People v. Washington

• Citation: 204 Cal.App.2d 206,22 Cal.Rptr. 185
• Decision Date: 29 May 1962
• Docket Number: Cr. 4054
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Thomas C. WASHINGTON, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals

Page 185

22 Cal.Rptr. 185

204 Cal.App.2d 206

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Thomas C. WASHINGTON, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 4054.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

May 29, 1962.

Rehearing Denied June 15, 1962.

Louis F. Hawkins, San Francisco, for appellant (under appointment of the District Court of Appeal).

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., John S. McInerny, Eric Collins, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent.

SALSMAN, Justice.

The defendant was indicted for the murder of Rozine B. Rashall and Billy Joe Johnson. He retained counsel and entered a plea of guilty; the court determined the degree of murder to be first degree in each instance, and sentenced the defendant to prison. He appeals from the judgment.

The victims of the murder were found in the front seat of an automobile which had crashed into a light pole at the side of the road. Billy Joe was in the driver's seat and Rozine was at his side. Each victim had been shot in the back of the head--Billy Joe three times and Rozine twice.

Nine witnesses testified before the grand jury. Their testimony placed defendant in the company of Rozine for several hours prior to her murder, and indicated that defendant had severely beaten and physically abused her during the evening preceding her murder. In his statement to the probation officer defendant admitted being in the automobile with Rozine and Billy Joe, and admitted having a gun, but stated he could not remember the incidents immediately prior to the crash. However, he remembered running away from the vehicle after the crash, and that he had a gun in his hand as he fled.

On this appeal defendant contends he was denied due process of law in that he was not effectively represented by counsel in the trial court. This claim finds no support in the record before us. Defendant at first entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The court appointed psychiatrists to examine defendant. They reported to the court that defendant suffered from no mental illness. Defendant's counsel prosecuted discovery proceedings with diligence, and learned of a statement made by defendant to the police, and of physical evidence in the possession of the authorities. Counsel also was aware of the testimony of witnesses before the grand jury and of the fact that court-appointed psychiatrists had filed their report finding defendant not mentally ill. Finally, and of persuasive importance, both defendant and his counsel knew the district attorney was demanding the death penalty. The record shows that the district attorney agreed to withdraw his demand for the death penalty if a plea of guilty were to be entered by the defendant. It would appear that this change in attitude on the part of the district attorney, brought about in part through efforts of defendant's counsel, as well as defendant's knowledge of the extent of the evidence against him, helped in inducing the defendant to change his plea. At any rate, throughout the entire proceedings leading up to the change of plea, defendant was represented by counsel of his own choice, and the record demonstrates that the representation was effective.

It is the rule that when a defendant makes a claim that he has been denied his constitutional right to counsel, the burden of proof is cast upon him to sustain his charge. (People v. Crooker, 47 Cal.2d 348, 353, 303 P.2d 753.) Where, as here, the defendant is represented by an attorney of this own choice, the attorney's conduct of the case will not be declared inadequate except in those rare cases where counsel displays such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the proceedings to a farce or a sham. (People v. Wein, 50 Cal.2d 383, 410, 326 P.2d 457; People v. Robillard, 55 Cal.2d 88, 97, 10 Cal.Rptr. 167, 358 P.2d 295.) An attorney, charged with the defense of his client's interest, must be allowed to exercise his own best judgment in the conduct of the case, and in the absence of some complaint by the defendant in the trial court, the acts of his counsel are imputed to him. (People v. Wren, 140 Cal.App.2d 368, 295 P.2d 54; People v. Jones, 177 Cal.App.2d 420-422, 2 Cal.Rptr. 305.) The defendant cites and relies upon People v. McGarvy, 61 Cal.App.2d 557, 142 P.2d 92; People v. Chesser, 29 Cal.2d 815, 178 P.2d 761; People v. Davis, 48 Cal.2d 241, 309 P.2d 1. None of the cited cases is here applicable. In McGarvy and Chesser the defendants were given only casual and perfunctory representation by counsel not of their personal choice, and in Davis defendant's counsel suffered a mental...