People v. Weldon
| Decision Date | 18 December 1888 |
| Citation | 19 N.E. 279,111 N.Y. 569 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. WELDON. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from supreme court, general term, Fourth department.
E. C. Emerson, for appellant.
F. H. Peck, for the People.
The defendant was indicted and tried in the court of sessions of Jefferson county for the crime of receiving a silver watch knowing it to have been stolen, and was convicted of the offense. The general term affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appeals therefrom to this court.
Direct evidence was given upon the trial to establish all of the essential elements of the crime charged, and the verdict of the jury must therefore be taken as conclusively establishing the guilt of the defendant, unless some exception taken on the trial was well taken by him. He contends, among other things, that the indictment is defective in not alleging that the property was received by him feloniously or with criminal intent, and argues that the statute could not have been intended to include within its provisions a person who received such property with intent to restore it to its lawful owner, or for the purposes of its preservation. It is generally sufficient to state an offense in the language used in the statute defining the crime. As said by Judge FOLGER in Phelps v. People, 72 N. Y. 349: ‘If the indictment avers the offense as the statute defines it, the averment is sufficient; for the rule is that while in framing an indictment on a statute all the circumstances which constitute the definition of the offense in the statute itself, so as to bring the accused precisely within it, must be stated, yet no other description of the thing in which the offense was committed is necessary to be stated than that contained in the statute itself.’ See Eckhardt v. People, 83 N. Y. 462. The same rule is also laid down in the recent case of People v. West, 106 N. Y. 293, 12 N. E. Rep. 610.
The section of the Penal Code defining the crime in question is quite broad, and includes within its terms all persons who receive stolen property knowing it to have been stolen. No exceptions, either as to the description of the persons committing the crime, or as to the intent with which the property is received, are made by the statute. It declares that ‘a person who buys or receives any stolen property, knowing the same to have been stolen, is guilty of criminally receiving such property’ Section 550, Pen. Code.
Conceding that a person who receives such property with a laudable intent is not guilty of the commission of the crime, and a proviso to that effect had been incorporated in the act, it would not have been necessary for the pleader to negative the exception in the indictment. The fact might have been a defense, but it would be for the defendant to show that he came within the exception. Fleming v. People, 27 N. Y. 334;People v. West, supra. The allegation in the indictment that the defendant criminally received the property in question is, as here used, the equivalent of feloniously, and constitutes a sufficient description of the criminal intent with which the property was taken. People v. Willett, 102 N. Y. 251, 6 N. E. Rep. 301. Even if it were necessary to negative the possibility of an innocent reception of the property by the defendant, the statement that he criminally received it would, under the liberal rule of pleading now established, be a sufficient averment of the fact that he did so under circumstances constituting a crime. It is impossible to see how the defendant could have been prejudiced by the alleged defect, and we are of the opinion that, in any view, the case comes within the provisions of section 285 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, providing that ‘no indictment is insufficient * * * by reason of an imperfection in matter of form which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits.’
The defendant also alleges that the court erred in allowing the people's witness, Spellicy, to testify to a conversation held by him with one of the defendant's witnesses who had previously been sworn, and testified that he had had no...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Bradley
...were made. Thus, the foundation for extrinsic evidence of the alleged prior inconsistent statements was inadequate ( see People v. Weldon, 111 N.Y. 569, 575, 19 N.E. 279;People v. Laurey, 24 A.D.3d at 1109, 807 N.Y.S.2d 437;People v. Carter, 227 A.D.2d 661, 662–663, 641 N.Y.S.2d 908). There......
-
People v. Buchalter
...motives to swear falsely. At any rate, it was for the jury to decide whether they were to be believed or not.’ See also,People v. Weldon, 111 N.Y. 569, 576, 19 N.E. 279. The important factor was the reason which operated upon Rubin's mind. That reason might be a good one or a poor one. It m......
-
Wertheimer v. State, 25166.
...the presumption of guilt growing weaker as the time of possession recedes from the time of the original taking, People v. Weldon (1888) 111 N. Y. 569, 576, 19 N. E. 279. It has been aptly noted in a number of cases that this presumption or inference is not a presumption of law, but a deduct......
-
Wertheimer And Goldberg v. State
... ... secreting, but it includes any acts or conduct which assist ... the thief in converting the property to his own use, ... People v. Reynolds [1852], 2 Mich. 422, or ... which may prevent or render more difficult its discovery by ... the owner. 2 Brill, Cyc. Crim. Law ... 1029, the presumption of guilt growing ... weaker as the time of possession recedes from the time of the ... original taking. People v. Weldon [1888], ... 111 N.Y. 569, 576, 19 N.E. 279.) It has been aptly noted in a ... number of cases that this presumption or inference is not a ... ...