People v. Wall

• Decision Date: 31 January 1878
• Citation: 1878 WL 9809,88 Ill. 75
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOISv.GEORGE W. WALL.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

88 Ill. 75

1878 WL 9809 (Ill.)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

v.GEORGE W. WALL.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January Term, 1878.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. WILLIAM H. SNYDER, Judge, presiding.

This was an information in the nature of a quo warranto, against George W. Wall, to show by what authority he exercised the office of circuit judge.

Mr. JAMES K. EDSALL, Attorney General, for the People.

Mr. A. THORNTON, Mr. H. B. HURD, and Mr. SAMUEL P. WHEELER, for the defendant in error. Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court:

But one question is made on this record, and that has relation to the validity of the act of June 2, 1877, entitled “An act to divide the State of Illinois, exclusive of Cook county, into judicial circuits.” One section of that act provides, that in lieu of the circuits provided for in section 13, in article 6 of the constitution, the State of Illinois, exclusive of Cook county, shall be divided into judicial circuits, and it then declares the third circuit shall be composed of certain counties, naming them, which had previously constituted the twenty-second and twenty-third circuits as established by law. In response to the demand made upon defendant, by the people, to show by what authority he assumed to exercise the office of judge of the circuit court in one of the counties embraced in the third circuit, as its boundaries were defined, he pleaded in proper form his eligibility, election, qualification and commission as judge of the third circuit, created by the act in question, of which the county in which he had assumed to exercise the office of judge of the circuit court was one.

Another section provides, the judges of the circuit courts then in office should still be judges in the respective circuits in which they may reside, and also, for the election, by the electors thereof, of an additional judge in each circuit, making three judges for each circuit, but limiting the term of office of the judges to be so elected to the period of two years, which would expire on the first Monday of August, 1879.

On reference to the article of the constitution in relation to the judicial department, in that part which treats of circuit courts, it will be observed, two systems for judicial circuits are provided for--one as in section 13, to be composed of contiguous counties, in which one judge shall be elected, and another in lieu thereof, to be composed of greater population and territory, in which shall be elected by general ticket not exceeding four judges, who shall hold the circuit courts therein as provided by law. Obviously it was the intention the State should be divided first into circuits with one judge, under the provisions of section 13, for it is made the duty of the General Assembly to so divide the State, exclusive of Cook county, prior to the expiration of the term of office of the circuit judges then in office. That was accordingly done. But in lieu of the circuits first formed the General Assembly was invested with a discretionary power to adopt another system of circuits, comprising a greater population and territory, and as to the time when the new system in lieu of the former might be established, the constitution is silent. It is a matter plainly with the General Assembly, when the exigency for adopting a new system in lieu of the existing one may arise, and if there is no limitation upon its power in that particular, it is apparent it may be exercised at any time. It is difficult to appreciate how any construction that can be adopted as to these several paragraphs or sections relating to this subject, could assist to any better understanding of their meaning. When construed together, as is our duty to do, and each provision regarded, no ambiguity is observable. Words, when found in a constitution, as well as in a statute, are to be understood in their ordinary signification. There is no canon of construction that makes it imperative, the words employed should be understood in any other or different sense than their common acceptation. Any other rule would defeat the plain meaning of such instruments. A constitution, like any other instrument, admits of no interpretation other than that which the common understanding places upon it, where no technical words are employed. It should not be hampered by judicial construction, so as to render it impracticable or inoperative. That which is plainly expressed admits of no construction.

Adopting these common sense principles as we would concerning the interpretation of any other written instrument, no great difficulty need be experienced in arriving at a solution of the questions discussed. It is plainly expressed, that the General Assembly may divide the State into judicial circuits of greater population and territory, in lieu of the circuits provided for in the 13th section of the judiciary article of the constitution. The existence of that power is not denied, but the contention is, when may it be rightfully exercised. It is an undeniable principle, that unless prohibited, the General Assembly...