People v. Turner
| Decision Date | 30 November 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 43604,43604 |
| Citation | 56 Ill.2d 201,306 N.E.2d 27 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. James A. TURNER, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Brizius & Nixon, Chicago, for appellant.
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago, (James B. Zagel, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Kenneth L. Gillis and Linda West Conley, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel,) for the People.
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County defendant, James A. Turner, was found guilty of the offenses of murder and attempt rape and sentenced to the penitentiary for consecutive terms of not less than 74 nor more than 125 years on the murder conviction, and not less than 10 nor more than 14 years on the conviction for attempt rape. The evidence shows that the partially clad body of the victim, Mrs. Sylvia Sewell, was found in the basement of her antique shop in Evanston, and that the cause of death was a severe laceration of the throat. The record is voluminous, defendant has briefed and argued a number of grounds for reversal, and the evidence and the contentions of the parties will be discussed only to the extent necessary to this opinion.
As grounds for reversal defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress two written confessions and in admitting them into evidence. He argues that they were not made voluntarily for the reason that there was no knowing and intelligent waiver of his right against self-incrimination. The record shows that in a competency hearing the jury found defendant competent to stand trial, that approximately one month later the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the confessions, and it was stipulated at that time 'that all the testimony that was heard prior to this time is all part of this record.' At the conclusion of the hearing the court found that there was no coercion, physical or mental, and denied the motion.
Testimony adduced at the competency and suppression hearings shows that at the age of 8 defendant entered the Polk State School for mentally retarded children in Pennsylvania and that his stay there was terminated when he escaped at the age of 18. On admission he scored 77 on an IQ test. Approximately 3 years later a second test indicated an overall IQ of 75 and a verbal IQ of 65. At the time he left the institution he had 'a borderline mental capacity.' At age 13 he had attained an educational level of between third and fourth grade. A clinical psychologist testified that on a Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale type of IQ test administered several months prior to the competency hearing defendant's verbal IQ score was 70 and that this placed him in the 'borderline intellectual range,' in the bottom 10 percentile of the population.
Two attorneys who had been appointed to represent defendant withdrew and testified at the competency hearing. They testified that defendant did not know the name of the Methodist Camp Grounds Hotel where he had most recently lived or its exact location, or the name or place of residence of his fiancee. He was unable to relate his activities or the names of persons whom he had seen on the day on which Mrs. Sewell was killed. He was unable to spell his middle name, Arthur.
In the course of investigating the case Evanston police officers learned that defendant and his employer had done some carpenter work in the deceased's shop approximately one month prior to her death, that a man fitting defendant's general description was seen in the vicinity on the day of the murder, that defendant had quit his job several days prior to the murder, that he had called his employer on the telephone concerning some wages due him and had called later to ask that his wages be mailed to an address in McKeesport, Pennsylvania. Two police officers went to McKeesport and at the request of a police officer there, defendant came to the police station at about 1:00 P.M. The police officers testified that defendant was told that they were from Evanston, Illinois, and were there investigating the murder of Mrs. Sewell. They advised defendant of his constitutional rights and shortly thereafter his sister came into the police station whereupon he was again advised of his rights. The police officers advised him that he was not required to return to Illinois with them but he agreed to do so voluntarily. He signed a waiver of extradition, and although defendant was then 25 years of age the police officers requested that his sister also sign the waiver, and she did so.
Although the police officers testified that defendant was not arrested until approximately 5:00 P.M. the next day, the record shows that defendant returned to Evanston by automobile with the police officers, arriving there at about 1:00 A.M., spent the rest of the night in a hotel room in Evanston under surveillance of two police officers, the next morning accompanied police officers to the office of John Reid & Associates where poloygraph tests were administered, and except while closeted with the polygraph examiner was never out of the presence of police officers. It was only after he had admitted to the polygraph examiner that he killed Mrs. Sewell that he was placed under arrest. Following the 'arrest,' an assistant State's Attorney took a question and answer statement. The statement was transcribed, and after conferring with the Evanston police officers, the assistant State's Attorney took another statement in order to 'correct' errors and misstatements made by defendant in the first statement.
The testimony shows that defendant was advised of his rights twice in Pennsylvania, twice while in the office of Reid & Associates, and four times by the assistant State's Attorney. The ploygraph examiner testified that at approximately 10:30 A.M. when he entered the examining room where defendant had been placed, defendant stated that he thought he should have a lawyer. The examiner told him that he would go tell the police officers, and defendant said he didn't need an attorney until the tests were completed. The examiner commenced a 'pre-test interview' which was suspended at 11:30 A.M. when two police officers took defendant to lunch. Defendant was returned to the Reid offices at 1:00 P.M. The tests were completed shortly before 3:00 P.M., at approximately 3:00 P.M. the polygraph examiner advised defendant of his Miranda rights and after an additional twenty minutes of interrogation he told defendant that the polygraph tests indicated that he had killed Mrs. Sewell. When defendant did not respond, the examiner talked to him further 'trying to persuade him to admit that he had been lying.' The confessions were signed by defendant approximately 34 hours after he first met the Evanston police officers in McKeesport.
The purpose of advising an accused of his rights is to enable him to make an intelligent decision, and to understand the consequences of that decision, and the fact that the advice was iterated and reiterated, and that he said he understood it, is of little consequence unless the defendant was possessed of the intelligence to understand the admonition. Although there is no doubt that defendant was advised of his rights as mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, the question presented by this record is whether he knowingly waived those rights. In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466, the Supreme Court said:
This court has long recognized that the mental capacity of a...
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