People v. Valentine
Decision Date | 01 March 2001 |
Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff,<BR>v.<BR>JUAN VALENTINE, Defendant. |
Court | New York Supreme Court |
Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney of Bronx County (Ben Rivera of counsel), for plaintiff.
William K. Schwarz, Bronx, for defendant.
The court has before it two submissions from the District Attorney's office, both purporting to be the People's motion to reargue this court's decision and order of December 22, 2000 by which, pursuant to CPL 30.30, the indictment against the defendant was dismissed because the People were not ready to proceed to trial within the allowable period of 184 days. The first submission is date-stamped by the Clerk's office "RECEIVED JAN 18 2001" and consists of the assigned Assistant District Attorney's (A.D.A.) affirmation (with exhibits), but not a notice of motion. The last paragraph on the first page of the affirmation states that "this matter is next scheduled to be heard in Part 47 on January 22, 2001." The affidavit is dated January 10, 2001.
The second submission is not stamped by the Clerk's office, but it does contain (an undated but signed) notice of motion, setting a return date for the motion of February 5, 2001. The accompanying affirmation of the A.D.A. appears to be identical in all respects to the first submission, including the date of January 10, 2001 and an original signature, except that the last paragraph on the first page now reads that "this matter is next scheduled to be heard in Part 47 on February 5, 2001."
In fact, the case was not on this court's calendar on either of the dates mentioned in the A.D.A.'s affidavit. Rather, the parties appeared on January 10, 2001 and again on February 1, 2001. On the earlier of these dates the motion had not yet been filed, so the case was adjourned in anticipation of it. On the February 1st date, defense counsel had just received the moving papers and the matter was adjourned to February 14, 2001, so that he could submit a response on Mr. Valentine's behalf. The defense papers were duly received and, despite the procedural irregularities of the moving papers, the matter was then deemed fully submitted for consideration on the merits on Valentine's Day.
This court's prior decision determined that, of the 442 days that elapsed from the criminal court arraignment to the filing of the speedy trial motion, there were 205 days of chargeable time. Conceding all of the other rulings in the decision and order, the People base this motion solely on one adjournment period—March 1, 2000 to April 27, 2000—which they contend should not have been included in calculating the state of the People's readiness. If this 57-day period is excluded, the total amount of chargeable time would be just 148 days, well within the permissible time period of 184 days.
In the People's original response to the CPL 30.30 motion, they asserted that on March 1, 2000 the defendant's previous attorney had moved in court to be relieved and the case was then adjourned several times for new counsel to be assigned pursuant to article 18-B of the County Law. The People argued that (People's affirmation, dated Nov. 6, 2000, ¶ 11 [emphasis omitted].)
After this written response, at the hearing held on November 20, 2000, the prosecutor repeated this argument. The defendant's present defense counsel responded that on March 1, 2000 he had been appointed to represent the defendant contemporaneous to the withdrawal of the prior attorney. He also pointed out that the People were not in fact ready to proceed, and he had been present on each of the subsequent adjourn dates of April 27, June 5, June 15, July 11, July 20, and July 24, 2000, but the People were not ready on any of those dates, either. Notably, the A.D.A. agreed that he had not been ready to proceed on any of those dates, only arguing that just the specific adjourn periods requested by him should be included, but not the entire length of each of the adjournments.
This court's decision of December 22, 2000, relying upon the minutes of March 1, 2000, confirmed defense counsel's assertion that he was appointed in court that day and concluded that there was no basis to apply the rule that excludes a period where the defendant is "without counsel through no fault of the court" (CPL 30.30 [4] [f]). In addition, the decision noted that court records confirm that the case was adjourned solely because the People were not ready on March 1, 2000 to proceed with the Wade hearing. Accordingly, because the prosecutor was not ready and did not make a specific request for when the case should be adjourned to, all time was found to be a proper charge to the People.
In support of the motion to reargue, the assigned Assistant still does not deny that he was unprepared on March 1st to proceed with the Wade hearing, but he now makes multiple arguments as to why this period should be excluded. First, he contends that because new defense counsel was not going to receive the discovery materials from the outgoing attorney until the following day (as the minutes reflect), the adjournment to late April was "to permit the new attorney to familiarize himself with the case and for the relieved attorney to turnover [sic] the necessary paperwork." (People's affirmation, dated Jan. 10, 2001, at 3.) He continues: (Id., at 3-4 [citations omitted].)
Second, the People now argue that because defense counsel had not received the discovery material, and it was made plain on the record that new counsel would have to retain an investigator, the defendant was "effectively without counsel and also not ready to proceed." (Id., at 4.)
Third, the People now argue that because the prior attorney made a motion to be relieved and it was granted, "[t]he People are not required to be ready during which time there is a pending motion before the Court, which is made for the benefit of the defendant." (Id.) Last, the People argue that they are "also entitled to a reasonable adjournment following a decision on a motion made by the defense for the defendant's benefit." (Id.)
In response, defense counsel first points out that "[t]he People do not contest the fact that they did not have a witness available to testify at the hearing on that date and thus were not ready." (Affirmation of defense counsel, dated Feb. 12, 2001, at 2.) Counsel then states[1] that the People's "argument is a distortion of what actually occurred" on March 1, 2000.
(Id., at 2-3.)
Preliminarily, attention must be given to the nature of the present motion, which is labeled a motion to reargue. CPLR 2221 was revised in 1999 (L 1999, ch 281) to clearly define the elements of motions to reargue or renew, and to require that counsel precisely label the motion as what it is.
In contrast, a "motion for leave to renew:
Finally, subdivision (f) of CPLR 2221 provides for a "combined motion for leave to reargue and leave to renew" where both appropriately define the nature of the application. Such a multifaceted motion "shall identify separately and support separately each item of relief sought." (CPLR 2221 [f].)
The People's motion is not properly labeled a motion to reargue because, although adhering to the earlier legal assertion that the defendant was "without counsel through no fault of the court," within the meaning of CPL 30.30 (4) (f), the People now recognize and argue from the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
People v. Bauza
...justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion." See C.P.L.R. § 2221(e); see also People v Valentine, 187 Misc.2d 582 (Sup Ct Bronx County, 2001) (Price, J.). The defendant raises a question concerning the admissibility of evidence presented to the Grand Jury, which......
-
People v. Bauza
...justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion." See C.P.L.R. § 2221(e) ; see also People v Valentine , 187 Misc 2d 582 (Sup Ct Bronx County, 2001) (Price, J.).The defendant raises a question concerning the admissibility of evidence presented to the Grand Jury, whic......
-
People v. Olds, 2008 NY Slip Op 50852(U) (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 4/28/2008)
... ... McCaffery 78 AD2d 1003, 03-04(4th Dept.,1980). Compare People v. Middlemiss, 198 AD2d 755, 56-57(3rd Dept.,1993)("a week to 10 days" sufficient time to reschedule a hearing) and People v. Valentine 187 Misc 2d 582, 89-90(,2001) ("there is no articulable basis for allowing the People "preparation" time where the substitution of counsel did not require the A.D.A. to prepare for anything other than getting the witness he was already, repeatedly, unable to do.") ... 9. See CPL § 60.10(CPLR ... ...