People v. Valencia

• Decision Date: 03 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. S095385.,S095385.
• Citation: 28 Cal.4th 1,120 Cal.Rptr.2d 131,46 P.3d 920
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Cuahutemoc Sanchez VALENCIA, Defendant and Appellant.

120 Cal.Rptr.2d 131

28 Cal.4th 1

46 P.3d 920

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Cuahutemoc Sanchez VALENCIA, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S095385.

Supreme Court of California.

June 3, 2002.

Chris Truax, La Mesa, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

John T. Philipsborn and Cliff Gardner, San Francisco, for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Megan J. Beale, Racquel M. Gonzalez, Crystal L. Bradley, Peter Quon, Jr., and Quisteen S. Shum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

GEORGE, C.J.

Under California law, the crime of burglary is committed when a person "enters any ... building," including a "house," "with intent to commit ... larceny or any felony." (Pen.Code,¹ § 459, italics added; see § 460.)

We granted review to determine whether penetration into the area behind a window screen amounts to an entry of a building within the meaning of the burglary statute when the window itself is closed and is not penetrated. As we shall explain, we conclude that it does. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which held to the contrary.

I

The evidence presented at defendant's trial for the crime of burglary, viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, reveals the following facts pertinent to the issue before us:

On the morning of February 4, 1998, Lee Florea left the house he shared with his wife and children in Santa Ana to go to work, with the doors and windows locked and the window screens secured in their tracks in front of the windows.

About noon, Nicky Nava, who lived across the street from the Floreas, came home for lunch. Looking out through a screen door, Nava saw a person later identified as defendant. As she watched, defendant, who apparently had a screwdriver in his hand, removed a window screen from a bathroom window of the Floreas' house and tried unsuccessfully to open the window itself. Evidently, defendant earlier had pulled a window screen away from a bedroom window of the Floreas' house and had tried unsuccessfully to open that window as well.

Nava called the Santa Ana Police Department and described defendant and his activities. As she continued to watch, moving at some point up to her screen door and then outside, defendant walked from the bathroom window of the Floreas' house and tried unsuccessfully to open the front door. Apparently in anger or frustration, defendant banged on the wall and then sat down for a few minutes. Defendant then got into an automobile, which resembled a gray or brown Monte Carlo or LTD, drove down the street about four houses away, parked, and got out. By this time, Santa Ana Police Officer John Douthit had arrived at the scene. Douthit approached defendant, who was standing in the driveway of the house in front of which he had parked. Douthit asked defendant whether he owned the automobile parked in front of the house, and defendant answered he did not; Douthit asked defendant what he was doing, and defendant answered he was looking for a friend he called "Tommy." Douthit then searched defendant's pants pocket and found a pair of black gloves and a screwdriver with a bent blade and shank. Through a police dispatcher, Douthit confirmed that defendant matched the description reported by Nava. Douthit then arrested defendant. Defendant protested that he had not done anything wrong, and that he merely had been looking for a friend, whom he now called "Tony," to help in locating a stolen bicycle.

Going to the Floreas' house, Officer Douthit found what appeared to be rub marks on the bathroom window that could have been made by defendant's hand or hands as he tried to open the window. Douthit also found several pry marks on the frame of the bedroom window that could have been made by defendant's screwdriver. Florea returned to his house about this time, finding the scene as described above. Douthit later determined that defendant did indeed own the automobile he had denied owning.

After the presentation of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on the offense of burglary. At the People's request, and over defendant's objection, the court gave the following instruction, drawn directly from People v. Nible (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 838, 247 Cal.Rptr. 396 (Nible) and indirectly from People v. Ravenscroft (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 639, 243 Cal.Rptr. 827 (Ravenscroft): "Any kind of entry, partial or complete, will satisfy the element of entry. The entry may be made by any part of the body or by use of an instrument or tool. In order for there to have been an entry, a part of the defendant's body or some instrument, tool or other object under his control must have penetrated the area inside where the screen was normally affixed in the window frame in question." (Italics added.) The court refused to give the following instruction, based upon language from Nible, which defendant requested and the People objected to: "The test of whether an entry has occurred is whether a reasonable person would believe a window screen provides some protection against unauthorized intrusions."

The jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of burglary and determining that the burglary was of the first degree because it involved an inhabited dwelling house (§ 460, subd. (a)). The trial court rendered a judgment of conviction on the jury's verdict, imposing a sentence of four years in prison.²

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that penetration into the area behind a window screen does not amount to an entry of a building within the meaning of the burglary statute, at least when, as in this case, the window itself is closed and is not penetrated. The Court of Appeal therefore concluded that the trial court erred by instructing the jury as requested by the People. The Court of Appeal also concluded that the trial court did not err by refusing to instruct as requested by defendant. The Court of Appeal went on to determine that, "[a]s a matter of law," defendant "was guilty only of attempted [first degree] burglary." As a consequence, the Court of Appeal reversed defendant's conviction and sentence for first degree burglary and remanded the cause to the trial court with directions to enter a conviction for attempted first degree burglary and to impose sentence accordingly.

We granted the People's petition for review in order to consider the validity of the Court of Appeal's holding. As stated above, we reach a conclusion contrary to that reached by the Court of Appeal and therefore reverse the judgment rendered by that court.

II

The crime of burglary is committed when a person "enters any ... building," including a "house," "with intent to commit ... larceny or any felony." (§ 459, italics added.)³ Burglary may be of the first or second degree,⁴ but in either event involves an entry into a building or other specified structure.

The issue before us is whether penetration into the area behind a window screen amounts to an entry of a building within the meaning of the burglary statute when the window itself is closed and is not penetrated. As we shall explain, we conclude that it does.

In People v. Davis (1998) 18 Cal.4th 712, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 958 P.2d 1083 (Davis), we recently had occasion to discuss the offense of burglary, including consideration of its historical background and its general contours today. Our discussion provides a useful starting point for addressing the rather narrow question presented in this case.

In Davis, we explained that "[t]he interest sought to be protected by the common law crime of burglary was clear. At common law, burglary was the breaking and entering of a dwelling in the nighttime. The law was intended to protect the sanctity of a person's home during the night hours when the resident was most vulnerable. As one commentator observed: `The predominant factor underlying common law burglary was the desire to protect the security of the home, and the person within his home. Burglary was not an offense against property, real or personal, but an offense against the habitation, for it could only be committed against the dwelling of another.... The dwelling was sacred, but a duty was imposed on the owner to protect himself as well as looking to the law for protection. The intruder had to break and enter; if the owner left the door open, his carelessness would allow the intruder to go unpunished. The offense had to occur at night; in the daytime home-owners were not asleep, and could detect the intruder and protect their homes.'" (Davis, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 720,76 Cal.Rptr.2d 770,958 P.2d 1083.)

We went on to explain in Davis that, "[i]n California, as in other states, the scope of the burglary law has been greatly expanded. There is no requirement of a breaking; an entry alone is sufficient. The crime is not limited to dwellings, but includes entry into a wide variety of structures. The crime need not be committed at night." (Davis, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 720-721, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 958 P.2d 1083.)

Nonetheless, as we added in Davis, the great expansion in the scope of the burglary law has not been unlimited. "In People v. Gauze (1975) 15 Cal.3d 709, 125 Cal. Rptr. 773, 542 P.2d 1365, we ... observed that `[a] burglary remains an entry which invades a possessory interest in a building.' [Citation.] ... `"Burglary laws are based primarily upon a recognition of the dangers to personal safety created by the usual burglary situation—the danger that the intruder will harm the occupants in attempting to perpetrate the intended crime or to escape and the danger that the occupants will in anger or panic react violently to the invasion, thereby inviting more violence. The laws are primarily designed, then, not to deter the trespass and the intended...