People v. Villalobos

• Decision Date: 09 October 1962
• Citation: 208 Cal.App.2d 321,25 Cal.Rptr. 111
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Beatrice VILLALOBOS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 111

25 Cal.Rptr. 111

208 Cal.App.2d 321

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Beatrice VILLALOBOS, Defendant and Appellant.

District Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Oct. 9, 1962.

Edward J. Allen, Red Bluff, under appointment by the Third District Court of Appeal, for appellant.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., by Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Raymond M. Momboisse, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, for respondent.

SCHOTTKY, Justice.

Beatrice Villalobos was accused by indictment with the crime of involuntary manslaughter, it being alleged that 'she did unlawfully kill, without malice, one CHARLOTTE RAMERIZ in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, and in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death in an unlawful manner and without due caution and circumspection.' The jury found her guilty as charged, her motion for a new trial was denied, and she has appealed from the judgment entered on such verdict and from the order denying her motion for a new trial.

In arguing for a reversal of the judgment, appellant makes two major contentions. (1) That the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict; and (2) that the court erred in allowing the introduction of appellant's statements because of the failure to establish the corpus delicti of the crime. Before discussing these contentions, we shall give a brief summary of the evidence as shown by the record.

Beatrice Villalobos, referred to hereafter as the appellant, was residing in a small five-room cottage with her paramour, Octavio Gomez, her six children, her sister, Irene Fuentes, and her sister's two children. About 4:30 p. m. on November 5, 1961, Irene and Octavio left the house to gather firewood. Appellant remained in the house, as did her daughter Charlotte, a three-year-old child who was usually kept in a small open recess in a bedroom. Appellant discovered that the child had soiled herself. She took the child into the bathroom where she removed the child's diaper and partially cleaned her. She then placed the child in the washbasin and went into the kitchen to get a pan of cold water. The washbasin had only a single spigot which discharged hot water. Appellant poured the cold water into the washbasin and opened the tap a bit and returned to the kitchen. When she came back she removed the child from the washbasin and put her in the shower. She noticed that the child's skin seemed wrinkled and pinkish but she did not think anything of it. After she had bathed the child, she saw that the child's feet, ankles, thighs, buttocks and genitals were scorched by hot water. She then put the child in bed. Appellant admitted the skin was sloughing from the burns the child received. After Octavio and Irene returned, appellant, who was pregnant, was taken to the hospital by Octavio. Irene remained in the house. About 10:00 p. m. she heard Charlotte crying and after investigating discovered that the child's legs were red and the skin was peeling. The child was taken to the hospital. Upon her arrival, it was ascertained that the child had first and second degree burns. The feet and ankles were quite red, the skin had sloughed off, and the burns were dry. The burns around the buttocks and the left thigh had blisters on them. Charlotte died. The autopsy report stated the child had severe second or third degree burns involving the lower legs, the back of the thighs, the region around the perineum and high up on the buttocks. The area of the burns covered 20 to 25 per cent of the body. The cause of death was severe swelling of the brain. The pathologist testified that the burns set off the chain of events which caused death. He also testified that it would be very difficult to see how burns of the particular distribution could have been self-inflicted.

In addition to the above, there was evidence that appellant disliked Charlotte and had treated her cruelly.

We shall first discuss appellant's contention that the corpus delicti of the crime was not established before appellant's admissions were introduced in evidence.

'In a murder charge the corpus delicti consists of two elements: the death of the alleged victim and the existence of some criminal agency as the cause. (People v. Cullen, 37 Cal.2d 614, 624, 234 P.2d 1, and cases cited.) The corpus delicti must be proved by evidence independent of the extrajudicial statements of the accused. But, as a prerequisite to the reception of a defendant's extrajudicial statement in evidence, the corpus delicti need not be established by proof as clear and convincing as is necessary to establish guilt. (25 Cal.Jur.2d 510-513, and cases cited.) The corpus delicti need only be shown by some evidence, and a prima facie showing that the alleged victim met death by a criminal agency will suffice. (People v. Corrales, 34 Cal.2d 426, 429, 210 P.2d 843; People v. Mehaffey, 32 Cal.2d 535, 545, 197 P.2d 12, and cases cited.) Furthermore, the corpus delicti may be established wholly by circumstantial evidence and by inferences reasonably derived therefrom. (People v. Corrales, supra, 34 Cal.2d 426, 429, 210 P.2d 843; People v. Mehaffey, supra, 32 Cal.2d 535, 545, 197 P.2d 12.) And such evidence need not connect defendant with the commission of the crime. (People v. Amaya, 40 Cal.2d 70, 76, 251 P.2d 324.)' (People v. Misquez, 152 Cal.App.2d 471, 477, 313 P.2d 206; see also People v. Ogg, 159 Cal.App.2d 38, 323 P.2d 117.)

The evidence discloses that Charlotte died as the result of burns which covered 20 to 25 per cent of her body. The autopsy surgeon testified that it was unlikely the burns could have been self-inflicted. There was evidence that the burns were incurred some five or six hours prior to the time the child was received at the hospital. There was also evidence that the child was kept in a recess in a room away from the kitchen or the bathroom. Appellant and the child were in the home. We believe that a prima facie case was established that the burns were inflicted on the child other than by accident. There was no fire and the burns were not self-inflicted.

A more difficult question is whether the evidence supports the judgment.

Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being. It is of three kinds: '2. Involuntary--in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection; * * *.' (Pen.Code, sec. 192.)

Section 20 of the Penal Code requires that 'In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence.'

Section 26 of the Penal Code provides in part that a person is incapable of committing a crime if the act charged was done through misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no evil design, intention or culpable negligence.

Even if a person commits an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, there must be a showing that the unlawful act was committed with criminal intent or criminal negligence in order for the person to be guilty of the crime of involuntary manslaughter. (People v. Stuart, 47 Cal.2d 167, 173, 302 P.2d 5, 9.) 'To be an unlawful act within the meaning of section 192 * * *, the act in question must be dangerous to human life or safety and meet the conditions of section 20.' (People v....