People v. Valentino

• Decision Date: 13 June 1974
• Citation: 78 Misc.2d 678,356 N.Y.S.2d 962
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Rudolph VALENTINO, Defendant.
• Court: New York County Court

Page 962

356 N.Y.S.2d 962

78 Misc.2d 678

PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Rudolph VALENTINO, Defendant.

Nassau County Court, Special Term, Part I.

June 13, 1974.

William Cahn, Dist. Atty., Nassau County, Mineola, for plaintiff.

James J. McDonough, Atty. in Charge, Legal Aid Society of Nassau County, New York Crim. Div., Mineola, for defendant.

BERNARD TOMSON, Judge.

Following a psychiatric examination pursuant to CPL § 730.30(1), two psychiatrists reported to this court that the defendant was competent to stand trial. The defendant exercised his prerogative under CPL § 730.30(2) and a hearing was held on April 16, 1974. The two psychiatrists from the Nassau County Medical Center who had conducted the examination testified that the defendant was not an 'incapacitated person' within the meaning of CPL § 730.10(1). A psychiatrist called by the defendant testified that he found the defendant to be incapacitated.

"Incapacitated person' means a defendant who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense.' (CPL § 730.10(1)). All three psychiatrists agreed that the defendant is suffering from a mental disease or defect. The area of disagreement centers upon the remainder of the statutory test, namely, the defendant's 'capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense.' The testimony on these points pointed up the conclusion that the phrases 'understand the proceedings' and 'assist in his own defense' were not assigned a common meaning by the psychiatrists. ¹

According to Blackstone, it was the common law rule that

'In criminal cases, therefore, idiots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, if committed when under these incapacities; no, not even for treason itself. Also, if a man in his sound 'mind' commits an offense, and before arraignment for it he becomes mad, he ought not to be 'called on to plead to it, because he is unable to do so' with that advice and caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his defense?' (4 Blackstone's Commentaries 24).

The answer to Blackstone's rhetorical question is, of course, that a madman cannot 'make his defense' and that was the very task assigned him in the common law trial by jury. Not until the passage of a statute in 1837 did the defendant charged with a felony win the right to be represented by counsel. (4 Blackstone's Commentaries 359; Plunknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, at 435).

It appears that in the 1840's, New York cast the common law rule in statutory form by requiring that 'no insane person can be tried, sentenced to any punishment, or punished for any crime or offense while he continues in that state.' (Cited as 2 R.S. 697, § 2, in Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9, 19). This rephrasing of Blackstone could have been interpreted as an absolute rule barring the trial of any 'insane person', but such was not the construction given it. In Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9, 24--25, the court ruled as follows:

'The statute, before cited, is emphatic that 'no insane person can be tried.' In its terms the prohibition is broad enough to reach every possible state of insanity, so that, if the words be taken literally, no person while laboring under insanity in any form, however partial and limited it may be, can be put upon his trial. But this the legislature could not have intended; for, although a person totally bereft of reason cannot be fit subject for trial or punishment, it by no means follows that one whose insanity is limited to some particular object or conceit, his mind in other respects being free from disease, can justly claim the like exemption.

. . . The common law, equally with this statute, forbids the trial of any person in a state of insanity. This is clearly shown by authorities which have been referred to, and which also show the reason for the rule, to wit, the incapacity of one who is insane to make a rational defense. The statute is an affirmance of this common law principle, and the reason on which the rule rests furnishes a key to what must have been the intention of the legislature. If, therefore, a person arraigned for a crime, is capable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings going on against him, if he rightly comprehends his own condition in reference to such proceedings, and can conduct his defense in a rational manner he is, for the purpose of being tried, to be deemed sane, although on some other subjects his mind may be deranged or unsound.'

The court at this early stage in our legal history thus resisted the allurements of a flat rule making sanity the sole criterion and opted instead for a functional approach. It was left for the jury to determine whether the defendant possessed sufficient capacity to stand trial. (Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9, 27).

Competency to stand trial is a question of law and fact and should not be the subject of a contest between psychiatric experts. (See Wieter v. Settle, 193 F.Supp. 318, 322 (W.D.Mo., 1961)). 'The real issue here is the injection by the psychiatrist of his own ethical standards into this value-judgment so as to usurp a function which is not a medical but a legal one.' (Cooper, Fitness to Proceed: A Brief Look at Some Aspects of the Medico-Legal Problem Under the New York Criminal Procedure Law, 52 Neb.L.Rev. 44, 58 and see 5461 (1972)). Consequently, from the time of Freeman v. People to the present, New York courts have weighed psychiatric testimony applying Legal tests to determine whether defendants were competent to stand trial. (e.g., People v. DeFrancesco, 20 Misc.2d 854, 193 N.Y.S.2d 963; People v. Greene, 203 Misc. 191, 116 N.Y.S.2d 561. See also People v. Wolfe, 198 Misc. 695, 103 N.Y.S.2d 479, vacated 199 Misc. 413, 102 N.Y.S.2d 12, rev'd 278 App.Div. 967, 105 N.E.2d 540, aff'd 303 N.Y. 752, 103 N.E.2d 540). 'Competency, in the final analysis, is a Legal issue which must be determined by the court with the assistance of the medical expert. It is an abdication by the courts of their prerogative to blindly follow psychiatric pronouncements which may be based on a partial or total lack of understanding of the issues involved in a determination of legal, not medical, competence for trial.' (Rosenberg, Competency for Trial: A Problem in Interdisciplinary Communication, 53 Judicature 316, 321 (1970)).

Unquestionably, psychiatric testimony is essential to any intelligent evaluation of a defendant's capacity to stand trial. The problems posed by its use are traceable more to the imprecision of the legal standard than to any doubts about the validity of the psychiatric discipline. While variously phrased, the standard for competency at trial has always been a composite of legal and medical concepts. (See CPL § 730.10(1); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824; People v. Francabandera, 33 N.Y.2d 429, 435--436, 354 N.Y.S.2d 609, 614, 310 N.E.2d 292, 295; People ex rel. Malone v. Johnston, 37 A.D.2d 585, 323 N.Y.S.2d 246, People ex rel. Fazio v. McNeill, 4 A.D.2d 686, 164 N.Y.S.2d 156; People v. Posey, 74 Misc.2d 149, 343 N.Y.S.2d 532; People v. Swallow, 60 Misc.2d 171, 175--177, 301 N.Y.S.2d 798, 802--804; People ex rel. Bernstein v. McNeill, Sup., 48 N.Y.S.2d 764). The psychiatrist's expertise is medical, not legal, despite the invention of 'forensic psychiatry'.

A psychiatric finding of incompetence to stand trial must be made upon an official form adopted by the judicial conference. (CPL § 730.10(9)). The form requires a 'detailed statement of the reasons for (the) opinion by making particular reference to those aspects of the proceeding wherein the defendant lacks capacity to understand or to assist in his own defense.' (CPL § 730.10(9)). It was hoped that the forms would 'furnish a court with meaningful data and . . . promote a uniform administration of the 'fitness to proceed' standard . . .' (Commission Staff Comment to CPL § 730.10). This hope is not entirely realized. By merely restating the statutory requirements, too much reliance is placed upon the psychiatrist's knowledge of the nature of legal proceedings and of the defendant's role in them. (22A NYCRR, App. A--7, form DMH 704 (4--72) JC). The form is of no assistance where the court-ordered psychiatric report finds the defendant competent since the detailed statement is required only where the finding is one of incapacity. ²

For some time writers have been urging courts to adopt meaningful tests for competency at trial and a functional approach which focuses upon the defendant's true role in his own defense. (Bacon, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Commitment to an Inclusive Test, 42 So.Cal.L.Rev. 444 (1969); Bennett, Competency to Stand Trial: A Call for Reform, 59 J.Crim.L.C. & P.S., 569 (1968); Note 81 Harv.L.Rev. 454 (1967)). Such a test would limit psychiatric testimony to the medical sphere by defining the defendant's role and merely asking of the expert whether the defendant can perform the tasks assigned him. The drafters of the Criminal Procedure Law appear to have envisioned such a test when they delegated to the judicial conference the responsibility for drawing a psychiatric report form designed to elicit specific information. In People v. Francabandera, 33 N.Y.2d 429, 354 N.Y.S.2d 609, 310 N.E.2d 292, the Court of Appeals too adopted such an approach by analyzing an amnesiac's competency for trial in terms of fairness considered in light of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.

In determining competency there has been a tendency to assign the defendant a key role at trial and to demand of him at times what may be too high a level of performance. (People v. Swallow, 60 Misc.2d 171, 301 N.Y.S.2d 156; People ex rel. Butler v. McNeill, 30 Misc.2d 722, 219 N.Y.S.2d 722; People ex rel. Bernstein v. McNeill, Sup., 48 N.Y.S.2d 764)....