People v. Walters

• Decision Date: 19 July 1923
• Docket Number: No. 119.,119.
• Citation: 194 N.W. 538,223 Mich. 676
• Parties: PEOPLE v. WALTERS.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

223 Mich. 676

194 N.W. 538

PEOPLE

v.WALTERS.

No. 119.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

July 19, 1923.

Exceptions from Circuit Court, Newaygo County; Joseph Barton, Judge.

Leo R. Walters was convicted of manslaughter. On exceptions before sentence. Conviction affirmed, and circuit court advised to proceed to judgment.

Argued before WIEST, C. J., and FELLOWS, McDONALD, CLARK, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ.John M. Dunham, of Grand Rapids, for appellant.

Wm. J. Branstrom, of Fremont, for the People.

WIEST, C. J.

Under an information charging him with the crime of murder, defendant was convicted of manslaughter. The case is here on exceptions before sentence. Defendant stabbed Peter Christiansen in the body seven times with a large jackknife, one stab killing him. The stabbing took place in Christiansen's dooryard. Defendant claimed at the trial that he went to Christiansen's home to warn Mrs. Christiansen that her husband had been drinking, and upon leaving encountered Christiansen, who seized him, threw him down and choked him, and, being fearful of death, he took the jacknife from his pocket, opened the blade and stabbed his assailant to make him let go his hold. Defendant had accompanied Christiansen earlier in the day, out in the country on an automobile trip, and both had been drinking, and jupon return to Bitely where they lived they had some trouble in the livery barn, and clinched, but defendant broke the hold, seized a club, and chased Christiansen away. From this encounter defendant went to Christiansen's home, as he claims, for the purpose stated, but this is disputed by Mrs. Christiansen, who testified that defendant asked, ‘Where is Pete?’ and upon her saying, ‘I don't know,’ he stated, ‘I want Pete,’ and, ‘I will fix him to-night.’ In this she was supported by two other witnesses, who also testified defendant threatened to kill the deceased.

Defendant was brought up by the mother of the deceased, and at the time of the killing lived at the home of a sister of the deceased. At the trial defendant claimed he stabbed in self-defense. The trial judge cut off a wide range of cross-examination of witnesses for the people relative to the general reputation of the deceased for quarrelsomeness and specific acts of his reputed violence, holding that only such repute and acts coming to the knowledge of defendant were admissible, and deferred examination as to such matters until defendant's knowledge was made to appear. There was no error in this. In the order of proof such testimony would have to follow, not precede, testimony supporting defendant's claim of self-defense. It is true the circuit judge might have permitted the testimony upon counsel's promise to later make the proper showing of defendant's knowledge, but the question here raised only goes to the order of proof, and cannot be urged as reversible error. Defendant's fear of imminent death at the hands of the deceased, arising from apprehension because of his had character, could not have come from what he had not heard. But it may be said the ruling drove defendant to take the stand. His sole defense compelled him to give his testimony. The defendant was iven full opportunity to shows, and did show, the character of the deceased, as understood by him, and there was no error in requiring the reason for such a showing to come before instead of after testimony relating thereto was admitted.

It is contended there was error in not permitting the sister of the deceased to testify that the neighborhood believed Christiansen had set fire to a store some years before, and he was a lawless man. Defendant claims he heard this rumor. There was no error in excluding what the neighborhood believed and in limiting the issue to what defendant had heard and believed. People v. Farrell, 137 Mich. 127, 100 N. W. 264. Counsel state:

‘We believed we had a right to show by reputable witnesses living in that community that this man's reputation was bad and that everybody knew it. First, it tended to corroborate the testimony of respondent as to that reputation. Second, it would be competent as bearing upon the fear created in the mind of respondent when assaulted by decedent, and when he claims he was placed in fear because of the reputation he knew decedent possessed.’

The reputation of the deceased for ferocity, brutality, and vindictiveness, so far as defendant had been informed thereof before the affray, was competent upon the question of whether such knowledge, together with knowledge of specific acts along the same lines, afforded defendant reasonable grounds for entertaining the belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, in an assault at the hands of the deceased, and only to be averted by stabbing him. People v. Farrell, supra. This was permitted. Defendant...