People v. Washington

• Decision Date: 08 May 1987
• Citation: 192 Cal.App.3d 1120,236 Cal.Rptr. 840
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael WASHINGTON, Defendant and Appellant. A035602.

Page 840

236 Cal.Rptr. 840

192 Cal.App.3d 1120

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael WASHINGTON, Defendant and Appellant.

A035602.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.

May 8, 1987.

Review Denied Aug. 20, 1987.

Gordon S. Brownell, Court-Appointed Counsel, San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Stan M. Helfman, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., Sharon G. Birenbaum, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

LOW, Presiding Justice.

Defendant, Michael Washington, appeals from a probation revocation resulting from a finding that he was in possession of cocaine. (Health & Saf.Code, § 11350.) He was sentenced to three years in state prison. Defendant contends (1) that the evidence used against him at the probation revocation hearing was the product of an illegal detention and (2) that the conduct of the police in detaining defendant was so egregious as to warrant the suppression of that evidence at the hearing. We agree, and reverse.

I

On May 3, 1986, Officers Lewis and Griffin were in the vicinity of 1232 Buchanan Street. They observed defendant along with four other individuals in a courtyard area between 1133 Laguna and 1232 Buchanan. Defendant and the others were observed talking in a "huddle" formation with "a lot of hand movement" inside the huddle, but the officers could not see what was in the hands of any member of the group. The officers then walked toward the group, at which point everyone looked in the officers direction, whispered, and quickly dispersed. When defendant saw the officers, he immediately turned around and started walking at a fast pace through the lobby of 1232 Buchanan. The officers followed him for a quarter of a block when Officer Griffin called out to defendant. Defendant replied, "Who me?" Officer Griffin answered, "Yes," and defendant immediately ran away. The officers gave chase. Two minutes later, while still chasing defendant, Officer Lewis saw defendant discard a plastic bag containing five white bindles. Officer Lewis scooped up the bag as he continued to give chase. Shortly thereafter, the officers apprehended defendant.

During the probation revocation hearing, Officer Lewis testified that during the four years he had been a patrolman he had made at least 100 arrests concerning cocaine in the area frequented by defendant that night. On cross-examination, Officer Lewis answered in the affirmative when asked if most of the Black men he saw in the area usually had something to hide if they ran from police. The officer stated that prior to the chase he saw no contraband, nor was anything about the group's dispersal significant. Nor did the officer explain why they singled out defendant to follow. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress and revoked defendant's probation.

II

The facts bearing on the legality of the detention in this case were undisputed; therefore it is the responsibility of this court to measure the facts as found by the trial court against constitutional standards. (See People v. Aldridge (1984) 35 Cal.3d 473, 477, 198 Cal.Rptr. 538, 674 P.2d 240.) Defendant argues that the actions of the police officers constituted a detention without the factual predicate necessary to support an investigative stop or detention. (See In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893, 148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957.) Therefore, he asserts the evidence used against him at the probation revocation hearing was the product of an illegal detention and should have been suppressed.

A

Prior to defendant's abandonment of the cocaine, the police lacked the "articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime." (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229.) The officers spotted the group of men in an open courtyard at 6:15 p.m.; the men made no attempt to conceal themselves and did not exhibit any furtive behavior. The hand gestures were, on the police officer's own testimony, inconclusive and unrevealing. Furthermore, the time at which the detention occurred is not the "late or unusual hour ... from which any inference of criminality may be drawn." (People v. Bower (1979) 24 Cal.3d 638, 645, 156 Cal.Rptr. 856, 597 P.2d 115.) The fact that defendant was seen in what was a high crime area also does not elevate the facts into a reasonable suspicion of criminality. Courts have been "reluctant to conclude that a location's crime rate transforms otherwise innocent-appearing circumstances into circumstances justifying the seizure of an individual." (Id., at p. 645, 156 Cal.Rptr. 856, 597 P.2d 115.)

Once the officers made their approach visible, they gave no justification for their decision to follow defendant apart from the others in the group. Neither officer knew defendant or knew of defendant's past criminal record, nor did Officer Lewis testify that defendant appeared to be a principal or a leader in the group. Further, the defendant had the right to walk away from the officers. He had no legal duty to submit to the attention of the officers; he had the freedom to "go on his way," free of stopping even momentarily for the officers. (See Florida v. Royer, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 498, 103 S.Ct. at p. 1324; People v. Bower, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 648, 156 Cal.Rptr. 856, 597 P.2d 115.) By walking at a brisk rate away from the officers, defendant could have been exercising his right to avoid the officers or avoid any other person, or could have simply walked rapidly through sheer nervousness at the sight of a police officer. (People v. Bower, supra, at pp. 647-648, 156 Cal.Rptr. 856, 597 P.2d 115; cf. People v. Moore (1968) 69 Cal.2d 674, 683, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800, 446 P.2d 800.)

We see no change in the analysis when defendant decided to run from the officers. Flight alone does not trigger an investigative detention; rather, it must be combined with other objective factors that give use to an articulable suspicion of criminal activity. (See People v. Aldridge, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 479, 198 Cal.Rptr. 538, 674 P.2d 240.) No such factors existed, nor does Officer Lewis's assertion that the "black men [they] see in the project usually have something to hide when they run" justify a detention. "[M]ere subjective speculation as to the [person's] purported motives ... carries no weight." (Ibid.)

Thus, prior to defendant's abandonment of the contraband, the circumstances of defendant's actions were not reasonably consistent with criminal activity (People v. Loewen (1983) 35 Cal.3d 117, 129, 196 Cal.Rptr. 846, 672 P.2d 436) whether viewed separately or in their totality.

B

In Florida v. Royer, supra, 460 U.S. at page 497, 103 S.Ct. at page 1324, the Supreme Court stated that "law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, [or] by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen...." The person approached "need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way." (At p. 498, 103 S.Ct. at p. 1324.) The court further stated: "He may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds. [Citation.] If there is no detention--no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment--then no constitutional rights have been infringed." (Ibid., emphasis added.)

Thus, "a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." (United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497.) This standard was approved by plurality in Royer and has been adopted by a majority of the court. In Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 195 Cal.Rptr. 671, 670 P.2d 325, certiorari denied 466 U.S. 944, 104 S.Ct. 1929, 80 L.Ed.2d 474, the California Supreme Court adopted the Mendenhall analysis.

In this case, defendant, a Black male, had been confronted by two uniformed police officers. He exercised his right to avoid the officers through rapid walking designed to put distance between the police officers and himself. Instead, the police officers singled him out and began following him down the block. At that point, it would be reasonable for defendant to believe that he was the focus of the officers' particularized (if wholly unreasonable) suspicion. The officers then called out to him, though the words are absent from the record. Defendant broke into a run and the officers followed.

At the moment that the officers gave chase, however, the reasonable belief that the officers wanted to talk with him changed into a definite signal to defendant that he was not free to leave. By chasing defendant, the officers made clear their intention that defendant would not be able to escape contact through running. From the police officer's testimony, the chase had lasted two minutes before any evidence of contraband was revealed. If defendant required further indication of the officer's determination that he was not free to leave, a sustained two-minute chase amply demonstrates that intent.

In People v. Menifee (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 235, 160 Cal.Rptr. 682, on similar facts, the Court of Appeal held that the actions of the police officers constituted a threat of unlawful detention. Menifee was decided before Mendenhall and Royer; the scope of the seizure alluded to by the Menifee court was the actual physical restraint of the suspect's liberty by the officers. As Mendenhall and Royer state, however, the proper standard focuses on the reasonability of the belief by the person that he is not free...