People v. W.B. (In re W.B.)
| Decision Date | 26 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. S181638.,S181638. |
| Citation | 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8873,2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10817,144 Cal.Rptr.3d 843,55 Cal.4th 30,281 P.3d 906 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | In re W.B., Jr., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. W.B., Jr., Defendant and Appellant. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
See 10 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Parent and Child, §§ 528, 896.
Jonathan E. Demson, New York, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Mark Radoff, Bishop, and Delia Parr, for California Indian Legal Services as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Paulino G. Durán, Public Defender (Sacramento), Arthur L. Bowie and Randi Barrat, Assistant Public Defenders, for the Office of the Public Defender for Sacramento County as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Steven T. Oetting and Meredith S. White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
W. Scott Thorpe; and Albert C. Locher, Assistant District Attorney (Sacramento), for California District Attorneys Associationas Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jennifer B. Henning, for California State Association of Counties as Amicus Curiae.
Passed in 1978, the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA, or the Act) formalizes federal policy relating to the placement of Indian children outside the family home. State courts presiding over adoption, guardianship, and dependency matters have become familiar with the many requirements of this federal law. Historically, however, ICWA provisions have not been applied in the juvenile delinquency context because ICWA includes an express exemption for placements “based upon an act which, if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).)
The minor argues state legislation has expanded ICWA to delinquency proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.1 The Courts of Appeal have considered the question with varying results. Here, we determine the federally required scope of ICWA in juvenile delinquency proceedings and whether our Legislature has expanded those requirements. Consistent with the federal statutes, we hold that California law requires the court to inquire about a child's Indian status at the outset of all juvenile proceedings, but that ICWA's additional procedures are not required in most delinquency cases. A delinquency court must ensure that notice is given and other ICWA procedures are complied with only when (1) exercising “dual status” jurisdiction over an Indian child (see post, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 852–854, 281 P.3d at pp. 914–915); (2) placing an Indian child outside the family home for committing a “status offense” ( §§ 601– 602; see post,at p. 850, 281 P.3d at p. 912); or (3) placing an Indian child initially detained for “criminal conduct” ( § 602; see post,at pp. 850–851, 281 P.3d at pp. 912–913) outside the family home for reasons based entirely on harmful conditions in the home. In this narrow third category, ICWA notice is required when the delinquency court sets a permanency planning hearing to terminate parental rights, or when the court contemplates ordering the ward placed in foster care and announces on the record that the placement is based entirely on abuse or neglect in the family home and not on the ward's delinquent conduct. Without a clear announcement from the court to the contrary, it will be presumed that a placement of a section 602 ward is based on the ward's delinquent conduct, rather than conditions in the home, and thus not subject to ICWA.
The minor, W.B., Jr. (W.B.), has been the subject of several delinquency petitions. He was referred to probation in 2003 and 2006 on allegations of felony burglary and robbery, but these matters were closed for lack of evidence. Referred to diversion in November 2006 for possessing marijuana on school grounds, he failed to complete the program. On March 27, 2007, shortly before his 15th birthday, a section 602 petition alleged he committed felony burglary and receipt of stolen property. On May 3, 2007, a second section 602 petition alleged he committedbattery with serious bodily injury. On May 23, 2007, a third section 602 petition alleged residential burglary. At a combined hearing, after W.B. admitted the battery and one burglary allegation, he was declared a ward of the juvenile court. The court ordered that he be placed outside the home. The court later reconsidered this order, released him to his mother, and directed that both participate in the Wraparound Program.2
In June 2008, another section 602 petition was filed alleging robbery. At a contested jurisdiction hearing, the victim testified that as he was leaving school W.B. approached from behind and hit him in the jaw, causing him to drop his cellular phone. A boy with W.B. picked up the phone, and the two ran off with it. The court found the allegation true and continued the minor as a ward. The probation officer's dispositional report noted that “ICWA may apply” because W.B.'s mother had reported possible Cherokee ancestry. There was no history of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse. Although the probation department recommended that he continue on home supervision and in the Wraparound Program, the People urged a placement outside the home because W.B. had not “learned to appreciate the seriousness of his conduct.” Following the probation department's recommendation “with some misgivings,” the court released him to his mother's custody and ordered continued participation in the Wraparound Program.
On October 14, 2008, just two months after disposition of the robbery case, a subsequent 602 petition was filed alleging residential burglary. W.B. and two others broke into a home through a sliding glass door and stole a number of items. The court found the burglary allegation true and set the maximum confinement time at six years. The probation officer's report once again stated that “ICWA may apply” because W.B.'s mother had reported Cherokee ancestry. No history of abuse was reported, and the child welfare agency confirmed that it had no active dependency case involving the family.
The probation officer reported that the county's interagency placement committee (CIPC) unanimously recommended that W.B. be placed in foster care. The committee believed his treatment needs, which included “anger management, victim awareness, [and] impulse control,” would be best met in a placement program. Although he had appeared to be making progress at home, he had continued to commit criminal acts and posed a threat to the community's safety. The probation department endorsed the CIPC recommendation. The court ordered placement in a foster care facility and directed W.B. to comply with terms of probation. He would be returned to his mother's custody upon successful completion of the placement. The aggregate term of potential confinement was eight years eight months.
On appeal, W.B. argued the dispositional order placing him in foster care had to be reversed because the juvenile court had failed to comply with the notice requirements of ICWA. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding notice was not required because federal law specifically excludes delinquency cases from ICWA, and any interpretation of California law that would expand ICWA's application to delinquencies would be invalid under federal preemption principles. We granted review.
In California, the juvenile court's jurisdiction over a minor can be invoked in two ways: (1) by a dependency petition (§ 300), which alleges the child's home is unfit due to parental abuse or neglect; or (2) by a delinquency petition, which accuses the child of either disobedience or truancy (§ 601) or the violation of a law that defines a crime (§ 602). The terms “delinquency” and “status offense” have been employed somewhat loosely in various contexts. Before beginning our analysis, it is useful to clarify the definitions of these terms and explain how they fit into the statutory framework.
Allegations that a minor refuses to obey orders of a parent or guardian, is beyond parental control, violates age-based curfew ordinances, or is truant or disobedient in school, must be brought in a petition filed under section 601. (§ 601, subd. (a).) These allegations, which are specifically delineated in section 601, are commonly called “status offenses” because they address conduct that is not criminal but is nevertheless subject to punishment because of the offender's status as a person under age 18. (See In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 731, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 331, 94 P.3d 477;R.R. v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 185, 198, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 110.) Strictly speaking, “[a]n adjudication under section 601 neither requires nor implies a finding of ‘delinquency.’ ” (In re Bettye K. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 143, 151, 285 Cal.Rptr. 633.)Section 601 allegations are not the only status offenses considered by the juvenile court, however.
Section 602 confers broad juvenile court jurisdiction over allegations that the minor's conduct “violates any law.” (§ 602, subd. (a).) Some penal statutes proscribe conduct only when it is committed by a minor. For example, although an adult may legally consume alcohol, underage drinking is not permitted. (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 22; see generally In re Jennifer S. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 64, 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 467 [].) Likewise, although an adult may lawfully purchase cigarettes, a minor cannot. (Pen.Code, § 308, subd. (b).) Offenses like these, which can be committed only by a person under 18, are technically status offenses, but they...
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