People v. Wasilewski
| Decision Date | 30 November 1978 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 77-465,77-464,s. 77-465 |
| Citation | 66 Ill.App.3d 1,22 Ill.Dec. 667,383 N.E.2d 31 |
| Parties | , 22 Ill.Dec. 667 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James WASILEWSKI, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
A. Randolph Comba, Princeton, Douglas A. Gift, LaSalle, for defendant-appellant.
Frank X. Yackley, State's Atty., Ottawa, John X. Breslin, James E. Hinterlong, State's Attys. Appellate Service Commission, Ottawa, for plaintiff-appellee.
This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court of LaSalle County which denied a motion of the defendant James Wasilewski to quash certain search warrants and to suppress and return certain evidence which was seized as the result of the search conducted pursuant to the authority contained in the warrants.
The defendant Wasilewski resides in Bureau County, Illinois, and manages and operates the Green Front Tavern located in the city of Peru, LaSalle County, Illinois.
On June 8, 1977, Lieutenant Washkowiak of the LaSalle County sheriff's office obtained a search warrant from the circuit court of LaSalle County to search the defendant's residence in Bureau County. The following day the lieutenant again appeared before the circuit court of LaSalle County and obtained a search warrant to search the tavern located in LaSalle County and which was operated and managed by the defendant.
The search warrants were executed and resulted in the seizure of certain evidence, to-wit, a $500 check made in payment for a riding lawn mower and a large quantity of gambling paraphernalia. Articles were seized at both the defendant's residence and his place of business. The defendant was thereafter indicted for burglary, felony theft and gambling in LaSalle County and was charged by a misdemeanor complaint in Bureau County for the offense of gambling.
On July 27, 1977, the defendant moved in the circuit court of LaSalle County to quash the search warrants and to suppress the evidence seized as the result of their execution. The defendant's motions were grounded on the assertion that there was lack of probable cause which would justify the issuance of the warrants. The circuit court of LaSalle County found that there was probable cause for the issuance of the warrants and denied the defendant's motions to quash and suppress.
The defendant filed notices of appeal from the denial of his motions to quash and suppress and further obtained a continuance of the criminal prosecution being pursued in LaSalle and Bureau Counties.
Prior to the briefs being filed by either party in this appeal the State moved to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. It was the State's contention that the defendant has no right to appeal, before trial, from an adverse ruling on a pre-trial motion to quash and suppress. Alternatively the State contended that assuming arguendo that the case was civil in nature, the trial court's denial of the motion to quash and suppress was not a final order nor is it the type upon which an interlocutory appeal is permitted, and further the defendant did not seek permission for an interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 308 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 110A, sec. 308). The defendant answered the State's motion to dismiss the appeal and asserted that he was appealing only in search warrant cases which were separate civil cases and not connected with the criminal charges pending against him. He further argued that civil cases involving search warrants were final upon their return and therefore appealable. The State filed a reply to the defendant's answer. This court neither granted nor denied the State's motion to dismiss this appeal but ordered that the jurisdictional question raised by the motion to be taken with the merits of this appeal.
The State in its brief renews in the form of an issue its motion to dismiss this appeal on jurisdictional grounds.
A question concerning a court's jurisdiction is of threshold importance so we first address ourselves to this issue.
Proceedings relating to search warrants emanate from our Criminal Code. Authority for the issuance of such a warrant is found in section 108-3 of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, sec. 108-3). The Code further permits a defendant to file a motion for the return of property and to suppress evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, sec. 114-12, and Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, sec. 108-11.) It is clear that the issuance, execution and motions relating to the search warrants and the evidence obtained by their use all stem from provisions in our Criminal Code. In the instant case subsequent to the execution of the search warrants the defendant was charged in Bureau County with having committed a criminal offense and was charged in LaSalle County with three criminal offenses. It should be noted that both Bureau and LaSalle County are in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit and the defendant had the status of a criminal defendant before the circuit court of that judicial circuit.
The defendant argues that the proceedings on the search warrants issued as to his residence and place of business were separate civil actions by virtue of the fact that they were given "MR" (miscellaneous remedy) docket numbers by the circuit court clerk at the time the complaint for the search warrants was filed. As authority for this contention the defendant cites the "Manual on Recordkeeping" published by the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts. Paragraph 1425 of the manual provides that:
"When a complaint for search warrant is filed which does not relate to a pending case a Miscellaneous Remedy (MR) case number is to be assigned * * * Index the case in the Civil index."
The defendant, however, has failed to note paragraph 1424 of the Manual on Recordkeeping which provides:
We believe that defendant's argument that the search warrant proceedings were civil actions because they were classified by miscellaneous remedy docket numbers is too tenuous. A criminal action cannot become a civil action or vice versa by recordkeeping procedures, but even if his argument had merit the recordkeeping manual upon which he relies as authority refutes his contention by the provisions above set forth in paragraph 1424 of the manual. The State in contending that the search warrant proceedings were criminal actions relies heavily upon correspondence from the attorney for the defendant to the circuit clerk of LaSalle County in which he refers to further proceedings in cases numbered 77-MR-47 and 77-MR-48 as being criminal appeals. We agree with counsel for the defendant that the search warrant proceedings where a motion to quash and suppress was filed, heard and denied were in fact criminal actions and an appeal therefrom would be a criminal appeal. We reach this conclusion not because such proceedings were designated as being criminal in nature by counsel for the defendant, but because, as we have previously outlined, the Criminal Code authorized the issuance of the warrants, and further provided the defendant with the right to move that the evidence derived from the execution of the warrants be returned and suppressed. We further deem it to be of significance that the defendant is a criminal defendant in both Bureau and LaSalle County as the result of evidence which was obtained from the execution of the warrants. We find no basis for the defendant's contention that the search warrant proceedings were civil actions.
Having concluded that the proceedings were criminal actions we are then confronted with the question as to whether the defendant has the right to appeal, before trial, from an order denying his motion to quash and suppress.
The State is specifically authorized to appeal from an order quashing a search warrant or suppressing evidence. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 110A, sec. 604(a) (1).) This rule of the...
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A. M., In Interest of
...a "final judgment" is generally perceived as that which terminates the litigation on its merits. (People v. Wasilewski (1978), 66 Ill.App.3d 1, 22 Ill.Dec. 667, 383 N.E.2d 31.) Usually, that consists of a judgment of guilt and imposition of a sentence. People v. Lilly (1974), 56 Ill.2d 493,......
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...conviction or imposition of sentence. Village of Niles v. Szczensy (1958), 13 Ill.2d 45, 147 N.E.2d 371, People v. Wasilewski (1978), 66 Ill.App.3d 1, 22 Ill.Dec. 667, 383 N.E.2d 31 and People v. Culhane (1975), 34 Ill.App.3d 158, 340 N.E.2d The defendant has never requested a new sentencin......
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People v. Shick
...in court during any proceedings in the identified cases. DM & M appealed the trial court's ruling. Citing People v. Wasilewski, 66 Ill. App.3d 1, 22 Ill.Dec. 667, 383 N.E.2d 31 (1978), this court dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was not an appeal from a final order or an order fro......
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In re the Raymond Gee And the Gee Family Homicide Investigation
...v. Altheimer & Gray, 191 Ill.2d 214, 221–22, 246 Ill.Dec. 324, 730 N.E.2d 4, 11 (2000); see also People v. Wasilewski, 66 Ill.App.3d 1, 5–6, 22 Ill.Dec. 667, 383 N.E.2d 31, 34 (1978).¶ 18 B. Standard of Review ¶ 19 Whether the presumption of public access applied to this particular type of ......