People v. Veach

• Docket Number: SC 160469,SC 160470 S.C. 160471,COA 342394,COA 342395,COA 342396
• Decision Date: 28 July 2023
• Parties: PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY JOSEPH VEACH, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY JOSEPH VEACH, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. SC 160469, SC 160470 S.C. 160471

COA 342394, COA 342395, COA 342396

Supreme Court of Michigan

July 28, 2023

Macomb CC: 2017-000447-FC 2017-001859-FC 2017-001865-FC

Elizabeth T. Clement, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra David F Viviano Richard H. Bernstein Megan K. Cavanagh Elizabeth M Welch Kyra H. Bolden, Justices

ORDER

On March 1, 2023, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the October 15, 2019 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered. MCR 7.305(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals and REMAND this case to the Macomb Circuit Court for a new trial.

The Court of Appeals erred by holding that defendant's right to a public trial was not violated. The right to public trial is secured by the United States and Michigan Constitutions but is not unlimited. People v Davis, 509 Mich. 52, 66 (2022). Generally speaking, "an accused [individual] is at the very least entitled to have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged." In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 272 (1948). But the courtroom may still be closed over a defendant's objection where the party seeking closure advances "an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure [is] no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court [considers] reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [the trial court makes] findings adequate to support the closure." Davis, 509 Mich. at 66 (quotation marks omitted), quoting People v Vaughn, 491 Mich. 642, 653 (2012), quoting Waller v Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984). See also Presley v Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 214 (2010).

Prior to trial, the prosecutor, relying on MRE 611(a), moved to close the courtroom during the complainant's testimony and to allow a victim advocate to be present for support. Defendant stipulated to the victim advocate's presence but objected to closure of the courtroom on the basis that family members who would not otherwise be sequestered as witnesses and potentially, unaffiliated members of the public, wanted to attend. The trial court granted the prosecutor's motions. In closing the courtroom, the entirety of the trial court's reasoning consisted of the following:

The Court reviewed the motion in this matter. I also reviewed the preliminary exam transcript from . . . I think it was February 3, 2017. Just about six or seven months ago. There was no objection at that time to closing the courtroom [during the preliminary hearing] raised by counsel. I see no reason not to close the courtroom in this case in particular, since the other witnesses are family members or the other family members may be called as witnesses and be sequestered anyway.

Based on that, I will go ahead and grant the motion to close the courtroom for the purpose of the complaining witness testimony.

The courtroom was closed to all but the parties, their attorneys, the complainant, and the victim advocate during the complainant's trial testimony. The victim advocate, as an employee of the prosecutor's office, is not a member of the public, much like attorneys and courtroom staff. This was a total closure of the courtroom to the public during a critical phase of the defendant's trial. See Davis, 509 Mich. at 68-70; Waller, 467 U.S. at 42; Presley, 558 U.S. at 211.

The trial court did not consider any reasonable alternatives to closure on the record as required by Vaughn and Waller. Vaughn, 491 Mich. at 653. "[T]rial courts are required to consider alternatives to closure even when they are not offered by the parties ...." Presley, 558 U.S. at 214; see also Weaver v Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 297 (2017).^[1]"[E]ven assuming, arguendo, that the trial court had an overriding interest" in closing the courtroom during the complainant's testimony, "it was still incumbent upon it to consider all reasonable alternatives to closure. It did not, and that is all this Court needs to decide." Presley, 558 U.S. at 216.^[2] Post-hoc rationalizations for courtroom closure made by an appellate court are not sufficient. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 n 8.^[3]

Moreover, the trial court's findings of an overriding interest were inadequate to support closure. Davis, 509 Mich. at 66. The court must identify "the particular interest, and threat to that interest . . . along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered." Presley, 558 U.S. at 215216 (quotation marks and citations omitted). As an initial matter, the trial court did not identify an overriding interest.^[4] In providing its ruling, the trial court remarked that defendant did not object to courtroom closure at the February 3 preliminary examination. We can only speculate as to the purpose of this remark.^[5] Moreover, the mere fact of closure during preliminary examination is insufficient to support closure at trial.^[6] Finally, the trial court's sole discernable rationale for closure-that some unidentified observing family members may be sequestered as witnesses-lacks specificity and is thus insufficient to support appellate review. Again, post-hoc justifications by an appellate court cannot be substituted for the trial court's findings, or lack thereof. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 n 8. The Court of Appeals erred by failing to assess whether the Vaughn/Waller requirements were satisfied.

The prosecution urges us to find that the closure was partial and remand for the trial court to supplement the record with findings and reasoning to support the closure during the complainant's testimony. See People v Kline, 197 Mich.App. 165 (1992). Given our conclusion that the courtroom was completely closed to the public during a critical phase of the trial, Kline is not applicable, and the Court of Appeals did not rely on it.^[7] We further note that neither the United States Supreme Court nor this Court have endorsed a remedy akin that that ordered in Kline for courtroom closure.^[8]

Defendant timely objected to the courtroom closure during trial, preserving the issue for appellate review. When preserved, the erroneous denial of a defendant's public-trial right is a structural error entitling the defendant to automatic relief. Davis, 509 Mich. at 67; Weaver, 582 U.S. at 295-297, 301-303. Since the trial court did not consider any alternatives to closure during the complainant's testimony, defendant's public-trial right was violated and we reverse and remand for a new trial. See Presley, 558 U.S. at 216 (closure during jury voir dire, reversing and remanding for further proceedings); Davis, 509 Mich. at 78-79 (closure for nearly the entire trial, reversing and remanding for a new trial); People v Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 293 (1891) (closure during trial, same); People v Micalizzi, 223 Mich. 580, 585 (1923) (closure before charging jury, same) ("If a portion of the trial may be conducted behind barred doors, it may all be conducted behind barred doors.").

CLEMENT, C.J. (concurring).

I agree with the majority order that the instant erroneous denial of defendant's right to a public trial is a preserved structural error and thus requires automatic reversal. People v Davis, 509 Mich. 52, 67 (2022). However, though I believe reversal is required, I do not relish the practical result of a new trial in this instance. I believe the closure was very likely justified insofar as there was an overriding interest that was likely to be prejudiced and the closure was no broader than necessary; the error here consists only of a failure by the trial court to make an adequate record by considering reasonable alternatives to closure and by making findings adequate to support the closure. Waller v Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984). I question whether reversal in cases such as this is the result the United States Supreme Court intended when it required courts to consider alternatives to closure and to make findings adequate to support the closure in order to close a courtroom constitutionally. Nevertheless, the rule that preserved structural errors require automatic reversal is clear, and I see no viable basis in the caselaw to avoid the rule's application in this instance. Therefore, despite that a new trial will exact considerable costs on all the parties involved, particularly on the victim, I believe that reversal is legally required. I therefore concur with the majority.

VIVIANO, J., joins the statement of CLEMENT, C.J.

ZAHRA J. (dissenting).

This is a difficult case involving heinous crimes committed against a vulnerable young girl who could not effectively defend herself. The jury heard the available evidence, heard the defendant's argument and numerous witnesses, observed defense counsel's cross-examination of the victim, and returned verdicts of guilty after receiving proper instructions under the law. The convictions in this case were supported by record evidence and were received after a vigorous adversarial process. But there is a snag, according to the majority order. The trial court allowed the victim to present her testimony without the presence of defendant's family or noninterested public in the court gallery. With a young victim almost at the point of a mental breakdown while recounting the horrible abuse inflicted upon her, and who was caught between sides in a torn family with little social support, the trial court responded to the needs of the case and individuals before it. The trial court, which stands on the front lines of litigation battles and is granted broad discretion to ensure a fair proceeding, took what it viewed as the best...