People v. Vos
| Decision Date | 10 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | B306919 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JONATHAN DANIEL VOS, Defendant and Appellant. |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 0PR02052)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Kevin S. Rosenberg, Judge. Affirmed.
Edward Mahler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen and Peggy Z. Huang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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A defendant on postrelease community supervision was arrested for committing a new crime, and the People sought to revoke his supervision. The defendant was quarantined in custody for COVID-19 for several weeks, so the trial court did not conduct the evidentiary hearing on the revocation petition until 95 days after his arrest. Because the maximum sentence of incarceration for a revocation (once custody credits are taken into consideration) is 90 days, defendant argues that his incarceration for longer than 90 days violates due process and entitles him to have the revocation petition dismissed in its entirety. The trial court rejected this argument, and so do we. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2019, Jonathan Daniel Vos (defendant) entered a no contest plea to a single charge of attempting to inflict injury upon a cohabitant or spouse (Pen. Code, §§ 273.5, subd. (a), 664).1 In exchange for his plea, the People dismissed the original charge of making a criminal threat (§ 422) and agreed to a two-year prison sentence.
On March 19, 2020, defendant was released from the two-year prison sentence and placed on postrelease community supervision (supervision). As mandated by statute (§ 3453, subd. (b)), one of the terms of supervision was that he "obey all laws."
Two days after his release from prison, on March 21, 2020, defendant went to his father's house. While there, defendant got into a verbal fight with his father that escalated into a melee in which defendant eventually swung a skateboard at his father and hit his father in the face and/or the arm. Defendant was arrested the same day.
Based on defendant's assault on his father, (1) the probation office filed a petition to revoke defendant's supervision, and (2) the People charged defendant in a new case with the crime of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)).
On April 2, 2020, defendant was arraigned and denied the allegations in the revocation petition.
On April 23, 2020, the trial court held a probable cause hearing. Based on the testimony of an officer who responded to the scene and the probation officer, the court found probable cause to believe that defendant had violated his supervision. The court set the evidentiary hearing on the revocation petition for May 15, 2020.
On May 1, 2020, defendant was placed into quarantine for COVID-19.
On May 15, 2020, defendant was still in quarantine and the court was forced to take the evidentiary hearing off calendar.The court set the matter for a hearing-setting date on May 21, 2020.
On May 21, 2020, defendant was still in quarantine, so the court set a further hearing-setting date for June 1, 2020. At the defense attorney's request, the court also set bail at $500,000, according to the bail schedule.
On May 28, 2020, the trial court issued an in-chambers order advancing the June 1, 2020 hearing and rescheduling the hearing-setting date for June 10, 2020.
On June 10, 2020, the court convened the hearing setting. Defendant was out of quarantine and present in court. Before the court could select a date, defendant moved to dismiss the revocation petition on the ground that (1) the maximum period for incarceration for a revocation of supervision is 180 days in jail (§ 3455, subd. (d)), (2) due to the award of one custody credit for each day of actual time served, the maximum 180-day jail term was really a maximum of 90 days of actual jail time, and (3) defendant had already served 85 days of actual jail time, so setting the evidentiary hearing more than five days later would exceed the maximum sentence, violate due process, and require dismissal of the revocation petition. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the delay in holding the evidentiary hearing was excusable "under the circumstances" and did not violate due process. After the People indicated that could not have their witnesses present in less than 10 "business days," the court set the evidentiary hearing for June 23, 2020.
On June 23, 2020, the court held the evidentiary hearing. After the People called defendant's father and the probation officer as witnesses, the court found defendant in violation of his supervision, revoked and reinstated supervision, and imposed ajail sentence of 180 days with credit for 95 actual days, which amounted to a sentence of time served.
Defendant filed this timely appeal.
The new charges for assault with a deadly weapon still appear to be pending.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the revocation petition because, in defendant's view, his due process rights were violated. Because this case involves the application of undisputed facts to a constitutional standard, our review is de novo.2 (People v. Byron (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1013 (Byron).)
Since the Realignment Act of 2011, not all persons released from state prison are placed on parole, where they are supervised by state officials. Instead, persons released from prison after serving time for many "lower-level" felonies (that is, felonies that do not qualify as "serious felonies," "violent felonies" or more aggravated sex-related felonies) are placed on postrelease community supervision, where they are supervised by county officials. (§ 3451, subds. (a) & (b).)
Persons placed on either type of supervision are entitled to the protections of due process. Due process guarantees a person the right to an evidentiary hearing before his supervision may be revoked (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481, 489(Morrissey)), and, most pertinent here, that hearing must be conducted "within a reasonable time." (People v. Murdock (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 429, 435 (Murdock); People v. Gutierrez (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 393, 400-401 (Gutierrez).) When evaluating whether the timing of a hearing satisfies the due process requirement of reasonableness in other contexts, courts have "balance[d] the harm to the defendant" from any delays "against the justification for th[ose] delays." (See People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 107 []; People v. Boysen (2007) 165 Cal.App.4th 761, 772 [same]; United States v. Lovasco (1977) 431 U.S. 783, 790 [].) We see no reason not to apply the same standard here.
We independently conclude that the balance of these factors establishes that the evidentiary hearing in this case was conducted within a "reasonable" time, and hence in compliance with due process.
On one side of the balance, the delay in conducting defendant's evidentiary hearing was justified. Here, the trial court initially set the evidentiary hearing for May 15, 2020—55 days after defendant was arrested. The delay between May 1 and at least May 21, 2020, was due to defendant's COVID-19 quarantine, which was certainly a justifiable delay. (E.g., Stanley v. Superior Court (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 164, 170 [].) What is more, the fact that no emergency order was in effect on June 10, 2020, allowing forfurther COVID-related continuances does not, as defendant seems to assert, negate the justification for the earlier delay. And the delay between June 10 and June 23, 2020, was due to the People's reasonable request for 10 business days from the date of a hearing-setting to subpoena the witnesses needed for that hearing. (But see Pickett v. Municipal Court (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 1158, 1160-1162 [].)
On the other side of the balance, defendant has not articulated any cognizable, actual prejudice arising from the delay. (People v. Price (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 536, 542 [].) Prejudice from delay in conducting a hearing or trial typically arises when the delay "impair[s]" "the defense" through the loss of evidence or fading of memories (e.g., Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 532), but defendant has made no claim that the postponement of his hearing from May 15 to June 23 caused him any such prejudice. Rather, defendant argues that he was prejudiced because his prehearing incarceration exceeded the sentence ultimately imposed by five days. To be sure, a defendant's interest in avoiding delay encompasses an interest in "prevent[ing] oppressive pretrial incarceration." (Ibid.) But it is far from clear that defendant's service of a sentence that is well within the 180-day statutory maximum but a few days in excess of...
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