People v. Williams

• Citation: 351 N.Y.S.2d 761,43 A.D.2d 884
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Stuart WILLIAMS, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 11 January 1974
• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division

Page 761

351 N.Y.S.2d 761

43 A.D.2d 884

PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Stuart WILLIAMS, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Jan. 11, 1974.

Nathaniel A. Barrell, Public Defender, Charles D. Halvorsen, Buffalo, for appellant.

Michael F. Dillon, Dist. Atty., Judith Blake Manzella, Buffalo, for respondent.

Before MARSH, J.P., and WITMER, CARDAMONE, SIMONS and HENRY, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

An examination of the record of the suppression hearing, including a review of the video tapes of the statement made by defendant and the stipulated transcript thereof, supports the orders denying the motions to suppress. The court did not err in accepting defendant's reduced plea of guilty of manslaughter in the first degree under each indictment; and the sentences imposed were not excessive.

Judgments affirmed.

All concur, WITMER and CARDAMONE, JJ., in separate Memoranda.

WITMER, Justice (concurring):

Besides urging that the record supports the orders denying the motions to suppress, the District Attorney argued, as an additional ground for affirmance, that before the guilty pleas were accepted, and as a condition thereof, defendant waived his right to appeal from the orders denying suppression. The record confirms this. Since we find that defendant's statement to the police was voluntarily made and was properly held to be admissible if defendant went to trial, it is unnecessary for us to reach this alternate ground urged by the District Attorney. However, because of the possibility that on review hereof the Court of Appeals should be inclined to reverse our determination that the orders denying suppression were properly made, I express my further view that the waiver of his rights to appeal from such orders bars defendant from raising on this appeal any question with respect to the validity of the orders denying his motions to suppress, and that the judgments should also be affirmed because the appeals do not properly bring up those orders for review. After defendant had been indicted for the two alleged murders in this case, to wit, of Richard Giff on October 5, 1968 and Delores Sekuterski on March 29, 1970, the court assigned separate attorneys to represent defendant, one for each crime, respectively. Before the suppression motions were heard the District Attorney offered to accept from the defendant reduced pleas of manslaughter in the first degree but defendant declined so to plead. Thereafter, the suppression hearings were had at considerable length and the court denied the motions. The indictments were then moved for trial. At that time defendant changed his mind and offered to plead guilty to manslaughter first degree on each indictment in satisfaction thereof. Because the People were then ready for trial, with witnesses ready, and because of the age of the crimes and the danger of losing the witnesses, the District Attorney refused to accept the pleas unless defendant would waive his right to appeal from the orders previously made denying his suppression motions. Of course, the District Attorney is not required to agree to accept a plea of guilty to a lesser charge, nor is a court required to accept a plea of guilty (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427; Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 8 L.Ed.2d 211). After conferring further with his attorneys and after the court called to the special attention of defendant and his attorneys the fact that the District Attorney would only accept the pleas on condition that defendant waive his right to appeal from the orders denying suppression, defendant plead guilty to manslaughter, first degree. The court interrogated defendant's attorneys about their investigation of these cases and questioned defendant about the details of the killings, and then accepted the guilty pleas. The court's action can in no way be interpreted as a denial to defendant of his right to appeal, which is regarded as 'an integral part of our judicial system' (People v. Pride, 3 N.Y.2d 545, 549, 170 N.Y.S.2d 321, 323, 147 N.E.2d 719, 720). Unquestionably, defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to appeal from the orders denying his suppression motions. He, therefore, is precluded from having this court review them on appeal unless waiver of the right to appeal from such an order may not be waived. Since even greater rights may be waived, such as the right to jury trial, it seems clear to me that in order to obtain acceptance of a reduced plea a defendant may waive his right to appeal from an order denying his motion to suppress evidence. This is in accord with the holding that a district attorney may attach to his acceptance of a plea of guilty to one count of an indictment a condition that the remaining counts will be dismissed only if defendant does not appeal from his conviction on the count to which he pleads guilty (People v. Irizarry, 27 N.Y.2d 856, 317 N.Y.S.2d 15, 265 N.E.2d 540; People v. Chaney, 25 N.Y.2d 966, 305 N.Y.S.2d 359, 252 N.E.2d 856). It has been held that a district attorney will be required to perform specifically his promise to make no recommendation as to the sentence to be pronounced upon a defendant's plea of guilty (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, supra). This rule, of course, is to protect a defendant in his plea; but there seems no reason why the rule should not work both ways where it is clear that each side has acted in good faith, freely and with full knowledge of all the attendant circumstances. It is argued on behalf of defendant that by enacting subdivision 2 of section 710.70 of the Criminal Procedure Law the Legislature has established as a matter of public policy defendant's right to appeal. As above noted, it may likewise be said that the right to jury trial embodied in the Constitution is a matter of public policy, and yet waiver of that right is expressly authorized by statute (CPL, section 320.10) and is often exercised. Beyond that, however, just what is the basis of the public policy supporting the right to appeal? I suggest that it has two aspects, (1) to relieve calendar congestion by permitting the parties, both the People and the defendant, to avoid what they deem to be a superfluous trial in the event that a confession or statement is admissible upon the trial, and yet have a review of the order denying suppression and (2) permitting a defendant to gain the benefit of plea bargaining without forfeiting his right to appeal from the order denying suppression. To deny to the People the right to demand waiver of the right to appeal from an order denying a motion to suppress may very well run counter to the public policy of permitting a defendant to plead to a lesser crime in lieu of standing trial and risking conviction of the crime for which he stands indicted. In cases, such as this one, where the People are ready for trial and genuinely feel that they should proceed to trial absent such waiver and where both sides are well aware of all factors involved and act freely and in good faith, I think that public policy favors permitting such waiver of the right to appeal from an order of suppression, and that defendant should be bound by his agreement. We do not need to fear that if the district attorney can refuse to accept a reduced plea unless the defendant waives his right to appeal from such order, district attorneys will adopt such practice in every case. In the face of a holding that such a waiver may be binding, defendants will refuse to waive and plead guilty where they have a reasonable chance of success on a trial, and the People will not in such case undertake to exact the promise of waiver and cause further delay in disposition of their cases. Not only that, but the great majority of cases, as heretofore, will involve indictments for recent crimes where the danger of loss of witnesses is less...