People v. Weinberg

• Decision Date: 28 March 1967
• Docket Number: Docket No. 1660
• Citation: 6 Mich.App. 345,149 N.W.2d 248
• Parties: , 1 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9778 PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Melvin WEINBERG et al., Defendants and Appellants. . Div. 1
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 248

149 N.W.2d 248

6 Mich.App. 345, 1 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9778

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Melvin WEINBERG et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Docket No. 1660.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Div. 1.

March 28, 1967.

Wallace M. Handler and Myron H. Wahls, Detroit, for appellants.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Lansing, Samuel H. Olsen, Pros. Atty., Wayne County, Samuel J. Torina, Chief Appellate Lawyer, Wayne County, Richard J. Padzieski, Asst. Pros. Atty., Wayne County, Detroit, for appellee.

Before LESINSKI, C.J., and GILLIS and HOLBROOK, JJ.

HOLBROOK, Judge.

On October 4, 1963, the fifteen defendants and others assembled outside the main office of complainant, the First Federal Savings and Loan Association, located at 751 Griswold, Detroit, Michigan. Their purpose was to protest alleged discriminatory employment and loan practices of the association. During the course of the day, various members of the group of which defendants were a part, entered the premises of First Federal on four different occasions. Each time the procedure was the same, I.e., members of the group would stand in line, and when they reached the teller's windows they would sit on the floor immediately beneath the windows. On the first three occasions the persons seated on the floor got up and left the building upon request. When defendants entered the building for the fourth time, they refused to leave although they were each individually requested to do so by Mr. Aliber, the complainant's authorized agent. They sang songs, blocked the teller's windows and were informed that they were interfering with the orderly business of the First Federal. They were also individually informed by Inspector Sheridan of the Detroit police department that they were in violation of the law. After they refused to leave upon request, the defendants were placed under arrest and removed on stretchers by the police.

On October 24, 1963, the defendants were charged with exciting and making a disturbance or contention in a business place in violation of CL 1948, § 750.170 (Stat.Ann.1962 Rev. § 28.367), and with failure to leave a business place when ordered by a duly authorized agent, in violation of C.L.S.1961, § 750.552 (Stat.Ann.1954 Rev. § 28.820(1)). Each defendant entered a plea of not guilty and the matter was tried before a jury commencing on December 4, 1963. On the opening day of trial, defendants, by a motion to dismiss, challenged the validity of the criminal warrant under the provisions of C.L.1948, § 767.45 (Stat.Ann.1954 Rev. § 28.985). This motion, as well as defendants' motion for a bill of particulars, was denied. On December 12, 1963, the jury found each defendant guilty on both counts. On January 16, 1964, defendants were sentenced to probation for a period of one year.

A motion for new trial was filed on December 31, 1963, and dismissed on February 7, 1964. Subsequently, on January 11, 1965, the motion for new trial was reinstated and the order of February 7, 1964, was set aside. The reinstated motion for new trial was finally denied on November 5, 1965.

Defendants appeal and raise 6 questions for review which will be considered in order.

1. Did the defendants make or excite a disturbance or contention in a business place within the meaning of C.L.1948, § 750.170 (Stat.Ann.1962 Rev. § 28.367)?

The statute which defendants were found to have violated is as follows:

'Any person who shall make or excite any disturbance or contention in any tavern, store or grocery, manufacturing establishment or any other Business place or in any street, lane, alley, highway, public building, grounds or park, or at any election or other public meeting where citizens are peaceably and lawfully assembled, Shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Appellants contend that their activities within the office of the complainant do not warrant the imposition of criminal penalties because their demonstration was peaceful. In other words, they did not excite a 'disturbance or contention.'

There is no dispute as to the conduct of these defendants. They entered the complainant's office, sat down on the floor in front of the teller's windows, interfered with complainant's business, and refused to leave. While inside the building they also sang 'freedom songs.' Because of the actions of these defendants, patrons of First Federal who would normally transact their business at windows reserved for that purpose had to be served at desks located in another portion of the office. Others were forced to either step over or around the defendants. The question is whether these facts constitute a violation of the above statute. Reported cases dealing with the statute are of no assistance to us in this cause. See People v. O'Keefe (1922), 218 Mich. 1, 187 N.W. 282; Ware v. Branch Circuit Judge (1889), 75 Mich. 488, 42 N.W. 997.

In Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed., 1951), p. 563, a disturbance is defined as:

'Any act causing annoyance, disquiet, agitation, or derangement to another, or interrupting his peace, or interfering with him in the pursuit of a lawful and appropriate occupation or contrary to the usages of a sort of meeting and class of persons assembled that interferes with its due progress or irritates the assembly in whole or in part.'

From the above definition it is clear that the statutory prohibition, framed in the disjunctive, embraces more than actual or threatened violence. Violence, actual or threatened, is proscribed by the use of the word 'contention.' The statute, however, does not require both a disturbance And a contention to sustain a conviction. Either is sufficient. A disturbance, which is something less than threats of violence, is an interruption of peace and quiet; a violation of public order and decorum; or an interference with or hindrance of one in pursuit of his lawful right or occupation.

A case very similar on its facts to that at hand though based on a somewhat dissimilar statute is People v. Green, (1965), 234 Cal.App.2d Supp. 871, 44 Cal.Rptr. 43, (certiorari denied 382 U.S. 993, 86 S.Ct. 576, 15 L.Ed.2d 480), where the defendants, obviously were intended to obstruct and interfere windows interfered with, disturbed and delayed the business of the bank officials and that of its customers. Defendants' refusal to move aside to permit other customers to conduct their business at the bank at the windows continued for some time until the tellers closed the windows and transferred their work to an area reserved for business with officers of the bank behind a railed-in enclosure. * * * The conduct of the defendants was intended to and did obstruct, interfere with and delay the normal business relations of the bank and its officials and those of the public who were there for the transaction of business. The evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of each of the defendants.'

Sitting on the floor on the inside of the building and acting as they did, constituted a disturbance. A savings and loan association and its shareholders have a right to conduct their business in an orderly, quiet, decorous manner. These rights were hindered and interfered with because appellants chose to ensconce themselves indecorously on the floor directly in the path of those desiring to transact business with the association. The defendants' actions obiously were intended to obstruct and interfere with the orderly business relations between the loan company and its customers. The guilt of each defendant beyond a reasonable doubt was clearly shown.

2. Were defendants properly convicted of failing to leave a business place when so ordered by a duly authorized agent?

Conviction of appellants on the second count was based on the following statute:

'Any person who shall wilfully enter, upon the lands or premises of another without lawful authority, after having been forbidden so to do by the owner or occupant, agent or servant of the owner or occupant, or Any person being upon the land or premises of another, upon being notified to depart therefrom by the owner or occupant, the agent or servant of either, who without lawful authority neglects or refuses to depart therefrom, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.' (Emphasis supplied) C.L.S.1961, § 750.552 (Stat.Ann.1954 Rev. § 28.820(1)).

Relying upon Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Wonderland Shopping Center, Inc. (1963), 370 Mich. 547, 122 N.W.2d 785, defendants argue that, because of the nature of the business, any savings and loan association's offices are dedicated to the public and therefore any person may enter and remain at his own pleasure. An examination of Wonderland, supra, however, does not reveal serious support for the conclusion contended for by appellants.

Wonderland is a large shopping center, located in Livonia, Michigan, covering approximately 55 acres of land. Upwards of 60 tenants lease store space from Wonderland, Inc. The center is typical of the kind known to shoppers in southeastern Michigan in that it has a large mall area, many sidewalks and extensive parking facilities, all for the purpose of giving the public easy access to the various shops and stores doing business in the center. The clothing workers union sought to distribute handbills in the mall area, urging shoppers to refrain from purchasing clothing apparel which did not bear a union label. In upholding the right of the union to distribute handbills on the mall, sidewalks, and parking areas, Justices Black and Smith stated on p. 565, 122 N.W.2d on p. 795 that Wonderland, Inc., had,

'by the very necessities and profitable advantages of its invitational and fully effective plan of doing business, made a special dedication, to general public use during regular shopping hours, of its self-designated 'public area of the shopping center."

It is notable that the 'public areas' of Wonderland were not held to include the...