People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 09 March 2022
• Docket Number: Ind. 18-530,2020-00281
• Citation: 2022 NY Slip Op 01468
• Parties: The People of the State of New York, respondent, v. Patrick Williams, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

2022 NY Slip Op 01468

The People of the State of New York, respondent, v. Patrick Williams, appellant.

No. 2020-00281, Ind. No. 18-530

Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

March 9, 2022

Thomas T. Keating, Dobbs Ferry, NY, for appellant.

Miriam E. Rocah, District Attorney, White Plains, NY (Brian R Pouliot of counsel), for respondent.

MARK C. DILLON, J.P. COLLEEN D. DUFFY FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court Westchester County (Barry E. Warhit, J.), rendered November 7, 2019, convicting him of burglary in the third degree (five counts), upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant pleaded guilty to five counts of burglary in the third degree. Prior to sentencing, he moved to withdraw his plea of guilty. The Supreme Court denied the motion without a hearing and imposed sentence. The defendant appeals.

"The decision to permit a defendant to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty rests within the sound discretion of the court and generally will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of [that] discretion" (People v Jamison, 197 A.D.3d 569, 570 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPL 220.60[3]; People v Torres, 192 A.D.3d 831, 832). "In general 'such a motion must be premised upon some evidence of possible innocence or of fraud, mistake, coercion or involuntariness in the taking of the plea'" (People v Hollmond, 191 A.D.3d 120, 136, quoting People v De Jesus, 199 A.D.2d 529, 530). "A defendant's contention that his or her plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent survives a valid appeal waiver" (People v Torres, 192 A.D.3d at 832). "When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea, the nature and extent of the fact-finding inquiry 'rest[s] largely in the discretion of the Judge to whom the motion is made' and a hearing will be granted only in rare instances" (People v Brown, 14 N.Y.3d 113, 116 quoting People v Tinsley, 35 N.Y.2d 926, 927; see People v Hollman, 197 A.D.3d 484, 484).

Here, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying, without a hearing, the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. Reviewing the record as a whole and the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea (see People v Sougou, 26 N.Y.3d 1052, 1055), we conclude that the defendant's plea of guilty was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made (see People v Hollman, 197 A.D.3d at 484-485; People v Duart, 144 A.D.3d 1173, 1175). The defendant's assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty were unsubstantiated and contradicted by the record of the plea proceeding (see People v Haffiz, 19 N.Y.3d 883, 884; People v Turner, 195 A.D.3d 953, 954; People v Abreu, 184 A.D.3d 656, 656).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the record demonstrates that he also knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal (see People v Sanders, 25 N.Y.3d 337, 339-342; People v Lopez, 186 A.D.3d...