People v. Van Gorden

• Decision Date: 24 April 1964
• Citation: 38 Cal.Rptr. 265,226 Cal.App.2d 634
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Vine VAN GORDEN et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 27395.

Page 265

38 Cal.Rptr. 265

226 Cal.App.2d 634

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Vine VAN GORDEN et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 27395.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

April 24, 1964.

Rehearing Denied May 18, 1964.

Hearing Denied June 16, 1964.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., Howard S. Goldin, Asst. Atty. Gen., N. B. Peek, Don G. Kircher, Deputy Attys. Gen., for appellant.

Andre & Wood and Richard D. Wood, San Luis Obispo, for respondents.

HERNDON, Acting Presiding Justice.

The plaintiff State of California appeals from the judgment of dismissal entered against it in its action seeking to condemn certain parcels of land for state park purposes. The trial court, sitting without a jury in the trial of the preliminary legal issues relating to public use and necessity, found that the condemnation was for a 'public use,' but that there was no public necessity for the acquisition of the land described in the complaint.

'Generally, statutory requirements of necessity as a condition of the exercise of the power of eminent domain are liberally construed by the courts so as not to limit unnecessarily the power of the condemning agency. * * * The cases above reflect the general rule as stated in 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 90, p. 886: "'Necessity,' within the rule that the particular property to be appropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and property owner consistent with such benefit, although it does not include the taking of land which may merely render the employment of the improvement more convenient or less expensive, or for a necessity which is merely colorable."' (City of Hawthorne v. Peebles, 166 Cal.App.2d 758, 761, 333 P.2d 442, 444. See also Monterey County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. v. Hughes, 201 Cal.App.2d 197, 213-214, 20 Cal.Rptr. 252.)

Although a condemnor must allege and prove necessity (Code of Civil Procedure, §§ 1241(2) and 1244(3)) in takings for the extension, improvement or development of the state park system, such necessity is established initially and prima facie by the filing of a declaration of the Director of Parks and Recreation. Section 5006.1 of the Public Resources Code expressly provides:

'The declaration of the director shall be prima facie evidence: (a) Of the public necessity of such proposed acquisition. (b) That such real or personal property or interest therein is necessary therefor. (c) That such proposed acquisition is planned or located in a manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.'

'Prima facie evidence is that degree of evidence which suffices for proof of a particular fact until contradicted and overcome, as it may be, by other evidence, direct or indirect. For example, the certificate of a recorder is prima facie evidence of a record, although it may afterwards be rejected on proof that there is no such record. And a bank account is prima facie evidence of the transactions properly recorded therein. But the effect of prima facie evidence is not destroyed merely by the introduction of contradictory evidence. It stands as proof of the fact until it is both contradicted and overcome by other evidence.' (18 Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 18, p. 435.)

In the instant action, appellant introduced in evidence the declaration of the director in conformity with section 5006.1 and rested. Appellant was entitled to judgment as prayed until and unless the prima facie case which it had made was thereafter overcome by the introduction of sufficient contrary evidence. Respondents introduced no evidence on the subject in the form of testimony of their own witnesses but called two employees of appellant under the provisions of section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The first such witness, a land agent for the state, was able to supply no substantial information bearing in any way upon any of the issues involved. The second witness, Richard A. May, Regional Supervisor of Planning and Development, answered various questions regarding the issues to the extent that his limited knowledge and authority permitted. That is, he testified that above him in rank and authority were the Supervisor of Planning and Development, the Department Chief of the Division of Beaches and Parks, Technical Services, the Chief of the Division of Beaches and Parks, and, finally, the Director of the Department of Parks and Recreation. His sole concern was the development of a plan to utilize the land which the department theretofore had determined to acquire.

In addition, he had not been serving in his present capacity at the time the original study of the area had been made and approved by the then State Park Commission. However, he had made a 'follow-up' study in the matter, and, insofar as his personal knowledge was concerned, he approved of and agreed with the conclusions earlier reached by his superiors. Nothing whatsoever is found in his testimony which in any way conflicts with the disputable presumption created by section 5006.1 by the filing of the director's declaration.

Nevertheless, at the close of this phase of the proceeding, the trial court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 'FINDINGS OF FACT 1. That the property described in the complaint is being condemned for a public use. 2. That there is no public necessity for the acquisition of the property described in the complaint in this action. From the foregoing facts, the court concludes: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 1. Defendants and each of them are entitled to judgment of dismissal against the plaintiff, together with costs.'

Although the mere statement of the ultimate legal issue to be determined in the form of a finding of fact is generally inappropriate (cf. Bellerue v. Business Files Institute, Inc., 215 Cal.App.2d 383, 395, 30 Cal.Rptr. 232), it is the general rule that it is sufficient to find upon the ultimate and determinative issues of fact. (Cf. Nisbet v. Rhinehart, 2 Cal.2d 477, 482, 42 P.2d 71; Hannah v. Canty, 175 Cal. 763, 769, 167 P. 373.) However, even where permissible, such 'findings of fact' obviously are of little aid to an appellate court in determining the propriety of the trial court's determination. In such circumstances any expression of the trial court's reasoning assumes great importance. In the instant case, the rules restated in Ehrenreich v. Shelton, 213 Cal.App.2d 376, 378-379, 28 Cal.Rptr. 855, 856-857, are particularly apposite:

'It is a general rule, of course, that the judgment of a trial court will not be disturbed even though in arriving at that judgment the trial court may rely upon erroneous reasoning. [Citation.] It is held in this state that although the reasons reflected in an opinion of the trial court are not ordinarily effective to disturb the final judgment, nevertheless the appellate court may inspect that opinion in order to determine the processes of reasoning by which the trial court arrived at the result. [Citations.] In a number of cases, however, it has been held that where the record reflects that in arriving at the result of which appellant complains, the trial court relied upon erroneous reasoning and except for that reliance would probably not have reached such result, then a judgment may properly be reversed. [Citations.]

'In the instant case the erroneous ...