People v. White

• Decision Date: 27 December 2022
• Docket Number: C095640
• Citation: 86 Cal.App.5th 1229,302 Cal.Rptr.3d 863
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Matthew Douglas WHITE, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

86 Cal.App.5th 1229

302 Cal.Rptr.3d 863

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Matthew Douglas WHITE, Defendant and Appellant.

C095640

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Filed December 27, 2022

Michelle T. LiVecchi-Raufi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher J. Rench and Doris A. Calandra, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

RENNER, J.

In May 2006, 25-year old Matthew Douglas White, while drunk and speeding, struck a car stopped on the shoulder of the highway with its hazard lights on, killing the driver and injuring two passengers. ( People v. White (Jan. 21, 2011, C063838) 2011 WL 193382 [nonpub. opn.].) A jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder, gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, driving under the influence causing injury, and driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or higher causing injury, with enhancements for causing and inflicting great bodily injury on multiple victims.¹ ( Ibid. ) The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life for second degree murder, and a consecutive determinate middle term of two years for driving under the influence with injury.² The conviction became final, by defendant's admission, in December 2012.

Some eight years later, in 2020, defendant requested and received a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496, 370 P.3d 1053 ( Franklin ) to make a record of information relevant to an eventual youthful offender parole hearing. He then filed a motion to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948 ( Estrada ) based on amendments to Penal Code section 654 following the passage of Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1; Assembly Bill 518).³ The trial court denied the motion.

Defendant appeals, arguing: (1) the Franklin hearing rendered the judgment nonfinal and subject to Assembly Bill 518; (2) Assembly Bill 518 should be applied retroactively to all convictions; and (3) failure to remand for resentencing would deprive him of equal protection under the law. We will reject these contentions and affirm.

I. DISCUSSION

At the time of sentencing, section 654, former subdivision (a) required that a defendant who committed an act punishable by two or more provisions of law be punished under the provision that provided for the longest possible term. (Stats. 1997, ch. 410, § 1.) Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill 518 amended section 654, subdivision (a) to permit an act or omission punishable under two or more provisions of law to "be punished under either of such provisions." ( § 654, subd. (a) ; Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1.) Thus, under newly amended section 654, a trial court is no longer required to punish under the longest possible term of imprisonment when multiple offenses are based on the same act or omission. ( People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379, 289 Cal.Rptr.3d 452.) Section 654 "now provides the trial court with discretion to impose and execute the sentence of either term, which could result in the trial court imposing and executing the shorter sentence rather than the longer sentence." ( Mani, supra, at p. 379.)

The parties agree, as do we, that Assembly Bill 518 "applies retroactively to defendants ... whose convictions were not yet final when the law became effective January 1, 2022." ( People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673, 289 Cal.Rptr.3d 792.) The parties also agree that defendant's conviction became final before Assembly Bill 518 went into effect. The parties disagree, however, on whether Assembly Bill 518 may nonetheless apply. We conclude it does not.

A. Finality of Conviction

Defendant argues he is entitled to remand under Assembly Bill 518 because the law applies to convictions that are not yet final, and the Franklin hearing "is a substantive hearing that reopens, unfinalizes, and corrects the prior sentence." Defendant offers several variations on this theme. First, he argues the Franklin hearing was "necessary to cure the unconstitutionality of the prior sentence." Second, he argues section 1204 and California Rules of Court, rule 4.437 (rule 4.437 ), the procedures followed in Franklin hearings, are procedural provisions for sentencing, and therefore, Franklin hearings can only be procedurally valid if they are extended portions of the original sentencing hearing. In a related vein, he observes the California Supreme Court has determined that section 1203.01, a statute authorizing a trial court to receive postjudgment submissions for transmission to the Board of Parole Hearings, authorizes a trial court to convene a Franklin hearing for a youthful offender whose judgment is final. ( In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 455, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 669, 441 P.3d 912 ( Cook ).) Relying on Cook , defendant argues, third, that if a Franklin hearing is an expansion of section 1203.01, it must be considered an extension of the original sentencing hearing. We disagree.

Some background on Franklin hearings may be helpful before we address defendant's specific contentions. The United States Supreme Court and California Supreme Court have declared that mandated life without parole sentences and their equivalents imposed on juveniles are unconstitutional. ( Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 ; People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 286, 282 P.3d 291.) The Legislature responded to these precedents by adopting Senate Bill No. 260 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4 ; Senate Bill 260) in 2014. Senate Bill 260 added section 3051 to the Penal Code. Under section 3051, a person incarcerated for a "controlling offense" when the person was 25 years of age or younger is eligible for release on parole at a "youth offender parole hearing." ( § 3051, subds. (a)(1), (b).) Depending on the offense, the hearing must be held no later than the prisoner's 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration. ( § 3051, subd. (b).) The right to a youth offender parole hearing applies retrospectively to all eligible youth offenders regardless of their date of conviction. ( Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 278, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496, 370 P.3d 1053.)

To provide a meaningful opportunity for the youth offender to obtain release and for the Board of Parole Hearings to "give great weight" to youth-related factors ( § 4801, subd. (c) ), the prisoner must be guaranteed a sufficient opportunity to put on the record relevant information of his or her characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense. ( Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 282-284, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496, 370 P.3d 1053.) Hearings for admitting this evidence are referred to as Franklin hearings. (See Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 458-459, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 669, 441 P.3d 912.) In Franklin hearings, the trial court may receive submissions and testimony pursuant to procedures set forth in section 1204 and rule 4.437, and subject to the rules of evidence. ( Franklin, supra, at p. 284, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496, 370 P.3d 1053.)

Contrary to defendant's contention, a Franklin hearing does not reopen a final judgment or sentencing. ( People v. Lizarraga (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 201, 207, 270 Cal.Rptr.3d 273 ( Lizarraga ).)⁴ Rather, it is an "evidence preservation process" to gather evidence for the eventual determination of parole, not a process to reopen or reconsider a sentence. ( Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 446, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 669, 441 P.3d 912 ; id. at p. 450, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 669, 441 P.3d 912.) Indeed, "a Franklin proceeding is unrelated to the validity of the defendant's sentence. Neither the entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing, nor the evidence preservation process ‘disturb[s] the finality of state convictions.’ " ( Id. at p. 451, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 669, 441 P.3d 912.)

When the Legislature enacted section 3051, it "did not envision that the original sentences of eligible youthful offenders would be vacated and that new sentences would be imposed to reflect parole eligibility during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration. The continued operation of the original sentence is evident from the fact that an inmate remains bound by that sentence, with no eligibility for a youthful offender parole hearing, if ‘subsequent to attaining [26] years of age’ the inmate ‘commits an additional crime for which malice aforethought is a necessary element ... or for which the individual is sentenced to life in prison.’ ( § 3051, subd. (h) ; [ ].) But section 3051 has changed the manner in which the juvenile offender's original sentence operates by capping the number of years that he or she may be imprisoned before becoming eligible for release on parole. The Legislature has effected this change by operation of law, with no additional resentencing procedure required." ( Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 278-279, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496, 370 P.3d 1053.)

Just as the provision of a youth offender parole hearing does not affect the underlying sentence, a Franklin hearing to ensure a fair parole hearing does not affect the defendant's final judgment. When a youth offender receives a Franklin hearing, the offender "need not be resentenced" because the sentence remains valid. ( Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496, 370 P.3d 1053.) At a Franklin hearing, the youth offender "may place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on the record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile offender's culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors. The goal of any...