People v. Turnage

• Citation: 119 Cal.Rptr. 237,45 Cal.App.3d 201
• Decision Date: 10 February 1975
• Docket Number: Cr. 12274
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ronald Wayne TURNAGE, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 237

119 Cal.Rptr. 237

45 Cal.App.3d 201

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ronald Wayne TURNAGE, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 12274.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Feb. 10, 1975.

Hearing Denied April 14, 1975.

Brian Glick, Berkeley (Court Appointed Counsel), for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., of the State of California, Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., Edward P. O'Brian, Asst. Atty. Gen., W. Eric Collins, Terry A. Douglas, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

KANE, Associate Justice.

Found guilty by jury of first degree murder, defendant appeals, contending that (1) he was arrested without probable cause and that his post-arrest statements were therefore (a) improperly used to support the issuance of a search warrant and (b) erroneously introduced at his trial, and that (2) the trial court erroneously determined that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and to remain silent.

For the reasons which follow we have concluded that each of appellant's contentions must be rejected. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Shortly before midnight on September 24, 1972, the California Highway Patrol, checking on a reported abandoned vehicle which was a traffic hazard, discovered a body, later identified as Albert Hudson, in a ravine alongside McEwen Road near Port Costa, California. The vehicle, subsequently determined to have been owned by the victim, contained bloodstains, an expended .32 caliber casing and a pool of liquid which appeared to be vomit and which contained a large piece of red candy. Five additional expended .32 caliber cartridge cases were found at the scene. ¹ The autopsy report indicated that Hudson's death had been caused by six to eight gunshot wounds in the head.

The following morning the sheriff's department talked with a medic from the Contra Costa County jail, who had observed a yellow Chevrolet near Hudson's vehicle shortly before the California Highway Patrol discovered the body. As the medic's car approached, the Chevrolet, driven by a young Caucasian or Chicano, sped away. Also, at approximately the same time, an off-duty deputy sheriff observed a man standing near Hudson's vehicle. Initially the deputy described the man as a white male, but later he was not sure; the deputy's wife gave similar equivocal testimony in that it was only her 'impression' that the man was a Caucasian. The sheriff's department also learned from a student that a black man was at the scene shortly before the highway patrol arrived. On September 25, 1972, an all points bulletin for two white men was issued by the sheriff's department.

During the early evening of September 26, 1972, Renee Bennett, appellant's former girl friend, was interviewed by investigating officers at her apartment. During the interview Miss Bennett's mother called to say that appellant was on his way over. Appellant pulled into a driveway in the apartment area complex, but instead of going into the apartment he drove off. He was pursued by the police at high speeds through a residential area and was finally stopped and arrested approximately one to two miles from Miss Bennett's apartment. Appellant was promptly taken to the sheriff's office in Martinez, where he was questioned after being informed of his Miranda rights. After the interrogation appellant was looked for murder. Appellant's car and his mother's residence were searched pursuant to a subsequently issued search warrant; unexpended .32 caliber cartridges, which a criminalist determined to have been worked through the murder weapon, were found in the car.

Probable Cause to Arrest

"The question of probable cause to justify an arrest without a warrant must be tested by the facts which the record shows were known to the officers at the time the arrest was made.' (People v. Talley (1967) 65 Cal.2d 830, 835, 56 Cal.Rptr. 492, 423 P.2d 564.)' (People v. Lara (1967) 67 Cal.2d 365, 373--374, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 592, 432 P.2d 202, 208.) At the time of appellant's arrest the arresting officers knew: that a felony, presumably murder because of the multiple headwounds, had been committed; that six expended .32 caliber cartridge cases were found at the scene; that according to appellant's former girl friend, Renee Bennett, appellant had previously lived with her, they had subsequently broken up, but appellant was attempting to reestablish the relationship, appellant wanted her to stop her relationship with Hudson, appellant frequently carried a .32 caliber weapon, appellant and Hudson left her apartment together at approximately 10:45 p.m. on the night of the murder, appellant had a tendency to vomit when nervous and often ate hard red candy; that Hudson owned a Studebaker automobile; that Hudson's body was found between 11:30 p.m. and midnight by the highway patrol, approximately 22 miles from the Bennett apartment; that what appeared to be human vomit, with a piece of red candy in it, was found at the scene; that the car at the scene was a Studebaker; that a black man had been seen at the rear of Hudson's car; that appellant was a black man; that non-blacks had been seen in the area of Hudson's car; that during the interview of Miss Bennett her mother called to say that appellant was on his way over; that appellant drove into the driveway of the apartment complex during the interview, but, instead of attempting to see Miss Bennett, drove off.

Appellant argues that the officers did not have reasonable cause to arrest him and that any statements made subsequent to the allegedly invalid arrest could neither be used at his trial nor be used to support the issuance of a search warrant (Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; People v. Bilderbach (1965) 62 Cal.2d 757, 766--767, 44 Cal.Rptr. 313, 401 P.2d 921). Appellant, relying principally on People v. Fein (1971) 4 Cal.3d 747, 94 Cal.Rptr. 607, 484 P.2d 583, asserts that because the arrest was based primarily upon statements made by Miss Bennett, an informer of unproven reliability, the arrest cannot stand unless the statements were independently corroborated.

Appellant's reliance on People v. Fein is not justified, for the reasoning of that case is inapposite to the facts here. Although it is true that in Fein the police made an arrest based on two untested informants, the critical defect was that the police had only the informants' statements for Both the commission of the crime of selling narcotics and the defendant's involvement therein.

The prosecution, in People v. Fein, supra, attempted to establish the informants' reliability by the fact that certain information furnished proved to be correct, namely the location of the apartment where the defendant lived, his name, and the kind of car he drove; but the court held that 'in order for corroboration to be adequate, it must pertain to defendant's alleged Criminal activity; accuracy of information regarding the suspect generally is insufficient. (People v. Gallegos, 62 Cal.2d 176, 179, 41 Cal.Rptr. 590, 397 P.2d 174; People v. Reeves, 61 Cal.2d 268, 274, 38 Cal.Rptr. 1, 391 P.2d 393; People v. Abbott, 3 Cal.App.3d 966, 971, 84 Cal.Rptr. 40; People v. West, 3 Cal.App.3d 253, 256, 83 Cal.Rptr. 223.)' (4 Cal.3d p. 753, 94 Cal.Rptr. p. 611, 484 P.2d p. 587.)

Here, however, we have the existence of the crime, and many other facts relative thereto, clearly established; the only question is whether, at the time of the arrest, there was reasonable cause to believe defendant was the perpetrator. The corroboration necessary here 'need not itself amount to reasonable cause to arrest; its only purpose is to provide the element of 'reliability' missing when the police have had no prior experience with the informant. Accordingly, it is enough if it gives the officers reasonable grounds to believe the informant is telling the truth, For in this type of case the issue is 'not whether the information obtained by the officers emanated from a reliable source, but whether the officers could reasonably rely upon that information under the circumstances.' (People v. Sandoval (1966) 65 Cal.2d 303, 308--309, 54 Cal.Rptr. 123, 126, 419 [45 Cal.App.3d 207] P.2d 187, 190, citing Willson v. Superior Court (1956) 46 Cal.2d 291, 294--295, 294 P.2d 36.)' (People v. Lara, supra, 67 Cal.2d at pp. 374--375, 62 Cal.Rptr. at p. 593, 432 P.2d at p. 209; emphasis added.)

We find People v. Lara to be controlling. There an informant (who was in custody on an unrelated charge) told the police that: he had been given a ride by the murder victim on the day of the crime; the victim and he had encountered two men at a lumberyard who were also given a ride; he had been taken home, leaving the victim with the two men; later, one of the men earlier encountered at the lumberyard told him that he had shot the victim. There, as here, the defendants claimed there was no reasonable cause to arrest because there was no corroboration of the information that had come from an untested informant. The Supreme Court said the test, 'in this type of case' is not the reliability of the source but whether the 'officers could reasonably rely upon (the) information under the circumstances. (Citations.)' (P. 375, 62 Cal.Rptr. p. 593, 432 P.2d p. 439; emphasis added.) The corroboration there closely parallels the corroboration here. In Lara the court held that the officers could reasonably rely on the information, because 'the investigating officers knew independently of Meza's (arrestee's) information, that a felony had been committed. From the nature of the wounds they knew that Mitchell had been killed by one or more shotgun blasts; and from the fact he had been bound and shot in the back, they could reasonably infer the killing was murder. They could also infer that Mitchell's car had been involved in the perpetration of the crime, as it was...