People v. Vandersee

• Decision Date: 23 February 1956
• Docket Number: Cr. 5488
• Citation: 139 Cal.App.2d 388,294 P.2d 77
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent. v. Arnold E. VANDERSEE, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 77

294 P.2d 77

139 Cal.App.2d 388

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent. v. Arnold E. VANDERSEE, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 5488.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

Feb. 23, 1956.

Hearing Denied March 21, 1956.

Matthews & Hill, John J. Hamilton, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

WHITE, Presiding Justice.

In an information containing six counts, filed by the District Attorney of Los Angeles County, defendant was accused in Counts I, III, V and VI with violations of section 405 of the Labor Code of California, while Counts II and IV charged the crime of grand theft.

Following the entry of not guilty pleas to all counts charged in the information, trial by jury was duly waived and it was stipulated that the cause by submitted on the transcript of testimony adduced at the preliminary examination. Exhibits were admitted into evidence and filed and the trial continued to July 22, 1954. After several continuances the trial was finally set for March 16, 1955, upon which date defendant moved to withdraw his plea of not guilty to Counts I and VI (violations of sections of section 405 of the State Labor Code). As to these counts, pursuant to stipulation, a mistrial was declared and the previous order of submission upon the preliminary examination transcript was vacated. Defendant thereupon pleaded guilty to Counts I and VI and the matter was referred to the probation department for report and recommendation. When the cause was again called on June 28, 1955, defendant made a motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty theretofore entered as to Counts I and VI. The motion was denied and defendant sentenced to State Prison. The remaining four counts were dismissed.

From the 'Judgment and sentence on Counts one and six', and from the order denying his 'motion to vacate pleas of guilty', defendant prosecutes this appeal.

In urging a reversal appellant relies solely upon his challenge to the constitutionality of sections 405 and 406 of the Labor Code, to the violation of which he pleaded guilty. He grounds this attack upon the claim that these sections 'interfere with and violate the right of persons to contract and is not a proper subject matter under the police power of the legislature affecting all classes of persons.'

It is appellant's contention that the aforesaid Labor Code sections being unconstitutional the judgment is void, and should be reversed with directions to the court below to dismiss the information.

Section 405 of the Labor Code provides as follows: 'Any property put up by any employee or applicant as a bond shall not be used for any purpose other than liquidating accounts between the employer and employee or for return to the employee or applicant and shall be held in trust for this purpose and not mingled with the property of the employer. No contract between the employer and employee or applicant shall abrogate the provisions of this section. Any employer or prospective employer, or agent or officer thereof, who misappropriates any such property, mingles it with his own, or uses it for any other purpose than that herein set forth is guilty of theft and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Penal Code relating to theft.'

Section 406 of the same code reads: 'Any property put up by an employee, or applicant as a part of the contract of employment, directly or indirectly, shall be deemed to be put up as a bond and is subject to the provisions of this article whether the property is put up on a note or as a loan or an investment and regardless of the wording of the agreement under which it is put up.'

Appellant's basic objection to the foregoing statutes is that they constitute an invalid invasion of freedom of contract. However, the validity of legislation impinging upon the right of contract is to be judged from its tendeny to promote the general good. And legislation which is enacted with the object of promoting the welfare of large classes of workers whose personal services constitute their means of livelihood must certainly be regarded as of direct and vital concern to every community and as calculated to confer direct or indirect benefits upon the people as a whole, thereby coming within the proper exercise of the police power, seeking as it does to promote the welfare of a large class against a real and existing danger. De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 67 Cal.App.2d 225, 235-237, 153 P.2d 983.

The very design and purpose of the statutes here in question was to forestall a very real danger of fraud, and embezzlement, as well as danger of misappropriation of the funds of an employee deposited with an employer in trust. The self-evident purpose of the legislation here under consideration is to protect that larger portion of the public who are employees and who, in many intances, are forced through economic necessity to find employment by meeting whatever requirements are set by a prospective employer. Under such conditions, employer and employee do not deal on an equal footing, and the force of economic conditions opens the way for fraudulent practices which the legislation here under attack seeks to abate.

Furthermore, an attack upon the constitutionality of the aforesaid Labor Code provisions, an attack analogous to the one here urged by appellant, was made in People v. Pond, 44 Cal.2d 665, 675-676, 284 P.2d 793, 799, wherein the Supreme Court declared the sections constitutional. In so holding, the court noted, 'Defendant urges that sections 402 through 406 of the Labor Code violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution and the provision of section 1 of article I of our state Constitution that 'all men * * * have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of * * * acquiring, possessing, and protecting property * * *', and that these Labor Code sections cannot be justified under the police power.

'As defendant says, the sections limit the right of contract between employer and employee. However, we agree with the following reasoning of Presiding Judge Shaw, speaking for the Appellate Department of the Superior Court in People v. McEntyre, 1938, 32 Cal.App.2d Supp. 752, 755-756, 84 P.2d 560, where the...