People v. Watson

• Decision Date: 18 November 1991
• Citation: 177 A.D.2d 676,576 N.Y.S.2d 370
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. John WATSON, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 370

576 N.Y.S.2d 370

177 A.D.2d 676

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. John WATSON, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Second Department.

Nov. 18, 1991.

Peter Branti, Jr., New City (Clare McCue, of counsel; Lois Cappelletti, on the brief), for appellant.

Kenneth Gribetz, Dist. Atty., New City (Carrie Ciganek, of counsel), for respondent.

Before ROSENBLATT, J.P., and MILLER, RITTER and COPERTINO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Rockland County (Nelson, J.), rendered February 28, 1989, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

On appeal, the defendant contends that the initial stop by the police officer was improper because a traffic violation was merely used as a pretext to investigate unrelated activities. The hearing court credited the uncontradicted testimony of the police officer that the vehicle was stopped for driving at an excessive rate of speed for the prevailing conditions in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(a) (see, People v. Rodriguez, 122 A.D.2d 895, 505 N.Y.S.2d 936). We find no basis in this record to disturb the determination that the vehicle was lawfully stopped (see, People v. Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759, 395 N.Y.S.2d 635, 363 N.E.2d 1380; People v. Francois, 155 A.D.2d 685, 548 N.Y.S.2d 256). Additionally, the defendant's failure, upon demand by the officer, to produce a driver's license was presumptive evidence that he was not duly licensed (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 507[2]; People v. Abrams, 119 A.D.2d 682, 501 N.Y.S.2d 110). Driving without a license is a traffic infraction which justifies a police officer's immediate arrest of the unlicensed operator (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509). The defendant was the only occupant of the vehicle at the time of the arrest and his car was impounded and the contents inventoried based upon established Police Department procedures. Thus, the evidence recovered from the defendant's vehicle was properly deemed admissible at the trial ( see, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000; see, People v. Brooks, 161 A.D.2d 655, 555 N.Y.S.2d 431).

The defendant argues that the County Court impermissibly allowed the admission of evidence of uncharged crimes by allowing a People's witness to testify that he saw the defendant cooking cocaine and placing it in a brown bag on the night he was arrested. We find that this evidence was properly admitted pursuant to the principles enunciated in People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286; see also, People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 438 N.Y.S.2d 261, 420 N.E.2d 59. The theory of the defense was that the drugs in the brown leather pouch on the backseat of the defendant's vehicle may have belonged to one of the passengers seen exiting the car. It was therefore necessary for the prosecution to prove the defendant's knowledge that the brown leather pouch contained cocaine and his dominion and control over it. The testimony that the defendant was seen cooking cocaine and placing it into the same brown leather pouch tended to show...