People v. Wells, 83SA391

• Decision Date: 14 February 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83SA391,83SA391
• Citation: 676 P.2d 698
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Linel WELLS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 698

676 P.2d 698

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Linel WELLS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 83SA391.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

Feb. 14, 1984.

James F. Smith, Dist. Atty., Emil A. Rinaldi, Deputy Dist. Atty., Brighton, for plaintiff-appellant.

David F. Vela, State Public Defender, Linda Hotes, Deputy State Public Defender, Brighton, for defendant-appellee.

QUINN, Justice.

The People pursuant to C.A.R. 4.1 appeal from a ruling of the district court suppressing the use of both physical and verbal evidence against the defendant, Linel Wells, in a pending criminal prosecution. The district court concluded that because there was no reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, the evidence was the fruit of an unconstitutional seizure of the defendant's person. We reverse the suppression ruling.

The defendant, who was charged in the Adams County District Court with attempt to commit first degree criminal trespass, ¹ filed a motion to suppress all the prosecution's evidence on the ground that it was obtained as a result of an unlawful seizure of his person in violation of the United States and Colorado Constitutions. U.S. Const. Amends. IV and XIV; Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 7. The only witness testifying at the suppression hearing was Officer Mark Nicastle of the Adams County Sheriff's Department. His testimony established the following facts.

On January 8, 1983, at approximately 7:30 a.m. Officer Nicastle was on routine car patrol near a warehouse complex located in the 1700 block of East 85th Avenue in Adams County. Upon looking over the complex, the officer observed the defendant in the warehouse parking lot. The defendant, according to the officer, had backed up his vehicle, with the trunk open, against a tractor-trailer and appeared to be pulling on the gate handle of the trailer. Believing that the defendant might be unlawfully breaking into the trailer, the officer drove past the entryway to the warehouse and then proceeded to the parking lot. As the officer drove into the parking lot he saw that the defendant had already entered his vehicle and was leaving. The officer drove to the side of the defendant's vehicle, rolled down his window, and told the defendant to "hold on a second." The defendant stopped his car and the officer turned around and pulled up behind him.

In response to Officer Nicastle's inquiry about what he was doing there, the defendant stated that he was looking for a job and was waiting for the driver of the tractor-trailer to arrive. The officer next requested the defendant's driver's license. When the defendant reached into his back pocket, he first pulled out a wrench-like tool and a "needle-nosed pair of pliers" and then his wallet. The officer took the defendant's driver's license and returned to his police vehicle where he called the police dispatcher for an identification check. He was informed by the dispatcher that the defendant was wanted on a Denver arrest warrant for second degree forgery. At this point Officer Nicastle made the decision to arrest the defendant and requested assistance from an officer in another police unit. When the other officer arrived, the defendant was arrested and searched. The wrench was recovered from his back pocket.

Shortly after the defendant's arrest, Officer Nicastle was able to contact the driver of the tractor-trailer. The driver came to the scene and, upon checking the trailer, determined that the aluminum seal on the back of the trailer had been removed. The officer perused the area and found the seal, which appeared to have been cut, lying on the ground about ten feet from the trailer. Officer Nicastle then arranged for the towing of the defendant's vehicle to the police station. He looked into the passenger compartment of the vehicle and observed the pliers, previously seen by him when the defendant removed his wallet from his rear pocket, stuffed inside the headrest of the driver's seat. The officer seized the pliers and the defendant's vehicle was later towed to the police station.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing the district court ruled that the defendant's act of pulling on the trailer gate handle and then attempting to leave the scene when the officer entered the parking lot did not amount to a reasonable suspicion to justify the initial stop and accordingly granted the motion to suppress. ² Although the court did not specify what evidence was suppressed, it apparently intended to include in its suppression ruling any and all evidence obtained subsequent to Officer Nicastle's stop, including the officer's observations at the scene, the defendant's post-stop statement to the officer, and any physical evidence taken by the police. The People, conceding that Officer Nicastle lacked probable cause to make an arrest when he first stopped the defendant in the warehouse parking lot, nonetheless claim that the officer's observations prior to the stop constituted reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain the defendant in order to investigate the circumstances of his conduct. We agree with the People's argument.

An investigatory stop, short of the traditional arrest, is an intermediate form of police response that may be utilized on less than probable cause under narrowly defined circumstances. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); accord, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); People v. Tate, 657 P.2d 955 (Colo.1983); Stone v. People, 174 Colo. 504, 485 P.2d 495 (1971). To justify a limited intrusion, a police officer must have an articulable and specific basis in fact for suspecting that criminal activity has occurred or is about to take place, the purpose of the intrusion must be a reasonable one, and its scope and character must be reasonably related to its purpose. State of Michigan v. Long, 452 U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 7 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983); People v. Lewis, 659 P.2d 676 (Colo.1983); People v. Johnson, 199 Colo. 68, 605 P.2d 46 (1980). The issue raised here involves only the first of these components--whether Officer Nicastle had a specific and articulable basis in fact for suspecting the defendant of criminal activity when he stopped him in the warehouse parking lot.

A subjective and unarticulated hunch of criminal activity will not support the "reasonable suspicion" necessary for an investigatory stop. E.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). On the contrary, "[t]he reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigative stop must be judged against an objective standard--that is, whether there were specific and articulable facts known to the officer, which taken together with rational inferences from these facts, created a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the intrusion into the defendant's personal security." People v. Thomas, 660 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Colo.1983). We are satisfied that, when viewed against this objective standard, the observations of Officer Nicastle prior to stopping the defendant measured up to reasonable suspicion.

When the officer initially observed the defendant in the warehouse parking lot, the defendant had backed up his car with the trunk open, to the...