People v. Villela
| Decision Date | 27 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 16CA2178 |
| Citation | 457 P.3d 743 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Danny Lee VILLELA, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, John T. Lee, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Brian Cox, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
Opinion by JUDGE DAILEY
¶ 1 Defendant, Danny Lee Villela, appeals the sentence imposed following termination of his probation. We affirm.
¶ 2 Defendant was originally charged with, among other things, menacing and six counts of child abuse after he threatened and physically abused his wife and their children. Pursuant to a written plea agreement, he pleaded guilty to menacing and child abuse. In the agreement, the parties agreed that the sentence to be imposed would be at the discretion of the court, but that, if the district court sentenced defendant to the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC), the sentences would be in the presumptive range of one to three years and would run concurrently to each other.
¶ 3 Defendant requested a sentence to probation, and the district court sentenced him to five years of probation. The next year, following a violation of the probation terms, the court revoked and reinstated defendant’s probation.
¶ 4 A year later, the People again moved to revoke defendant’s probation after he escaped from his program, contacted the victim in violation of a protection order, took her truck, and fled the jurisdiction.
¶ 5 The court revoked defendant’s probation. At the resentencing hearing, defendant argued that the court could impose presumptive range DOC sentences of no more than three years for each of his class 5 felonies, because he had "specifically pled guilty to the presumptive range" and his plea documents did not state "what the aggravating range was" for these crimes. However, he acknowledged that the original stipulations set forth in the plea agreement were no longer operative:
I am fully aware of the fact that when somebody is sentenced, [if] they violate the sentence, that things like stip to no prison, stip to, you know, stip to probation, that those things do not carry over if someone violates.
¶ 6 The prosecutor noted that the plea documents set forth the potential for an aggravated range sentence, and that defendant had several prior felonies that were Blakely -exempt factors.1 The prosecutor also asserted the applicable sentencing statutes permitted the court to "re-sentence[ ] the Defendant at its discretion" upon a probation violation. The court agreed and found that the plea agreement advised defendant of the potential for an aggravated range sentence.
¶ 7 The prosecutor then asked the court to impose a four-and-a-half-year aggravated range DOC sentence. In support, the prosecutor noted, among other things, defendant’s numerous prior felony convictions; that defendant had pleaded guilty to a new criminal violation that involved contacting the victim and fleeing to another state while still on probation; the sadistic, violent circumstances of the original crimes; and the number of child victims involved in the original crimes. The court imposed concurrent four-year terms in the DOC on each count.
¶ 8 Defendant appealed his DOC sentence, contending that the district court erred in imposing an aggravated range sentence because (1) it violated the stipulated sentencing range set forth in the original plea agreement; and (2) the sentence was aggravated in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). We disagree with both contentions.
¶ 9 Defendant first argues that the court erred by imposing an aggravated range sentence when his probation was revoked because the original plea agreement mandated a presumptive range sentence for his crimes. We disagree.
¶ 10 A plea agreement’s meaning is a legal question that we review de novo. See People v. Johnson , 999 P.2d 825, 829 (Colo. 2000).
¶ 11 It is well established that when a defendant’s probation is revoked, the trial court may then "impose any sentence ... which might originally have been imposed," regardless of any sentencing concession in the original plea agreement. § 16-11-206(5), C.R.S. 2018; People v. McDaniels , 844 P.2d 1257, 1258 (Colo. App. 1992) (), cited with approval in Montoya v. People , 864 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Colo. 1993).
¶ 12 Thus, "in the absence of language expressly addressing the contingency of revocation [or termination] of a conditional sentence, a sentencing stipulation will not be construed as limiting the court’s discretion in the event that the defendant fails to comply with the terms of the conditional sentence originally imposed." People v. Griego , 207 P.3d 870, 872 (Colo. App. 2008) ; see McDaniels , 844 P.2d at 1258.
¶ 13 The facts in McDaniels are similar to the facts in this case. In McDaniels , the defendant was sentenced to a three-year term of incarceration following probation revocation, even though the original plea bargain provided that, if he were sentenced to incarceration, his sentence would not exceed two years. A division of this court held that, in resentencing defendant to prison, the court was not bound by the two-year sentencing cap. The court reasoned that the defendant received the benefit of his plea agreement at the time of the initial sentencing and, following his probation violations, a "different factual predicate existed upon which sentence was imposed." 844 P.2d at 1258.2
¶ 14 In Griego , another division agreed with the analysis in McDaniels , concluding that a plea agreement’s sentencing cap for imprisonment did not apply if the defendant received and then violated a conditional sentence. Griego , 207 P.3d at 872.
¶ 15 Defendant argues that McDaniels and Griego were wrongly decided, but he cites to no cases that disagree with their reasoning. Further, these cases have been cited with approval in a long line of decisions. See Montoya , 864 P.2d at 1095 (); People v. Nance , 221 P.3d 428, 433 (Colo. App. 2009) (); People v. Smith , 183 P.3d 726, 728-29 (Colo. App. 2008) (); People v. Santana , 961 P.2d 498, 500 (Colo. App. 1997) (citing McDaniels ).
¶ 16 In addition, this reasoning is consistent with cases construing the court’s broad authority to resentence an offender under section 16-11-206(5) following revocation or termination of a conditional sentence. See Romero v. People , 179 P.3d 984, 987, 989 (Colo. 2007) (); People v. Adams , 128 P.3d 260, 262 (Colo. App. 2005) (same); see also Fierro v. People , 206 P.3d 460, 461 (Colo. 2009) ().
¶ 17 Here, the plea agreement prescribed the sentence to be imposed following defendant’s guilty plea, but the stipulation did not expressly address the sentence to be imposed after the initial sentencing. Given the well-established case law, defendant could have bargained for specific language to cover this contingency, but he did not. See Griego , 207 P.3d at 872 ().
¶ 18 We reject the assertion that the plea agreement is ambiguous or still applies because defendant requested and received a probation sentence rather than a DOC sentence. See McDaniels , 844 P.2d at 1258 ( similar argument). In interpreting an agreement, we must determine the meaning a reasonable person would have attached under the circumstances. See Craig v. People , 986 P.2d 951, 960, 962 (Colo. 1999) (). Probation is a privilege, not a right, and may be revoked if the probationer violates any condition. See Byrd v. People , 58 P.3d 50, 55 (Colo. 2002) ; People v. Ickler , 877 P.2d 863, 864 (Colo. 1994). In the absence of language to the contrary, we cannot assume that the parties intended that defendant would be granted a significant sentence concession at his initial sentencing and then be given the same concession after serving part of his probation and violating its conditions. See Romero , 179 P.3d at 987 ().
¶ 19 We also reject defendant’s assertion that he is entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement as he understood it. Before pleading guilty, defendant signed a written advisement that acknowledged that he understood the possibility that, if the court found aggravating circumstances, it could impose an aggravated range sentence of up to six years on each count. A defendant’s "plea is not invalid merely because the defendant was not warned that upon violation of the terms of his probation, he would be subject to resentencing to anything to which he could have originally been sentenced." People v. Marez , 39 P.3d 1190, 1194 (Colo. 2002) ; see Montoya , 864 P.2d at 1096-97 (...
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People v. Propst
...Law ¶ 11 The interpretation of a plea agreement is a legal question that we review de novo. People v. Villela , 2019 COA 95, ¶ 10, 457 P.3d 743. ¶ 12 Crim. P. 11 permits a defendant to plead guilty under an agreement with the prosecution. The sentencing court retains the ultimate discretion......