People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 23 February 2010
• Citation: People v. Williams, 14 NY3d 198, 925 N.E.2d 878, 899 N.Y.S.2d 76 (N.Y. 2010)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Darrell WILLIAMS, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Efrain Hernandez, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Craig Lewis, Appellant. In the Matter of Danny Echevarria, Appellant, v. Patricia D. Marks, Monroe County Court Judge, Respondent. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Edwin Rodriguez, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

899 N.Y.S.2d 76

14 N.Y.3d 198

925 N.E.2d 878

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Darrell WILLIAMS, Appellant.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Efrain Hernandez, Appellant.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Craig Lewis, Appellant.

In the Matter of Danny Echevarria, Appellant,

v.Patricia D. Marks, Monroe County Court Judge, Respondent.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Edwin Rodriguez, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 23, 2010.

Center for Appellate Litigation, New York City(Mark W. Zeno and Robert S. Dean of counsel), for appellant in the first above-entitled action.

Center for Appellate Litigation, New York City(Barbara Zolot and Robert S. Dean of counsel), for appellant in the second above-entitled action.

Center for Appellate Litigation, New York City(Carl S. Kaplan and Robert S. Dean of counsel), for appellant in the third above-entitled action.

Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (Brian Shiffrin and Drew R. DuBrin of counsel), for appellant in the fourth above-entitled proceeding.

Center for Appellate Litigation, New York City(Mark W. Zeno and Robert S. Dean of counsel), for appellant in the fifth above-entitled action.

Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York City(David M. Cohn and Mark Dwyer of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled action.

Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York City(Martin J. Foncello and David M. Cohn of counsel), for respondent in the second and third above-entitled actions.

Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, Albany (Rajit S. Dosanjh, Barbara D. Underwood and Nancy A. Spiegel of counsel), for respondent in the fourth above-entitled proceeding.

Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York City(Martin J. Foncello and David M. Cohn of counsel), for respondent in the fifth above-entitled action.

Legal Aid Society, Criminal Appeals Bureau, New York City(Kerry Elgarten of counsel), amicus curiae pro se in the fourth above-entitled proceeding.

OPINION OF THE COURT

GRAFFEO, J.

In 1998, as part of Jenna's Law, the Legislature adopted Penal Law § 70.45, which directs that postrelease supervision is a mandatory component of all determinate prison sentences.We subsequently held that a sentencing court's failure to pronounce postrelease supervision during sentencing proceedings results in an illegal sentence that cannot be administratively corrected by the Department of Correctional Services( seeMatter of Garner v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs.,10 N.Y.3d 358, 360, 859 N.Y.S.2d 590, 889 N.E.2d 467[2008] ).The Legislature responded in 2008 by enacting Correction Law § 601-d to provide a mechanism for courts to consider resentencing defendants serving determinate sentences without court-ordered postrelease supervision terms.In these appeals, we consider whether there are statutory or constitutional impediments to imposing postrelease supervision at resentencing on defendants who have completed their terms of imprisonment and been released into the community.

I.The History of Postrelease Supervision

The intent of the Legislature in adopting Jenna's Law was to abolish parole and institute determinate terms of imprisonment for certain felony offenses ( seeL. 1998, ch. 1).A major component of this statutory scheme required that every determinate

[925 N.E.2d 882, 899 N.Y.S.2d 80]

sentence must also provide for postrelease supervision (PRS)( seePenal Law § 70.45[1] ).The implementation of mandatory PRS spurred a series of cases in this Court, beginning with People v. Catu, 4 N.Y.3d 242, 792 N.Y.S.2d 887, 825 N.E.2d 1081[2005], in which we held that where PRS is a "direct consequence" of a conviction, a defendant seeking to plead guilty must be informed that a period of PRS constitutes part of his sentence if the plea is to be valid under the knowing, voluntary and intelligent standard ( seeid. at 244-245, 792 N.Y.S.2d 887, 825 N.E.2d 1081).Thus, a defendant who was not advised about a term of PRS prior to pleading guilty may seek vacatur of the plea.

Shortly after Catu, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declared in Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71[2006], cert. denied sub nom.Burhlre v. Earley,551 U.S. 1159, 127 S.Ct. 3014, 168 L.Ed.2d 752[2007] that a defendant is entitled to habeas corpus relief in federal court ifcorrection officials administratively imposed PRS that was not ordered by a court.A few weeks later, our decision in People v. Van Deusen, 7 N.Y.3d 744, 819 N.Y.S.2d 854, 853 N.E.2d 223[2006] dealt with a defendant who requested the withdrawal of her plea prior to sentencing because she had not been told about PRS as part of her negotiated plea bargain.The sentencing court had attempted to correct this oversight by combining the five-year mandatory term of PRS with a reduced prison sentence so that the total prison term would be less than the maximum 15-year sentence that the defendant had been promised.We rejected this corrective action, determining that a Catu error could not be rectified in this manner because, when the defendant pleaded guilty, "she did not possess all the information necessary for an informed choice among different possible courses of action" and, therefore, her plea was involuntary ( id. at 746, 819 N.Y.S.2d 854, 853 N.E.2d 223).

Then, in People v. Louree, 8 N.Y.3d 541, 838 N.Y.S.2d 18, 869 N.E.2d 18[2007], we recognized that a Catu error may be raised on direct appeal even if a defendant did not preserve the issue by moving to withdraw a plea prior to sentencing (as Van Deusen had done) or seeking vacatur of the conviction after sentencing ( seeid. at 545-546, 838 N.Y.S.2d 18, 869 N.E.2d 18).And in People v. Hill, 9 N.Y.3d 189, 849 N.Y.S.2d 13, 879 N.E.2d 152[2007], cert. denied553 U.S. ----, 128 S.Ct. 2430, 171 L.Ed.2d 257[2008], we reiterated that a Catu error requires vacatur of a defective guilty plea since the error affects the defendant's due process rights ( seeid. at 193, 849 N.Y.S.2d 13, 879 N.E.2d 152).

In April 2008, we issued the decisions in Matter of Garner v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 10 N.Y.3d 358, 859 N.Y.S.2d 590, 889 N.E.2d 467[2008]andPeople v. Sparber, 10 N.Y.3d 457, 859 N.Y.S.2d 582, 889 N.E.2d 459[2008].These cases dealt with the legality of the administrative imposition of PRS by the Department of Correctional Services(DOCS) in situations where the sentencing courts had not pronounced PRS as part of the sentences.In Garner,we ruled that DOCS did not have the authority to add PRS to an inmate's sentence because "CPL 380.20 and 380.40 collectively provide that only a judge may impose a PRS sentence"(10 N.Y.3d at 360, 859 N.Y.S.2d 590, 889 N.E.2d 467).And in Sparber,we held that imprisoned defendants who raised the pronouncement issue on direct appeal, but did not seek vacatur of their pleas, were not entitled to have PRS expunged from their sentences as this would result in non-PRS sentences that contravened the statutory mandate for determinate sentences ( seePenal Law § 70.45[1] ).

[925 N.E.2d 883, 899 N.Y.S.2d 81]

Consequently, we concluded that the appropriate remedy for defendants like Sparber was a resentencing proceeding that could provide for the proper inclusion of PRS ( see10 N.Y.3d at 471-472, 859 N.Y.S.2d 582, 889 N.E.2d 459).

In the aftermath of these cases, the Legislature sought to deal with the significant number of incarcerated individuals whose status had been affected by the Catu and Garner/Sparber decisions.Section 70.85 was enacted (L. 2008, ch. 141, § 2) to address "cases in which a determinate sentence was imposed ... and was required by law to include a term of postrelease supervision, but the court did not explicitly state such a term when pronouncing sentence."The statute allows a resentencing court to reimpose the originally pronounced determinate prison sentence without PRS if the District Attorney so consents.The purpose of this statute was to "avoid the need for pleas to be vacated when the District Attorney consents to re-sentencing without a term of PRS"(Governor's Approval Mem, at 2, Bill Jacket, L. 2008, ch. 141, reprinted in 2008 McKinney's Session Laws of N.Y., at 1653).In addition, section 601-d of the Correction Law was added to permit DOCS to notify sentencing courts that PRS had not been properly imposed in certain cases(these defendants are referred to as "designated persons") and to have these defendants returned to the original sentencing courts for modification of their sentences to include PRS.

Most recently, in May 2009, we decided another case where the defendant pleaded guilty but was not adequately informed about PRS.In People v. Boyd, 12 N.Y.3d 390, 880 N.Y.S.2d 908, 908 N.E.2d 898[2009], the People mentioned PRS at the plea proceeding but the court stated that it did not have to order it because PRS was a mandatory part of the sentence.The court then asked the defendant if he understood that PRS was mandatory and the defendant responded in the affirmative.However, the defendant was not advised of the specific duration of his PRS term at the time of his plea, nor did the court formally impose a term of PRS as part of the sentence.We determined that these deficiencies rendered the plea involuntary and that defendant did not need to preserve this issue by a postallocution motion to withdraw his plea( seeid. at 393, 880 N.Y.S.2d 908, 908 N.E.2d 898).Although the People requested that the defendant be resentenced without PRS under the procedure adopted in Penal Law § 70.85 in order to avoid vacatur of the guilty plea, we declined to approve this remedy in Boyd, finding it premature.We explained:

"This corrective action should not be entertained at this time because the constitutionality of this new provision and its applicability to this case have not been sufficiently developed for our review....[T]heissue of whether the deficiency in the plea allocution can be rectified by

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