People v. Vann

• Decision Date: 31 July 1974
• Docket Number: Cr. N
• Citation: 115 Cal.Rptr. 352,524 P.2d 824,12 Cal.3d 220
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 524 P.2d 824 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jack VANN et al., Defendants and Appellants. o. 17450. In Bank

Page 352

115 Cal.Rptr. 352

12 Cal.3d 220, 524 P.2d 824

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jack VANN et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Cr. No. 17450.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

July 31, 1974.

G. Kip Edwards, San Francisco, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Lascher & Rader, Edward L. Lascher, and Richard E. Rader, Ventura, for defendants and appellants.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., W. Eric Collins and Eugene Kaster, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

WRIGHT, Chief Justice.

Defendants appeal from orders granting probation after jury verdicts finding them guilty of receiving stolen property. (Pen.Code, § 496.) ¹ They contend, inter alia, that the trial court prejudicially erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the prosecution's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that the contention is meritorious and reverse the orders.

In July 1970 11 handguns were stolen from the residence of a gun collector during the course of a burglary. The following month Peter Brambini purchased three handguns from a stranger and, in the same month, sold or pawned them to defendant Vann for $50. In September Vann delivered the guns to defendant Fowler for safekeeping.

In October an undercover police officer met with Vann and proposed to purchase a gun for a purported illegal purpose. He was invited into Vann's automobile where he was advised that the guns in Vann's possession were 'hot.' ² Vann then drove to the bail bond office of Fowler. When Vann was satisfied that only Fowler and his wife were present in the office, he asked Fowler to bring in 'those guns.' Fowler left the room and returned with a bag containing several guns, from which the officer selected a .38 caliber revolver. After bargaining with Vann he settled on a purchase price of $65 and took possession of the weapon. The gun purchased by the officer was one of the guns stolen from the residence of the gun collector in July. ³

In November police searched Fowler's home and office pursuant to a search warrant. In a bag under Fowler's bed they found a .45 caliber pistol and a .38 caliber revolver, both of hwich had been stolen from the residence of the gun collector in July.

Vann, upon his arrest on the same day as the search of Fowler's premises and after being duly advised of his constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent, described the circumstances of his purchase of guns from Brambini in August. He stated that Brambini and a companion, variously described on different occasions by Vann, pawned the guns for a $35 loan. When Brambini did not return to redeem the guns Vann concluded that they were stolen. Vann also acknowledged that he had told the undercover officer that the gun purchased by the latter could be 'hot.'

Both defendants testified at the trial. In partial contradiction of the foregoing account, Vann denied that he told the police officer that the guns were stolen and maintained that he stated only that he did not know whether the guns were stolen. He conceded that he suspected that they may have been stolen when Brambini did not return to redeem them, but he claimed that he did not convey his suspicions to the police officer. Vann also testified that he dealt not with Brambini but with Brambini's companion and that six, not three, guns were pawned for the $35 loan.

Fowler denied any knowledge that the guns delivered to him by Vann were stolen. He also testified, and in this respect he was corroborated by Vann, that he did not inform the officer that he had a safe filled with 'hot' watches and rings belonging to Vann. Fowler conceded that he may have said 'Mum's the word' when the officer left.

The initial contention with which we deal is that the verdicts are not supported by substantial evidence. In order to establish the commission of the crime of receiving stolen property it must be established by substantial evidence (1) that the particular property was stolen, (2) that the accused received, concealed or withheld it from the owner thereof, and (3) that the accused knew the property was stolen. (People v. Stuart (1969), 272 Cal.App.2d 653, 656, 77 Cal.Rptr. 531; People v. Siegfried (1967), 249 Cal.App.2d 489, 493, 57 Cal.Rptr. 423.) It is manifest that the first two of the three elements of the crimes are conclusively established and defendants do not contend otherwise. It is urged, however, as to the third element, that the evidence falls short of establishing actual knowledge that the guns were stolen.

Knowledge that property was stolen can seldom be proved by direct evidence and resort must often be made to circumstantial evidence. However, no distinction is made between direct and circumstantial evidence in the degree of proof required. (People v. Stuart, supra, 272 Cal.App.2d 653, 656, 77 Cal.Rptr. 531.) 'Possession of recently stolen property is so incriminating that to warrant conviction there need only be, in addition to possession, slight corroboration in the form of statements or conduct of the defendant tending to show his guilt. (Citations.)' (People v. McFarland (1962), 58 Cal.2d 748, 754, 26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 476, 376 P.2d 449, 452.)

There is abundant corroboration in the instant case as will appear from the following summary: the guns in question were acquired at a grossly inadequate price (see People v. Clausen (1898), 120 Cal. 381, 382--383, 52 P. 658; People v. Malouf (1955), 135 Cal.App.2d 697, 706, 287 P.2d 834); the weapons were concealed by both Vann and Fowler (see People v. Gould (1952), 111 Cal.App.2d 1, 6, 243 P.2d 809); both defendants engaged in furtive conduct when dealing with the undercover officer; conflicts were present in Vann's several accounts of his acquisition of the property (see People v. Roberts (1960), 182 Cal.App.2d 431, 436, 6 Cal.Rptr. 161); most significantly, Vann told the undercover police officer that the guns were 'hot,' and acknowledged to other officers at the time of his arrest that he had concluded that the guns were stolen. He even testified that he suspected that they may have been stolen. Fowler, of course, maintained possession of contraband delivered to him by Vann and, according to the undercover officer, described some of it as 'hot.' ⁴

In reviewing a judgment of conviction, an appellate court, of course, must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and presume in support of that judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Sweeney (1960), 55 Cal.2d 27, 33, 9 Cal.Rptr. 793, 357 P.2d 1049.) The test is whether there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact (People v. Redmond (1969), 71 Cal.2d 745, 755, 79 Cal.Rptr. 529, 457 P.2d 31), and we conclude that there is such evidence.

We do not hold herein that, as a matter of law, the jurors were Required to find on the conflicting evidence that defendants had knowledge that the guns in their possession were stolen. For example, had the jurors elected to disbelieve the testimony of the undercover officer whose credibility had been attacked by defendants, they might have concluded, particularly as to Fowler, that the prosecution had not carried its burden of proving such necessary element beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendants thus were entitled to have the jurors fully instructed as to their responsibility in making their findings. Any material failure to give such instructions would constitute reversible error.

Apparently through inadvertence the trial court failed to include in its charge to the jury any specific instruction that the defendants were presumed to be innocent and that the prosecution had the burden of proving their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (See CALJIC No. 2.90 (3d rev. ed. 1970).) This basic principle is declared in section 1096. ⁵ Even though no such instruction is requested, the court must nevertheless instruct Sua sponte on those general principles of law which are closely and openly connected with the facts and are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case. (People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 531, 83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390.)

Citing People v. Soldavani (1941), 45 Cal.App.2d 460, 463, 114 P.2d 415 and People v. Benjamin (1970), 3 Cal.App.3d 687, 699, 83 Cal.Rptr. 764, the People contend, however, that the failure to give the standard instruction is not prejudicial error where the point is otherwise covered and the jury is aware that the People are required to prove the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In support of their proposition the People rely on an instruction on circumstantial evidence by which the jurors were told they could not find defendants guilty 'based on circumstantial evidence unless the proved circumstances are not only consistent with the theory that the defendant is guilty of the crime, but cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion and each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish a defendant's guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' Although the foregoing instruction states, albeit indirectly, that an accused cannot be convicted on circumstantial evidence except where such evidence proves the issue beyond a reasonable doubt, it fails to tell the jurors that a determination of guilt resting on direct testimony must also be resolved beyond a reasonable doubt.

The prosecution in the instant case depended in large part on direct evidence, the testimony of the undercover officer and the resolution of the conflict between such testimony and that of defendants as to what occurred in Fowler's office. An instruction which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt only as to circumstantial evidence, rather than importing a need for the same degree of proof where the crime is sought to be established by...