People v. Weddell
| Decision Date | 26 October 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 2–09–0543.,2–09–0543. |
| Citation | 939 N.E.2d 504,345 Ill.Dec. 661,405 Ill.App.3d 424 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.Ronald W. WEDDELL, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Larry Wechter, Law Office of Larry Wechter, Geneva, for Ronald W. Weddell.Joseph E. Birkett, DuPage County State's Attorney, Lisa Anne Hoffman, Assistant State's Attorney, Wheaton, Lawrence M. Bauer, Deputy Director, Marshall M. Stevens, State's Attorney Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, for the People.Justice JORGENSEN delivered the opinion of the court:
[345 Ill.Dec. 662 , 405 Ill.App.3d 425] Following a bench trial, defendant, Ronald W. Weddell, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11–501(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2006)) and sentenced to two years' probation. Defendant appeals, arguing that he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial because: (1) the State's nolle prosequi of misdemeanor DUI charges did not toll the speedy-trial term, as the State later refiled identical charges; and (2) the trial court occasioned a delay when it did not immediately reassign the case to another judge following defendant's motion for substitution of judge. We affirm.
During the early morning of May 17, 2007, Bartlett police officer Jim Zefo received a dispatch concerning a reckless driver ( i.e., defendant) in a blue van near the intersection of Route 59 and Stearns Road. Zefo noticed defendant stopped at a train crossing. When the train passed, defendant accelerated to speeds of 80 to 90 miles per hour in a 50–mile–per–hour zone. Zefo activated his overhead lights but defendant continued to drive for another half mile. Defendant finally stopped at a red light.
Zefo approached defendant's vehicle. Defendant remained in the vehicle but spoke to Zefo through an open window. According to Zefo, defendant smelled of alcohol and his eyes were red, bloodshot, and glassy. Against Zefo's orders, defendant put a mint in his mouth, presumably to obscure the scent of alcohol. Zefo then directed defendant to produce his license and insurance, but defendant refused and drove away from the scene. Zefo lost contact with defendant. However, Zefo released a dispatch sending other officers to look for defendant.
St. Charles police officer Michael Ross received Zefo's dispatch. He located a van matching the description of defendant's van in a garage located in St. Charles. Ross knocked on the door of the adjoining home, and defendant's wife opened the door. Ross searched the property, ultimately finding defendant in a playhouse in the backyard. Defendant emerged from the playhouse and walked toward his wife in a threatening manner. Ross placed defendant in the squad car, and defendant
[345 Ill.Dec. 663 , 939 N.E.2d 506]
kicked the rear driver's side window, causing the glass to crack in a web pattern across the entire window.
At the police station nearly two hours after the initial traffic stop, defendant's blood-alcohol content (BAC) registered at 0.181. However, defendant told police that he drank a bottle of liquor while in the playhouse. Defendant also told police that he had a panic attack, which was why he drove away from Zefo.
Also on May 17, 2007, police charged defendant by complaint with four misdemeanor counts: (1) DUI—BAC over 0.08 (625 ILCS 5/11–501(a)(1) (West 2006)); (2) DUI—under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11–501(a)(2) (West 2006)); (3) fleeing from or eluding a police officer (625 ILCS 5/11–204(a) (West 2006)); and (4) speeding (625 ILCS 5/11–601(b) (West 2006)). These charges all fell under Du Page County case No. 07–DT–2399.
On June 12, 2007, defendant requested a speedy trial on the four charged counts under section 103–5(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code), which provides that every defendant on bail or recognizance shall be tried within 160 days from the date he or she demands trial, unless said delay is occasioned by the defendant. 725 ILCS 5/103–5(b) (West 2006). Defendant then requested a series of continuances through December 11, 2007. Both parties agree that the speedy-trial term did not run during this period.
On December 11, 2007, defendant answered ready for trial. The State requested, and was granted, a continuance due to the unavailability of a police witness. The trial was continued until February 27, 2008, a period of 78 days.
On February 27, 2008, defendant again answered ready for trial. The State indicated that it did not want to answer one way or the other whether it was ready for trial until it received an assurance that witness Zefo would be there. The State requested to pass the case. Upon a recall of the case later that morning, the State did not address the question of Zefo's availability. Instead, it moved to nol-pros case No. 07–DT–2399, informing the court that it sought dismissal so that it could enhance the initial charges to felonies.
On March 25, 2008, the State filed a three-count felony indictment against defendant, alleging: (1) obstruction of justice (to prevent apprehension) (720 ILCS 5/31–4(a) (West 2006)); (2) obstruction of justice (to prevent prosecution) (720 ILCS 5/31–4(a) (West 2006)); and (3) aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer (625 ILCS 5/11–204.1(a)(1) (West 2006)). These charges all fell under Du Page County case No. 08–CF–835.
On April 22, 2008, at the first appearance on case No. 08–CF–835, the State filed by information two counts of misdemeanor DUI. 625 ILCS 5/11–501(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2006). These charges are identical to the misdemeanor DUI charges that police had filed in case No. 07–DT–2399, for which defendant had requested a speedy trial on June 12, 2007, and which the State had nol-prossed on February 27, 2008. The parties refer to these charges as counts IV and V. in case No. 08–CF–835.
Also on April 22, 2008, defendant filed another demand for speedy trial. However, he agreed to a continuance until May 7, 2008.
On May 7, 2008, defendant moved to dismiss the three felony charges on speedy-trial grounds. This speedy-trial issue is relevant to only the procedural history of the case, as defendant was ultimately
[345 Ill.Dec. 664 , 939 N.E.2d 507]
convicted of only the misdemeanor DUI counts. Regarding the felony charges, defendant contended that, pursuant to the compulsory-joinder statute (720 ILCS 5/3–3 (West 2006)), the State should have included the felony charges in case No. 07–DT–2399. Moreover, defendant, citing People v. Quigley, 183 Ill.2d 1, 231 Ill.Dec. 950, 697 N.E.2d 735 (1998), argued that, where new and additional charges arise from the same facts as the original charges, and the State had knowledge of these facts at the commencement of the prosecution, the time at which trial is to begin on the new and additional charges is subject to the same statutory limitation that is applied to the original charges under the speedy-trial statute. Additionally, defendant, citing People v. Williams, 204 Ill.2d 191, 273 Ill.Dec. 250, 788 N.E.2d 1126 (2003), argued that any delays attributable to him on the original charges did not apply to the new charges because they were not before the court when he obtained said continuances. Defendant noted that 288 days had elapsed from the date of his original speedy-trial demand to the date the State filed the three-count felony indictment, and he concluded that his right to a speedy trial had been violated.
On June 9, 2008, at the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss the three felony charges, the State conceded that the speedy-trial term had elapsed as to the three felony counts.1 The trial court dismissed the three felony counts (counts I, II, and III in case No. 08–CF–835) and transferred the remaining counts (misdemeanor DUI counts IV and V. in case No. 08–CF–835) to a misdemeanor courtroom.
One month later, on July 9, 2008, defendant moved to dismiss the misdemeanor DUI counts, alleging a speedy-trial violation as to these counts as well. This speedy-trial issue is relevant to the merits of the appeal. Defendant argued that the State's nolle prosequi did not toll the speedy-trial term, because the State refiled identical misdemeanor DUI charges. Thus, defendant counted the days as follows: December 11, 2007, to February 27, 2008, the date on which the trial court accepted the State's nolle prosequi in case No. 07–DT–2399 (78 days); February 28, 2008, to April 22, 2008, the term during which no misdemeanor DUI charges against defendant were pending (55 days); and June 9, 2008, the date on which the State refiled the misdemeanor DUI charges in case No. 08–CF–835, to July 9, 2008 (30 days); totaling 163 days.
The State, citing People v. Decatur, 191 Ill.App.3d 1034, 1037–41, 139 Ill.Dec. 124, 548 N.E.2d 509 (1989), responded that the speedy-trial term is tolled when a trial court grants the State's motion to nol-pros until identical charges are refiled and the defendant is once again taken into custody, unless there is a “clear showing” that the State sought nolle prosequi to evade the speedy-trial statute or otherwise disadvantage the defendant. Thus, the State counted the days as follows: December 11, 2007, to February 27, 2008 (78 days), and June 9, 2008, to July 9, 2008 (30 days), for a total of 108 days.
On August 27, 2008, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss. At the hearing, both parties seemed
[345 Ill.Dec. 665 , 939 N.E.2d 508]
to agree that the law as set forth in Decatur controlled. The defense argued under the exception set forth in Decatur that the State attempted to evade speedy-trial requirements when it sought nolle prosequi and that, therefore, the 55 days between the State's nolle prosequi and refiling of identical charges should count against the State in calculating the speedy-trial term. The defense also alleged that the State sought to...
To continue reading
Request your trial