People v. Trujillo, 80
| Decision Date | 15 June 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80,80 |
| Citation | 631 P.2d 146 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Gilberto TRUJILLO, Defendant-Appellant. SA 121. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary J. Mullarkey, Sol. Gen., Maureen Phelan, Clement P. Engle, Asst. Attys. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.
J. Gregory Walta, Colo. State Public Defender, Margaret L. O'Leary, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellant.
The defendant, Jose Gilberto Trujillo, appeals 1 a district court order denying his Crim.P. 35(a) motion requesting that his sentence of three to five years be corrected to an indeterminate sentence because he had not been convicted of a felony before he committed the crimes for which the sentence at issue here was imposed. We affirm the district court's denial of the motion.
On March 9, 1979, a jury convicted the defendant of felony menacing, a class 5 felony, 2 and criminal mischief resulting in damage of $100 or more to personal property of another, a class 4 felony. 3 The convictions arose from an incident which occurred in Delta, Colorado on March 29, 1978. On March 14, 1979, the trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of three to five years on each count, to run consecutively to a sentence imposed by the same trial judge on December 18, 1978, for an offense committed on March 16, 1978.
The defendant contends that he should have been sentenced under section 16-11-101(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), 4 which provides:
The trial court refused to enter an indeterminate sentence because section 16-11-101(1)(d), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8) 5 provides:
(Emphasis added.) The trial court reasoned that the defendant's November 28, 1978 conviction of three felonies which occurred on March 16, 1978, resulted in his ineligibility for an indeterminate sentence under section 16-11-101(1)(d).
The defendant argues that section 16-11-101(1)(d) should be read to require conviction for the first offense before commission of the second offense in order to effectuate the statutory purpose of deterring an individual convicted of a felony from committing further offenses. The defendant relies primarily on our decision in People v. Nees, Colo., 615 P.2d 690 (1980). There, we held that it was improper for a trial court to sentence a defendant as a habitual criminal on the basis of convictions sustained after the commission of the underlying crime. The relevant statute in Nees, section 16-13-101, C.R.S. 1973 , provides:
"(1) Every person convicted in this state of any felony for which the maximum penalty prescribed by law exceeds five years who, within ten years of the date of the commission of the said offense, has been twice previously convicted upon charges separately brought and tried, either in this state or elsewhere, of a felony or, under the laws of any other state, the United States, or any territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of a crime which, if committed within this state, would be a felony shall be adjudged an habitual criminal and shall be punished by confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of not less than twenty-five years nor more than fifty years."
In Nees, we ruled that this penalty enhancement provision applied only to a defendant who had been twice convicted within ten years before commission of the subject offense. Id. at 693. Our holding rested on the policy, recognized in a majority of jurisdictions, that habitual criminal penalty enhancement is intended to punish repeat offenders after the offender has experienced the salutary discipline of the prior convictions. We need not extend our ruling in Nees to indeterminate sentences under section 16-11-101(1)(b) for two reasons: first, the language in the habitual criminal statute differs significantly from the language of the indeterminate sentencing statute; second, the indeterminate sentencing statute does not create a separate status offense.
The wording of section 16-13-101 ties prior felony "convictions" to habitual criminal liability. By comparison, section 16-11-101(1)(d) provides that as long as the first offense occurs before the second offense, the trial court has no jurisdiction to enter an indeterminate sentence for the second offense if the defendant had been convicted of the first offense when the sentence for the second offense is imposed. Clearly expressed legislative intent must be given effect. People in the interest of Maddox v. District Court, 198 Colo. 208, 597 P.2d 573 (1979); Pigford v. People, 197 Colo. 358, 593 P.2d 354 (1979); People v. Meyers, 182 Colo. 21, 510 P.2d 430 (1973).
In contrast to the habitual criminal statute, section 16-11-101(1)(d) does not create a separate status offense requiring punishment for that status. See People v. Smith, 195 Colo. 404, 579 P.2d 1129 (1978); 6 People v....
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People v. Mattas
...exercise of judicial discretion and, accordingly, the sentencing judge has wide latitude in arriving at a final decision. People v. Trujillo, Colo., 631 P.2d 146 (1981); People v. Magee, supra; People v. Cohen, The same judge presided at the defendant's trial and sentencing. The judge had t......
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People v. Onesimo Romero, 85SA319
...vested with the power to define crimes and prescribe punishment. People v. Montgomery, 669 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Colo.1983); People v. Trujillo, 631 P.2d 146, 148 (Colo.1981). We will uphold such legislation unless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislative act violates constitut......
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People v. Francis, 80SA35
...McKenna, compel us to reject without further discussion the defendant's constitutional claims directed to H.B. 1589. People v. Trujillo, Colo., 631 P.2d 146 (1981); (S.Ct. No. 80SA121, announced June 15, 1981); People v. Moody, Colo., 629 P.2d 102 (1981); People v. Kerns, Colo., 629 P.2d 57......
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ARTICLE 3
...P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1981); People v. Lichtenstein, 630 P.2d 70 (Colo. 1981); People v. Francis, 630 P.2d 82 (Colo. 1981); People v. Trujillo, 631 P.2d 146 (Colo. 1981); People v. Jones, 631 P.2d 1132 (Colo. 1981); People v. Martinez, 634 P.2d 26 (Colo. 1981) ; People v. Stoppel, 637 P.2d 384 (......