People v. Watkins

• Decision Date: 17 February 1967
• Docket Number: Cr. 4114
• Citation: 248 Cal.App.2d 603,56 Cal.Rptr. 734
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Velton WATKINS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 734

56 Cal.Rptr. 734

248 Cal.App.2d 603

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Velton WATKINS, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 4114.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Feb. 17, 1967.

Hearing Denied April 12, 1967.

Willard Weddell, West Sacramento, Court-appointed, for appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., by Doris Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Raymond Momboisse and Christopher Longaker, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for respondent.

FRIEDMAN, Associate Justice.

A jury found defendants Watkins and Foster guilty of the first degree murder of Vincent Delaney. Watkins alone appeals. His codefendant, Foster, had also been charged with assault with a deadly weapon upon Jose Vargas. Prior to the murder trial, Foster pleaded guilty to the Vargas assault.

Both defendants were represented at the trial by Mr. Robert N. Chargin, public defender of San Joaquin County. On appeal Watkins asserts a conflict of interest between him and his codefendant preventing the public defender from giving effective representation to both defendants and prejudicing his own defense.

Four eyewitnesses gave testimony tending to show that Watkins and Foster attacked Delaney on a Stockton city street during the early morning hours; that Foster repeatedly hit Delaney on the head with a crowbar; that Foster threatened a witness who attempted to interfere; that Delaney commenced to escape and was grabbed by Watkins; that Foster and Watkins then dragged him to a vacant lot, where Foster again struck him with the crowbar while Watkins stood by. Two of the witnesses found a policeman and directed him to the scene. They found Delaney lying face down, his head in a pool of blood, his empty wallet beside him and his pockets turned inside out. Two of the witnesses and another officer searched the neighborhood for the attackers. Nearby they saw Foster, armed with a crowbar and pursuing Jose Vargas. Foster was arrested. There was blood on the crowbar and blood on his clothing. Meanwhile the first officer, armed with a description of Watkins, found him in a nearby bar and arrested him.

Two of the eyewitnesses identified both Watkins and Foster as the assailants of Delaney. The other two were able to identify Watkins only. Vargas testified to the crowbar attack on him by Foster, as did several eyewitnesses. None of these witnesses implicated Watkins in the attack on Vargas or identified him as having been present. Evidence of the Vargas incident was apparently offered on the theory that it tended to prove Foster's identity as one of Delaney's attackers.

Both defendants took the stand. Each admitted that he had been in the neighborhood earlier and had seen his codefendant at various times during the evening. Each denied participation in the crime. Foster testified that on the night in question he had been attacked with a knife by a man whom he referred to as a Mexican; that he picked up a piece of iron in a vacant lot and was going after the Mexican with it when he was arrested. He volunteered that he had pleaded guilty to the assault upon Vargas.

In the trial court there was no request for separate attorneys. Watkins' claim of improper dual representation is raised for the first time on appeal. He urges that the public defender, fettered by his duty of loyalty to Foster as well as himself, was unable to demand from the court (a) an admonition instructing the jury that Vargas' testimony should be disregarded in considering Watkins' guilt; (b) an admonition that Foster's testimony was binding on himself alone and should not be considered relative to Watkins; (c) an admonition that Watkins was not affected by the testimony of other eyewitnesses to the attack upon Vargas. Such admonitions, he argues, would have prejudiced the defense of Foster, while the absence of such admonitions prejudiced his own.

The People urge the rule that failure to object to joint counsel in the trial court precludes objection on appeal, citing People v. Ingle, 53 Cal.2d 407, 2 Cal.Rptr. 14, 348 P.2d 577; People v. Byrd, 228 Cal.App.2d 646, 39 Cal.Rptr. 644; and People v. Sprinkle, 201 Cal.App.2d 277, 19 Cal.Rptr. 804. The case has been tried and we have a record which enables us to employ hindsight to ascertain whether or not there was an actual conflict of interest. (See People v. Odom, 236 Cal.App.2d 876, 879--880, 46 Cal.Rptr. 453.) Under these circumstances, it is preferable to forego the procedural objection and consider the contention on its merits.

As stated in People v. Odom, supra, 236 Cal.App.2d at page 878, 46 Cal.Rptr. 453, the fact that a single attorney is appointed to represent multiple defendants does not mean that an individual has been deprived of his right to counsel; rather, an actual or potential conflict of interest among the codefendants must appear. The Odom decision assembles a useful catalog of the principal situations in which the courts have discerned conflicts of interest: 'Conflicts of interest among codefendants may arise when it would profit one defendant to attack the credibility of another (citation); when counsel would be restricted in final summation because he might injure one defendant by arguments in favor of another (citation); when one defendant has a record of prior felony convictions and the others do not (citation); when the defenses of codefendants are factually inconsistent (citation); or when appointed counsel believes a conflict of interest may exist (citation).'

The primary issue at defendant's trial was the identity of Delaney's two assailants. Eyewitnesses identified the two defendants. Each denied participation in any such event. Neither gave an alibi which in any way involved his codefendant. The jury could separately weigh the denial of Watkins and the denial of Foster against the prosecution's identification evidence. Evidence of the Vargas affair was part of the prosecution's identification evidence, but it involved Foster only, not Watkins. The Vargas incident had no bearing upon Watkins' identity as one of Delaney's assailants. None of the witnesses to the Vargas affair, including Foster, implicated Watkins; hence there was no occasion for admonishing the jury against considering their testimony in weighing Watkins' guilt. The court would have been justified in refusing such an admonition, even if counsel had requested it.

There was no inconsistency between the stories of the two defendants and no conflict in their separate denials. There was no occasion for one defendant to challenge the credibility of the other. The jury could weigh the credibility of each defendant independently.

Thus, as we check the present case against the conflict of interest situations enumerated in People v. Odom, supra, we find no occasion for one defendant to attack the credibility of another; no restriction of defense counsel's summation stemming from the possibility that an argument favoring one client might hurt the other; no factual inconsistency in their defenses; no expression by defense counsel of a potential or actual conflict of interest.

It does appear, however, that evidence of...