People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 20 May 1982
• Citation: 436 N.E.2d 1292,56 N.Y.2d 236,451 N.Y.S.2d 690
• Parties: , 436 N.E.2d 1292 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Kenneth WILLIAMS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 690

451 N.Y.S.2d 690

56 N.Y.2d 236, 436 N.E.2d 1292

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Kenneth WILLIAMS, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 20, 1982.

Thomas R. Legenhausen and William E. Hellerstein, New York City, for appellant

Mario Merola, Dist. Atty. (Jay Shapiro and Steven R. Kartagener, Asst. Dist. Attys., of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

COOKE, Chief Judge.

The extent to which the prosecution should be allowed to use prior convictions to impeach the credibility of a defendant who testifies is a matter that is generally left to the discretion of the trial court. The trial court may not, however, abdicate its responsibility by failing to exercise this discretion. Here, the Appellate Division was correct in its determination that no such discretion was exercised. This court cannot agree, however, that the error was harmless. The order of the Appellate Division, 82 A.D.2d 734, 439 N.Y.S.2d 641, therefore should be reversed.

Defendant Kenneth Williams was convicted after a jury trial of robbery in the second degree. Prior to trial, defendant moved, pursuant to the procedures outlined in People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413, for a ruling on which of defendant's prior convictions might be used to impeach his credibility if he chose to testify in his own behalf. The court reviewed 23 of defendant's prior convictions that the prosecution stated it planned to use. The prosecutor later withdrew his request to use one of the convictions. Of the remaining 22, the court ruled that defendant could be cross-examined on 20 of the convictions and on the underlying facts of the remaining 2. Defendant chose not to testify.

At trial, the complainant testified that defendant and another man accosted her on a Bronx street and defendant told her he had a gun. She testified that the men took her money and rings and forced her to buy a television set for them with her credit card. They then fled. She stated that four months later, she saw defendant walking on the street and called police. Two police officers testified that after his arrest defendant told them he took the rings, money, and television set from complainant but that he had done so by tricking her and had not used a weapon. The defense offered no testimony. In summation, defense counsel argued that defendant had perpetrated a confidence game upon the complainant but had not robbed her.

The Appellate Division, by a divided court, affirmed defendant's convictions (82 A.D.2d 734, 439 N.Y.S.2d 641). All of the members of that court agreed that the trial court had either abused its discretion or exercised none at all in its Sandoval ruling. A majority held, however, that this error was harmless.

In Sandoval, this court sanctioned a procedure whereby a defendant, before deciding whether to testify, could obtain "an advance ruling as to the use by the prosecutor of prior convictions or proof of the prior commission of specific criminal, vicious or immoral acts for the purpose of impeaching a defendant's credibility" (34 N.Y.2d 371, 374, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413, supra). It emphasized that, in weighing whether cross-examination about a prior conviction or immoral act should be allowed, the court should balance the probative worth of the evidence on the issue of defendant's credibility against "the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant, measured both by the impact of such evidence if it is admitted after his testimony and by the effect its probable introduction may have in discouraging him from taking the stand in his own behalf" (34 N.Y.2d 371, 375, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413, supra).

Although the list is by no means exhaustive, among the factors that may bear upon the court's decision whether to permit use of a prior conviction are the period of time since the conviction, the degree to which it bears on a defendant's veracity and credibility, and the extent to which any similarity between the prior conviction and the crime charged may "be taken as some proof of the commission of the crime charged rather than be reserved solely to the issue of credibility" (People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 377, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413, supra; see People v. Mackey, 49 N.Y.2d 274, 425 N.Y.S.2d 288, 401 N.E.2d 398; People v. Davis, 44 N.Y.2d 269, 405 N.Y.S.2d 428, 376 N.E.2d 901; People v. Carmack, 44 N.Y.2d 706, 405 N.Y.S.2d 446, 376 N.E.2d 919).

The balancing of these factors in the course of passing on a Sandoval motion is a discretionary determination for the trial courts, and review beyond the intermediate appellate level is generally not warranted (People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 921, 425 N.Y.S.2d 54, 401 N.E.2d 177). Where the court has abused its discretion or exercised none at all, however, a legal issue reviewable by this court exists. On this record we have no occasion to disturb the determination of the Appellate Division that there was error.

In this case, the District Attorney indicated he would use 23 of defendant's prior convictions for impeachment if defendant testified. With the exception of one felony, armed robbery, these involved a laundry list of misdemeanors, including larceny by trick, fraud, petit larceny and sexual abuse, among others....