People v. Whyte

• Decision Date: 23 November 2016
• Citation: 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 07880,144 A.D.3d 1393,42 N.Y.S.3d 370
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Corbin D. WHYTE, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

144 A.D.3d 1393

42 N.Y.S.3d 370

2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 07880

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Corbin D. WHYTE, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Nov. 23, 2016.

Mitch Kessler, Cohoes, for appellant.

Andrew J. Bonavia, Acting District Attorney, Ithaca, for respondent.

Before: EGAN JR., J.P., ROSE, CLARK, MULVEY and AARONS, JJ.

ROSE, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Tompkins County (Rowley, J.), rendered December 20, 2013, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of tampering with physical evidence.

Defendant was charged by indictment with two counts of murder in the second degree and one count each of robbery in the first degree and tampering with physical evidence based upon allegations that he participated in the robbery and shooting death of the victim. Following the shooting, defendant allegedly disposed of the jacket that he was wearing and directed his paramour, Zsatia Perkins, to dispose of his boots. After defendant's first two jury trials resulted in mistrials, the People dismissed one count of murder in the second degree. A third jury trial was thereafter held, following which defendant was convicted of tampering with physical evidence, acquitted of robbery in the first degree and a mistrial was declared as to the lesser included offense of attempted robbery in the first degree and the remaining murder charge. Defendant was sentenced to 2 to 4 years in prison. He now appeals.

Defendant first contends that the verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence because the only proof that he tampered with physical evidence is the uncorroborated testimony of Perkins, who defendant alleges is an accomplice as a matter of law. Although defendant moved for a trial order of dismissal at the close of the People's proof, he did not raise the issue of corroboration of Perkins' testimony. Thus, we find that defendant's current contention is unpreserved for our review (see People v. Raysor, 130 A.D.3d 1079, 1079, 15 N.Y.S.3d 111 [2015], lv. denied 27 N.Y.3d 968, 36 N.Y.S.3d 629, 56 N.E.3d 909 [2016] ; People v. Anderson, 120 A.D.3d 1549, 1549–1550, 993 N.Y.S.2d 216 [2014], lv. denied 25 N.Y.3d 1198, 16 N.Y.S.3d 520, 37 N.E.3d 1163 [2015] ). Defendant also argues that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence because there was no credible evidence linking the boots and jacket to the underlying robbery and murder or establishing that he disposed of either item. Although there was conflicting evidence adduced at trial and, thus, a different verdict would not have been unreasonable (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ), after viewing the evidence in a neutral light and deferring to the jury's credibility determinations, we find that the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence (see People v. Lucas, 25 A.D.3d 822, 824, 806 N.Y.S.2d 798 [2006], lv. denied 6 N.Y.3d 815, 812 N.Y.S.2d 455, 845 N.E.2d 1286 [2006] ; People v. Urtado, 21 A.D.3d 854, 854, 804 N.Y.S.2d 2 [2005], lv. denied 6 N.Y.3d 760, 810 N.Y.S.2d 428, 843 N.E.2d 1168 [2005] ).

Nevertheless, we find merit to defendant's contention that County Court erred in failing to charge the jury that Perkins was an accomplice as a matter of law. Initially, we note that defendant's request to provide an accomplice instruction, which occurred during deliberations and in direct response to a jury note, sufficiently preserved this issue for our review (see People v. Mariano, 101 A.D.3d 1367, 1368, 956 N.Y.S.2d 291 [2012] ; People v. Lewis, 116 A.D.2d 16, 19, 499 N.Y.S.2d 709 [1986] ). As to the merits, it is well settled that, “to be an accomplice for corroboration purposes, the witness must somehow be criminally implicated and potentially subject to prosecution for the conduct or factual transaction related to the crime[ ] for which the defendant is on trial” (People v. Medeiros, 116 A.D.3d 1096, 1098, 983 N.Y.S.2d 329 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv. denied 24 N.Y.3d 1045, 998 N.Y.S.2d 315, 23 N.E.3d 158 [2014] ; see People v. Kocsis,

137 A.D.3d 1476, 1480, 28 N.Y.S.3d 466 [2016] ; People v. Nelson, 128 A.D.3d 1225, 1227, 10 N.Y.S.3d 343 [2015], lv. denied 26 N.Y.3d 1041, 22 N.Y.S.3d 171, 43 N.E.3d 381 [2015] ). Thus, “a ‘witness is an accomplice as a matter of law only if the jury could reasonably reach no other conclusion but that he [or she] participated in the offense charged or an offense based upon the same or some of the same facts or conduct which constitute the offense charged’ ” (People v. Caban, 5 N.Y.3d 143, 153, 800 N.Y.S.2d 70, 833 N.E.2d 213 [2005], quoting People v. Besser, 96 N.Y.2d 136, 147, 726 N.Y.S.2d 48, 749 N.E.2d 727 [2001] ; accord People v. Hines, 24 A.D.3d 964, 965, 806 N.Y.S.2d 737 [2005], lvs. denied 6 N.Y.3d 834, 814 N.Y.S.2d 82, 847 N.E.2d 379 (2006), 6 N.Y.3d 839, 814 N.Y.S.2d 88, 847 N.E.2d 385 [2006] ; see People v. Sage, 23 N.Y.3d 16, 23, 988 N.Y.S.2d 104, 11 N.E.3d 177 [2014] ).

Perkins' testimony established that she picked defendant up at the same location that the jacket was later found and she subsequently disposed of defendant's boots pursuant to his direction. In addition, she was arrested the same day as defendant, was charged with a felony, entered into a cooperation agreement with the People and, pursuant to that agreement, pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor in exchange for her truthful testimony against defendant. When defendant requested the accomplice charge, he stated that Perkins had pleaded guilty to “obstructing governmental administration ... in exchange for not being prosecuted for tampering.” In light of this, we find that Perkins was an accomplice as a matter of law “since [s]he could have been (and was) charged with a crime ‘based upon some of the same facts or conduct’ upon which the charge[ ] against defendant [was] based” (People v. Medeiros, 116 A.D.3d at 1098, 983 N.Y.S.2d 329, quoting CPL 60.22[2][b] ; see People v. Lee, 80 A.D.3d 877, 878, 914 N.Y.S.2d 415 [2011], lvs. denied 16 N.Y.3d 832, 921 N.Y.S.2d 197, 946 N.E.2d 185 (2011), 16 N.Y.3d 833, 921 N.Y.S.2d 197, 946 N.E.2d 185 (2011), 16 N.Y.3d 834, 921 N.Y.S.2d 198, 946 N.E.2d 186 [2011] ; People v. Adams, 307 A.D.2d 475, 476, 763 N.Y.S.2d 347 [2003], lv. denied 1 N.Y.3d 566, 775 N.Y.S.2d 784, 807 N.E.2d 897 [2003] ; see generally People v. Fells, 279 A.D.2d 706, 711, 718 N.Y.S.2d 458 [2001], lv. denied 96 N.Y.2d 758, 725 N.Y.S.2d 284, 748 N.E.2d 1080 [2001] ). Thus, County Court erred in failing to instruct the jury that Perkins was an accomplice as a matter of law and that defendant could not be convicted on Perkins' testimony absent corroborative evidence (see CPL 60.22[1] ).¹ In addition, we find that County Court's failure in this regard “cannot be considered harmless error on this record,”...