appellant had been convicted of a prior offense as had been charged, and factoring that assumption into the sentencing choices, sentenced appellant to a total of 11 years in state prison.
Appellant appeals from the judgment. We reverse only for a trial on the prior conviction allegation and for resentencing. In all other respects we affirm.
Appellant contends the trial court improperly denied his motion to disqualify Juror No. 1824, thus forcing him to use all of his peremptory challenges. This contention is not persuasive.
Juror No. 1824 was a firefighter and paramedic. He was the first prospective juror to be voir dired. When questioned, Juror No. 1824 referred to his experience in dealing with gang members and drug overdoses and stated he recognized appellant's tattoos as gang tattoos. Based upon this experience, Juror No. 1824 stated in part, "I just think with my experiences and — looking at the individual that's charged in this case, I don't think I can give a fair shot." The trial court informed Juror No. 1824 that he was to be reassigned to the jury room and potentially assigned to a civil case, which meant he might have to come back the next day. After the trial court's statement, Juror No. 1824 said that he wanted to think about it.
Other prospective jurors were voir dired, including one whose home had been burglarized twice by gang members and whose brother-in-law handled gang related matters for the Torrance Police Department, one whose 21-year-old daughter had died from drugs, and one whose uncle had been murdered by gang members. Thereafter, the trial court and defense counsel asked additional questions of Juror No. 1824 to determine if he could be fair, notwithstanding his experiences. Juror No. 1824 stated he had listened to the responses given by other potential jurors and wanted to clarify his earlier statements. In part, Juror No. 1824 said, He further stated, [. Juror No. 1824 also stated he would not find appellant guilty if the evidence was to the contrary.
The trial court denied appellant's request to discharge Juror No. 1824 for cause. The trial court concluded that this juror had been disingenuous at the outset in an effort to avoid jury duty. However, thereafter, Juror No. 1824 showed he could be fair, especially after listening to other potential jurors who were willing to serve even though they had some familiarity with drugs or gangs. Subsequently, appellant used a peremptory challenge to excuse Juror No. 1824. The defense exhausted all of its 10 peremptory challenges.
We review the trial court's overruling a challenge for cause for abuse of discretion. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 715.) (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 456.) "[I]f the prospective juror's statements are equivocal or conflicting, court's determination of the person's state of mind is binding. (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 488.)
The trial court was in the best situation to observe Juror No. 1824's demeanor and intonation and evaluate Juror No. 1824's conflicting statements about his ability to be fair. The trial court concluded that Juror No. 1824's first statements were made in an attempt to avoid jury service. However, after listening to other jurors recount experiences with gangs or drugs, Juror No. 1824 articulated a clearer picture of his ability to be fair. While appellant suggests the trial court intimidated Juror No. 1824 into changing the position first taken, the record supports a contrary conclusion. The trial court simply informed Juror No. 1824 of reality — Juror No. 1824 would be sent back to the jury room and potentially sit on a civil case.
The trial court's factual determination that Juror No. 1824's first statements were a disingenuous attempt to avoid jury duty and that his subsequent statements more accurately described his state of mind and his ability to set aside any prejudices and be fair, is supported by the record and demonstrates that the court did not abuse its discretion.
Appellant contends there was no substantial evidence to support the street-gang enhancement findings pursuant to Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1). This contention is unpersuasive.
` ...
To continue reading
Request your trial