People v. Trujillo
| Decision Date | 07 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | G044131 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALEX DAVID TRUJILLO, Defendant and Appellant. |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINIONAppeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, James Patrick Marion, Judge. Affirmed.
Susan D. Shors, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood and Meagan J. Beale, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Alex David Trujillo struck two bicyclists while driving his pickup truck; one of the bicyclists died. After the collision, a test of defendant's blood showed he was driving under the influence of alcohol and prescription medication. The prosecution offered evidence of defendant's voluntary intoxication, as well as his previous conviction for driving under the influence, to establish implied malice supporting defendant's conviction for second degree murder. Defendant raises three issues on appeal; finding no merit in any of them, we affirm defendant's conviction.
First, defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding involuntary intoxication. There was no evidence supporting a defense of unconsciousness or involuntary intoxication, however. For the same reason, defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request such an instruction.
Second, defendant argues the jury was erroneously permitted to consider evidence of his voluntary intoxication to establish implied malice. We conclude Penal Code former section 22 permitted the prosecution to offer evidence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication to establish implied malice, while precluding the defendant from offering the same evidence to negate implied malice. Former section 22 did not violate a defendant's due process or equal protection rights.
Finally, defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, which is a lesser related charge of murder. The prosecution did not agree to an instruction on the lesser charge, and the trial court did not err in failing to give it.
About 4:55 p.m. on October 12, 2008, defendant was driving his pickup truck eastbound on Lampson Avenue in Seal Beach. Witnesses observed defendant driving normally within the posted speed limit. However, defendant failed to negotiate agradual left turn in the road, and his truck jumped the curb onto the sidewalk, hit two bicyclists, and struck a tree. Defendant did not apply the brakes or swerve before the collision. Catherine Busse, one of the bicyclists, died as the result of multiple blunt traumatic injuries.
Defendant was treated at the University of California, Irvine Medical Center. When questioned by paramedics and hospital personnel, he denied taking any medications or drinking alcohol that day. Defendant's blood was drawn at 5:35 p.m., showing a blood alcohol level of 0.10 percent. Defendant's blood was drawn again at 6:20 p.m.; the blood alcohol level of that sample was 0.09 percent. Defendant's second blood sample indicated the presence of therapeutic levels of oxycodone, hydrocodone, and alprazolam in his bloodstream.1
An expert in forensic toxicology opined defendant's blood alcohol content at the time of the collision would have been between 0.11 and 0.12 percent. The expert testified the other drugs in defendant's system were central nervous system depressants that would have enhanced the effects of alcohol. Using retrograde extrapolation, the expert estimated that if defendant had not consumed any alcoholic beverages on October 12, his blood alcohol level of about 0.11 percent at 4:55 p.m. would have meant he had a blood alcohol level between 0.30 and 0.40 percent at 12:00 a.m. on October 12. Such a blood alcohol level would potentially be a lethal dose, at which defendant would have been expected to be grossly impaired. Defendant would have had to consume between 17 and 23 alcoholic beverages to reach that level, although his weight, tolerance level, timing of consumption, food intake, and fatigue could affect the impacts of alcohol.
Multiple pill bottles for OxyContin and hydrocodone were found at defendant's home. Prescription receipts for OxyContin and hydrocodone were found in the glove compartment of defendant's truck. All the bottles and receipts were labeledwith warnings that the medication could make the user drowsy, caution should be used when operating a vehicle after taking the medicine, and alcohol could intensify the effects of the medication.
Defendant had been convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol in 2002. When defendant was pulled over in 2002, he felt fine, believed he could operate a motor vehicle, and thought he was safe to drive and in control; defendant testified he would not have gotten in his car that evening if he did not feel safe to drive. After his conviction, defendant participated in a nine-month first offender driving under the influence program. At the conclusion of that program, defendant signed a statement, acknowledging:
Both defendant and his wife testified that defendant drank alcohol at a wedding the night before the collision, but stopped drinking between midnight and 1:00 a.m. Defendant was drunk, but he and his wife spent the night at the hotel where the wedding reception was held. Defendant took OxyContin, Soma, and Vicodin, as prescribed, in the evening of October 11, and took OxyContin, as prescribed, in the morning of October 12. Defendant's wife testified defendant did not drink any alcohol during the morning of October 12, and did not appear impaired in any way. Defendant slept in the car while his wife drove home that morning. Defendant did some chores around the house and left at 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. to run errands. Both defendant and his wife testified that defendant did not drink any alcohol or take any prescription medication after they got home on October 12.
Defendant's wife did not observe any signs of intoxication before defendant left to go shopping. Defendant did not feel impaired. He would not have driven if he had felt drowsy. Defendant testified that on October 12, he did not feel he was a risk to others, and did not drive with a disregard for the safety of others.
Defendant's physician testified he had treated defendant for back pain for many years, and had prescribed OxyContin, Vicodin, and Flexeril, a muscle relaxant. The physician had warned defendant about the effects of combining those medications with alcohol, particularly when driving, and cautioned defendant not to drive after taking Vicodin.
Defendant was charged with a single count of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), and a jury convicted him. The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life in prison. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Defendant argues he was prejudiced by the lack of a jury instruction on involuntary intoxication. Defendant contends the trial court had a sua sponte duty to so instruct the jury; alternatively, he contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request such an instruction. Defendant does not identify the instruction or instructions he claims should have been given to the jury. We presume for purposes of this opinion that the potentially relevant instructions would have been CALCRIM Nos. 3425 and 3427.2
A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on defenses "'only if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.'" (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157.) No evidence supported the giving of an instruction on involuntary intoxication in this case. No evidence was presented that defendant was unconscious at the time of the collision; to the contrary, he provided significant testimony of exactly what had happened before, during, and after the collision. "[U]nconsciousness need not rise to the level of coma or inability to walk or perform manual movements; it can exist 'where the subject physically acts but is not, at the time, conscious of acting.'" (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 417.) Nothing in the record supports a contention that defendant was not conscious of his actions at the time of the collision.
Further, no evidence was offered showing defendant unknowingly ingested an intoxicating substance or his intoxication was caused by the force, duress, or trickery of someone else. To the contrary, all the evidence at trial was that defendant knowingly ingested alcohol and prescription medications, but did not realize he was still suffering from the residual effects of the combination of substances at the time the collision occurred.
This case is similar to People v. Mahle (1969) 273...
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