People v. Walker

• Decision Date: 17 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 1–13–0530.,1–13–0530.
• Citation: 35 N.E.3d 154
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. James WALKER, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

35 N.E.3d 154

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.James WALKER, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–13–0530.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

June 17, 2015.

Alan D. Goldberg and Deborah Nall, both of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Mary P. Needham, and Christine Cook, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice HYMAN

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Almost 30 years ago, James Walker was convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting deaths of three people. Walker claimed he was in Momence, Illinois, at the time of the shooting, but three eyewitnesses identified him as the shooter. On direct appeal, the appellate court affirmed Walker's conviction. People v. Walker, No. 1–86–856, 167 Ill.App.3d 1166, 131 Ill.Dec. 545, 538 N.E.2d 920 (1988)

(unpublished order under Supreme Rule 23). Walker filed two postconviction petitions, which were summarily dismissed by the circuit court and affirmed by the appellate court. People v. Walker, No. 1–02–0959, 348 Ill.App.3d 1091, 311 Ill.Dec. 440, 868 N.E.2d 1101 (2004) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 ); People v. Walker, No. 1–03–0333, 347 Ill.App.3d 1111, 310 Ill.Dec. 807, 867 N.E.2d 120 (2004) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 ). On December 4, 2012, Walker filed a third pro se petition for postconviction relief asserting actual innocence and reasonable doubt. The circuit court of Cook County denied the petition as without merit. We affirm, finding Walker's petition for postconviction relief presents neither newly discovered, noncumulative exculpatory evidence nor material evidence of a conclusive character that would likely change the outcome on retrial.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On April 30, 1985, Glendon McKinley, Vickie Nolden, and Ricco Chalmers were fatally shot while standing on the corner of 54th Street and Halsted Avenue in Chicago. At trial, the State presented the testimony of three eyewitnesses who said they saw Walker get out of the passenger seat of a white car and open fire on the victims. One eyewitness, Andre Chalmers, the brother of one of the victims, identified Walker as the shooter and testified that he had known Walker for years. Another eyewitness, Tyrone Wheatley, testified that he saw Walker for the first time when he stepped out of the front passenger seat and shoot, describing him as a man with braided hair, a light mustache, and a goatee. The final eyewitness, Charles Poree, testified that he was inside a nearby tavern when he saw a white Pontiac pull up and the person in the front passenger seat shoot Ricco Chalmers. He identified Walker as the shooter, describing him as having braids, a light mustache, a little beard, and small hat. He also testified that Andre Chalmers never mentioned that he knew the man who shot his brother. On cross-examination, Poree was asked whether he heard Andre Chalmers say “Strickland did it.” Although Andre Chalmers denied he ever made the statement, Poree stated that he thought he heard Andre say it.

¶ 4 Walker presented an alibi defense through the testimony of family members and friends. That testimony placed Walker at his mother's home in Momence for his wedding rehearsal. Nonetheless, Walker was found guilty and sentenced to natural life in prison without parole. This court affirmed that judgment (People v. Walker, No. 1–86–856, 167 Ill.App.3d 1166, 131 Ill.Dec. 545, 538 N.E.2d 920 (1988)

(unpublished order under Supreme Rule 23 )) and later affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of two pro se petitions for relief (People v. Walker, No. 1–02–0959, 348 Ill.App.3d 1091, 311 Ill.Dec. 440, 868 N.E.2d 1101 (2004)

(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 )); (People v. Walker, No. 1–03–0333, 347 Ill.App.3d 1111, 310 Ill.Dec. 807, 867 N.E.2d 120 (2004) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 )).

¶ 5 On December 4, 2012, Walker filed the petition before us. He asserts actual innocence and reasonable doubt, and attaches three supporting statements: (i) a sworn affidavit from Walker reiterating that at the time of the homicides he was attending his wedding rehearsal with his family; (ii) a sworn affidavit from Eugene Horton, a fellow inmate and a prison law clerk, who worked on Walker's case and claims to have interviewed several eyewitnesses, including Andre Chalmers and Charles Poree; and (iii) a statement from Tyrone Powell, a fellow inmate who claims he witnessed the shooting. Horton states that Chalmers and Poree told him that the shooter was a man named Strickland. Horton also claims that Poree and an inmate named Vincent Carter, another alleged eyewitness, told him that Strickland threatened to kill them if they identified him as the shooter and for this reason, Horton asserts, they would not speak about the murders until Horton told them that Strickland died.

¶ 6 The crux of Walker's actual innocence claim rests on the unnotarized statement of Tyrone Powell. Powell asserts that as he stood in a McDonald's parking lot eating, he saw a white car make a sudden stop in front of a tavern on the corner of 54th and Halsted. He then saw a “tall black man” get out of the passenger seat, shoot a handgun, get back in the car, and speed away. He further states that he knew Walker in 1985 and knew that the shooter was someone other than Walker. Powell said he did not know that Walker had been convicted for the crime until Eugene Horton recently asked him about it.

¶ 7 After reviewing Walker's petition and supporting documents, the circuit court rejected the petition as devoid of merit. Addressing Tyrone Powell's statement, the court observed:

“[N]ow this many years later he says that he found a witness, somebody apparently in the penitentiary that the law clerk also in the penitentiary found and has an affidavit saying that he was there, that [Walker] wasn't the shooter. It doesn't say who the shooter was. It doesn't say when he first knew anything about this and when he shared this information about who may or may not be involved. His name is Tyrone [Powell]. He has an affidavit apparently that he filed out in the penitentiary and it's coming quite late. There was an alibi witness that was presented. There were witnesses that were presented. I don't know that this late testimony by Tyrone [Powell] without any circumstances * * * other that he was present and saw a gunman come out and it wasn't [Walker] would be enough to change the outcome of the trial.”

¶ 8 Walker timely appeals.

¶ 9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Walker seeks postconviction relief based on actual innocence and reasonable doubt, claiming that he presented a colorable claim of actual innocence based on exculpatory affidavits. The State responds that (i) the assertion being made was litigated at trial, (ii) could have been discovered earlier, and (iii) does not exonerate Walker.

¶ 11 The Post–Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122–1 et seq. (West 2012)) provides a three-step process by which a convicted defendant may assert a substantial denial of his or her constitutional rights in the proceedings that led to the conviction. People v. Harris, 224 Ill.2d 115, 124, 308 Ill.Dec. 757, 862 N.E.2d 960 (2007)

. Such violations include “freestanding claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence.” People v. Brown, 2013 IL App (1st) 091009, ¶ 50, 370 Ill.Dec. 707, 988 N.E.2d 1063. A proceeding under the Act collaterally attacks the judgment. People v. Evans, 186 Ill.2d 83, 89, 237 Ill.Dec. 118, 708 N.E.2d 1158 (1999). “Consequently, any issues that were decided on direct appeal are res judicata, and any issues that could have been presented on direct appeal, but were not, are forfeited.” People v. Reyes, 369 Ill.App.3d 1, 12, 307 Ill.Dec. 834, 860 N.E.2d 488 (2006). We review the summary dismissal of a postconviction petition de novo.

People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 389, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998).

¶ 12 At the first stage of a postconviction proceeding, we focus on whether the petition sets forth a “gist” of a constitutional claim. People v. Boclair, 202 Ill.2d 89, 99–100, 273 Ill.Dec. 560, 789 N.E.2d 734 (2002)

. If the court determines that the defendant satisfied the minimum pleading threshold, then the petition moves on to second-stage proceedings. 725 ILCS 5/122–2.1(b) (West 2012). At the second stage, an indigent defendant has a right to counsel, and the State may file an answer or a motion to dismiss the defendant's petition for postconviction relief. Id.;

People v. Edwards, 197 Ill.2d 239, 245–46, 258 Ill.Dec. 753, 757 N.E.2d 442 (2001). During this stage, the trial court reviews the petition and accompanying documentation to determine whether the defendant made a “substantial showing” that a constitutional violation occurred. Edwards, 197 Ill.2d at 246, 258 Ill.Dec. 753, 757 N.E.2d 442. If the defendant fails to make the requisite showing, the petition will be dismissed. Id. But should the defendant satisfy the substantial showing requirement, the petition advances to the third stage of postconviction review, where the trial court conducts an evidentiary hearing on the petition and makes fact-finding and credibility determinations. 725 ILCS 5/122–6 (West 2012) ; People v. Childress, 191 Ill.2d 168, 174, 246 Ill.Dec. 352, 730 N.E.2d 32 (2000).

¶ 13 The defendant bears the burden to establish a substantial deprivation of constitutional rights. People v. Waldrop, 353 Ill.App.3d 244, 249, 288 Ill.Dec. 953, 818 N.E.2d 888 (2004)

. Walker's petition—a first-stage proceeding—will be dismissed only if found frivolous or patently without merit. See People v. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d 1, 10, 332 Ill.Dec. 318, 912 N.E.2d 1204 (2009). The supporting evidence for a petition, like Walker's, based on actual innocence, must be “new, material, noncumulative and, most importantly, ‘ “of such conclusive character” ’ as would ‘ “probably change the...