People v. Wade
Decision Date | 10 February 2015 |
Docket Number | B255894 |
Citation | 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 714,234 Cal.App.4th 265 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Steven WADE, Defendant and Respondent. |
Jackie Lacy, District Attorney, Phyllis C. Asayama and Scott D. Collins, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Jean Ballantine, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
Defendant Steven Wade was held to answer on a charge of carrying a loaded firearm on his person (Pen.Code, § 25850, subd. (a) ).1 Preliminary hearing testimony established that defendant was wearing a backpack containing a loaded revolver while being pursued by a police officer. The trial court granted defendant's section 995 motion to dismiss, finding that defendant did not carry the firearm on his person under the reasoning in People v. Pellecer (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 508, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 477 (Pellecer ), which held that a knife contained in a backpack is not carried “on the person.”
On appeal by the People, we reverse. A defendant wearing a backpack containing a firearm carries the firearm on his or her person. We decline to apply the reasoning in Pellecer, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th 508, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 477, to possession of a firearm concealed in a backpack in light of the historical interpretation of “carries a loaded firearm on the person” in California, which is in accord with decisions from other jurisdictions considering language similar to section 25850, subdivision (a).
Section 25850, subdivision (a) provides as follows: “A person is guilty of carrying a loaded firearm when the person carries a loaded firearm on the person or in a vehicle while in any public place or on any public street.” The issue presented is whether a person wearing a backpack containing a loaded firearm “carries a loaded firearm on the person.”
(Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1072, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 767, 222 P.3d 214.) “ (People v. Robinson (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1138, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 727, 224 P.3d 55.)
Section 25850, subdivision (a), is the successor statute to former section 12031, subdivision (a)(1), which was repealed in 2010 as part of the Deadly Weapons Recodification Act of 2010 (The Act).2 (§ 16000 et seq.) The Act is not intended to substantively change the law relating to deadly weapons and “is intended to be entirely nonsubstantive in effect.” (§ 16005.) Provisions of the Act are intended to be restatements and continuation of prior statutes in the absence of the appearance of a contrary legislative intent. (§ 16010.) “A judicial decision interpreting a previously existing provision is relevant in interpreting any provision of” the Act, although “the Legislature has not evaluated the correctness of any judicial decision interpreting a provision affected by the act” and it “is not intended to, and does not, reflect any assessment of any judicial decision interpreting any provision affected by the act.” (§ 16020.)
(People v. Vaughn (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 322, 332, 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 595.) “[C]arrying a concealed firearm presents a recognized ‘threat to public order’ ” because immediate access to the firearm impedes others from detecting its presence. (People v. Yarbrough (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 303, 314, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 674, citing People v. Hodges (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1357, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 619, and People v. Hale (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 353, 356, 117 Cal.Rptr. 697.)
California courts apply this broad legislative purpose in interpreting statutes regulating the possession of firearms. For example, courts have refused to impose an element of operability to statutes regulating firearms use and possession. (People v. Taylor (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 432, 437, 199 Cal.Rptr. 6 ; see also People v. Marroquin (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 77, 80–82, 258 Cal.Rptr. 290 [ ].)
The issue in People v. Dunn (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d Supp. 12, 132 Cal.Rptr. 921 (Dunn ) is indistinguishable from that presented in this case. In Dunn,the defendant had a firearm in his suitcase at the airport, and was convicted of violating former section 12025, which provided as follows: “(b) Any person who carries concealed upon his person any pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person without having a license to carry such firearm ... is guilty of a misdemeanor....” The former Appellate Department3 of the Los Angeles Superior Court rejected the defendant's argument that he did not carry the handgun on his person because it was in a suitcase, as opposed to being carried in a woman's purse, which the defendant conceded would violate the statute. “We hold that the Legislature intended to proscribe the carrying of concealed weapons by both men and women and that a handgun concealed in a suitcase and carried by appellant is sufficiently ‘upon his person’ to constitute a violation of [former] section 12025.” (Dunn, supra, at p. 14, 132 Cal.Rptr. 921 ; see also People v. Overturf (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 6, 134 Cal.Rptr. 769 []; People v. Smith (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d Supp. 875, 878, 164 P.2d 857 [].)
These California authorities are consistent with decisions in other states interpreting statutes similar to section 25850, subdivision (a). (See De Nardo v. State (Alaska Ct.App.1991) 819 P.2d 903, 908 [ ].) (De Nardo v. State, supra, at pp. 905–906, fn., omitted; see also State v. Anfield (1992) 313 Or. 554, 836 P.2d 1337, 1340 [ ]; State v. Finlay (2002) 179 Or.App. 599, 42 P.3d 326, 328–329 [ ]; 43 A.L.R.2d 492 [...
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