People v. Ward

• Decision Date: 01 July 1971
• Citation: 323 N.Y.S.2d 316,37 A.D.2d 174
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Francis X. WARD, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 316

323 N.Y.S.2d 316

37 A.D.2d 174

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Francis X. WARD, Defendant-Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

July 1, 1971.

Michael R. Juviler, New York City, of counsel (Burton N. Lipshie and Robert A. Goldschlag, New York City, with him on the brief; Frank S. Hogan, Dist. Atty.), for appellant.

Robert A. Levy of counsel (Richard D. Friedman and Herman H. Tarnow, New York City, with him on the brief; Friedman & Friedman, New York City, attorneys) for defendant-respondent.

Before STEVENS, P.J., and CAPOZZOLI, McGIVERN, KUPFERMAN and MURPHY, JJ.

PER CURIAM:

The People appeal from an order dismissing an indictment wherein the defendant was charged with Perjury in the First Degree (2 counts) and Criminal Contempt (2 counts).

In dismissing the indictment, the Court below held that the testimony of June 9, and June 11, while different, was the product of 'apparent confusion' and was not willful but was induced by aggressive questioning and a denial of access to counsel. In addition, 'The indictment * * * is not consistent with the record'.

We disagree. The test to be applied on a motion to dismiss the indictment for insufficiency of evidence is whether there has been a 'clear showing' that the evidence before the grand jury if unexplained and uncontradicted would not warrant a conviction by a trial jury. C.C.P. § 251; People v. Howell, 3 N.Y.2d 672, 171 N.Y.S.2d 801, 148 N.E.2d 867. In this case, there is no 'clear showing' that the evidence is insufficient. The first count of Perjury alleged that on June 9, 1970, defendant testified 'that he had received payments of money monthly for a period of months'. On June 11, 1970 he testified that 'He has received a payment of money only on one occasion', and further that if he had testified otherwise in the past he had been mistaken.

The second count of Perjury alleged that on June 9 defendant testified 'that he received cash from different police officers.' On June 11 the defendant testified that he did not receive money from different police officers, but just from one officer who is now dead. In addition, he stated that if he testified otherwise in the past he was mistaken. In each of the foregoing instances the lower court accepted the excuse of mistake and obviously found as a fact that a mistake rather than a wilful fabrication had been made by the defendant. In so doing the court below usurped the function of a petit jury. On a motion to dismiss an indictment, however, 'A court may not accept defendant's contention as fact; any defense that he may have must be offered at the trial for the appraisal and decision of the jury.' (People v. Donahue, 309 N.Y. 6, 127 N.E.2d 725.) 'That a trial jury might not convict on this evidence is not our concern. The Legislature has specifically relegated the question of whether a trial jury would return a conviction on this evidence to a judgment of the Grand Jury' (C.C.P. 251, People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d 126, 157 N.Y.S.2d 551, 138 N.E.2d 794).

The defendant was also charged with two counts of criminal contempt in that he contemptuously and unlawfully refused to answer a certain question concerning the purpose of telephone calls that he had made using a code name, 'Oldsnine' and in addition that he refused to answer a question concerning the substance of a conversation between himself and one Mulligan in February of 1970.

The court below in dismissing the contempt count ruled that the indictment charging defendant with contempt was improper on the ground that a grand jury may not return a charge of contempt against a witness for his refusal to answer questions before the same grand jury. In doing so the court relied principally upon Mayberry v. Pennsylvania 400 U.S. 455, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532, and In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942. Neither case is applicable to the facts presented herein. In each of those cases the crucial point is that the accusatory process and the adjudicatory process were merged in the same tribunal, a situation absent in in the case at bar. Moreover, the contention that 'an aggrieved grand jury before which the contempt had been committed cannot properly charge defendant testifying before it with contempt', has been rejected by our Court of Appeals. People v. Chestnut, 26 N.Y.2d 481, 482--483, 491, 311 N.Y.S.2d 853, 260 N.E.2d 501. Accordingly, the contempt counts must be reinstated.

Defendant further argues that the indictment was void in that he was denied the opportunity to consult with his counsel 'on matters affecting his legal rights'. However, this is not supported by the grand jury's minutes. Although a witness is entitled on demand to see his lawyer for counseling concerning his legal rights, there is no...