People v. Walton, B195084 (Cal. App. 11/1/2007)

Decision Date01 November 2007
Docket NumberB195084
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesTHE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JASON ROBERT WALTON, Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BA293563. Larry P. Fidler, Judge. Affirmed.

Robert D. Bacon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Joseph R. Lee and Carl N. Henry, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

KRIEGLER, J.

Defendant and appellant Jason Robert Walton was convicted by jury of the first degree murder of William Cox (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 and the attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated murder of Edward Williams (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)). The jury also found defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, and his discharge of the firearm proximately caused death and/or great bodily injury. (§ 12022.5.53, subds. (c)-(d).) Defendant was sentenced to a total of 50 years to life in state prison.

In this timely appeal, defendant argues as follows: (1) the prosecutor improperly injected racial animus into the trial, and the trial court's failure to remedy the misconduct violated defendant's constitutional rights; (2) the evidence is insufficient to establish the element of premeditation as to the murder and attempted murder convictions; (3) the Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (2006-2007) CALCRIM Nos. 521 and 601, do not properly differentiate between the element of intent to kill and premeditation; (4) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on suppression or fabrication of evidence pursuant to CALCRIM No. 371; (5) denial of access to juror contact information prejudiced defendant's ability to investigate potential grounds for a new trial; (6) denial of the motion for new trial was error, because the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence; and (7) the cumulative effect of the errors violated defendant's right to due process under the state and federal constitutions.

FACTS

A few weeks before November 13, 2005, 14-year-old Williams was visiting his friend, William Cox. When Williams left to go home, he saw a girl named Amber Jones with whom he was friendly. He waved at her as he walked by. Defendant was present and glowered at Williams. Defendant asked Williams why he was looking at his girl. Jones told defendant that Williams was a friend of the family. Williams continued to walk home. He heard the sound of a car burning rubber and turned to see defendant getting out of the car, with Jones in the passenger seat. He walked up to Williams and asked where he was from, a reference to gang membership. Williams said nowhere. Williams was scared and thought defendant would hit him if he said the wrong thing. Defendant made other gang-related references ("fuck naps" and "neighborhood killer") and referred to which gangs did not get along with his gang. Defendant said he was from a specific gang, and Williams said he had family from another gang that got along with defendant's gang.

Defendant walked back to the car and reached into an area under the driver's seat. Williams stood there with his fists balled up. Jones yelled several times, "No, baby, no." Defendant again got in his face, as Williams stood with his fists clenched. Eventually defendant walked back to his car and drove away.

On November 13, 2005, Williams went to Cox's house. They went to the store and then to a carnival. Williams and Cox ended up talking to some girls. Williams saw about eight people, including defendant, giving them mean looks. Defendant walked up and hugged one of the girls as if he knew her, and then he got into Williams's face. Cox suggested that they run, but Williams thought they would be caught or shot in the back. Defendant had his hands inside his jacket. Williams heard a boom and Cox went down. Cox was fatally wounded by two shots to the torso, one entering the left pulmonary artery and a second entering the left chest cavity, where it perforated the lung and came to rest in the musculature of the back.

Williams saw a flash and ran, as defendant fired a gun from inside his jacket. Williams felt nauseous and fell to the ground. He was shot twice in the heart and in the lung and back.2 Williams was 100 percent sure he was shot by defendant.

Richard Gray was working at a ride near the carnival entrance. He heard shooting and saw the back of defendant, who was running with a security guard in pursuit. Gray saw the side of defendant as he ran by, although he told the police he only saw the man from the back. Gray later saw a six-pack photo display and circled defendant's photograph, indicating his identification of defendant as the "guy who did the shooting of the two boys." By the time of trial, Gray was not sure if defendant was the person he saw running. Gray was first shown the six-pack at the carnival, six days after the shooting. He immediately identified defendant's photograph. After the initial identification, Gray was taken to the Southwest Station, where he circled a photograph marked number 4 after receiving an admonition.

Christian Monroe, defendant's seven-year-old nephew, was present when defendant was arrested three days after the shooting. In a tape-recorded statement, Christian told the police he had previously seen defendant with a gun. Defendant kept his gun in the car, or else he puts it in a case or in his pocket. When no one is in the house, defendant puts the gun in a hiding place. Christian saw the gun on three occasions under the driver's seat of defendant's car.

One day after defendant's arrest, Christian spoke to defendant on the phone. Defendant asked what Christian had told the police, expressing his anger and threatening to whip him. Defendant also spoke with Christian's brother, eight-year-old Antwoine. Christian told defendant what he had told the police. Defendant was mad because Christian had mentioned that he saw the gun. Defendant threatened to hit him.

Defense

Defendant presented an alibi defense, seeking to establish that he was at Roscoe's House of Chicken and Waffles (Roscoe's) at 5006 West Pico Boulevard at the time of the shooting. David Daviston, a manager at Roscoe's, was responsible each day for putting a videotape into a console to record from security cameras that capture the outside of the establishment, including the parking lot. He gave the videotape from November 13 to Jones, defendant's girlfriend. The tape showed defendant in the parking lot in Jones's car at several times, including 6:45 p.m. Defendant went out of the picture at 6:58 p.m., but Jones's car remained. The tape automatically depicts the time. Daviston believed the time on the tape was accurate, although the person who installed the system and services it believed it could be off by three to five minutes.

Ronaldo "Shorty" Dervin knew defendant for four years from Roscoe's, where Dervin works selling body oils and incense. He saw defendant at Roscoe's on November 13 in Jones's car. At 6:51 p.m., the videotape showed defendant by a white car. Defendant was still at Roscoe's when Dervin left at 8:00 p.m.

Nikko Deloney testified that he is a certified youth gang intervention prevention specialist working for the American Program for Social Change. He is a former gang member. He is familiar with Roscoe's and has known defendant his entire life. He was at Roscoe's on November 13, where he frequently goes to keep the peace. He identified defendant from the videotape as driving Jones's car. Deloney saw defendant on the videotape at 6:56 and 7:31 p.m.

Jones is defendant's ex-girlfriend. She has known Williams for five to seven years. A few weeks before November 13, Jones and defendant were at Jones's mother's house. Williams walked down the street and said, "What the fuck is this nigger looking at?" Jones directed defendant to drive after Williams. He did so, and Jones asked what made Williams say that and what was wrong with him. Defendant got out of the car to talk to Williams. Defendant told Williams not to walk down the street throwing gang signs and "banging." Jones told Williams to go home. The incident was no big deal.

Defendant drove her to work at 3:00 p.m. on November 13 and picked her up at 9:30 p.m. Jones learned on November 17 that defendant had been arrested. Jones gave the police three different versions of the first confrontation between defendant and Williams. First, she said Williams gave her boyfriend a bad look, but defendant never got out of her car to approach Williams. Second, she said the two exchanged words. Finally, Jones said defendant did exit the car and had a verbal confrontation with Williams, who she thought appeared to be nervous, but he stood his ground.

Jones learned defendant was at Roscoe's on the evening of November 13. She saw Daviston and asked to look at the tape, which showed defendant and her car. Jones took the tape to an attorney and eventually gave it to trial counsel.

Jones spoke with defendant over the telephone while defendant was in jail awaiting trial. She visited with him at the jail wearing a jacket that defendant said had a bullet hole, although she thought the hole was not from a bullet.

It was stipulated that a 9-1-1 call came in on November 13, 2005, at 7:01 p.m. reporting the murder.

DISCUSSION
I THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT MAKE RACIAL ANIMUS AN ISSUE AT TRIAL

Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly injected the issue of racial animus into the trial during his cross-examination of Dervin. Defendant further argues the trial court compounded the error by precluding defense argument to the jury about the prosecutor's injection of this improper consideration. We conclude the prosecutor did not improperly raise an issue of racial animus, and ...

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