People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 01 February 1990
• Citation: 158 A.D.2d 253,550 N.Y.S.2d 657
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Leroy WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 657

550 N.Y.S.2d 657

158 A.D.2d 253

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Leroy WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

First Department.

Feb. 1, 1990.

R. Vallejo, New York City, for respondent.

C. Santangelo, for defendant-appellant.

Before MURPHY, P.J., and SULLIVAN, ROSS, ROSENBERGER and ELLERIN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Richard L. Price, J.), rendered July 16, 1987, convicting defendant of criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree and sentencing him, as a predicate felony offender, to concurrent indeterminate terms of imprisonment of from two and one-half to five years on each, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that he acted under circumstances evincing "depraved indifference to human life" or that his conduct created a "grave risk of death" so as to support a conviction of reckless endangerment in the first degree. The trial evidence showed that on October 2, 1986, at about 8 p.m., two police officers observed defendant running a red light in a stolen Mazda RX-7. Defendant ignored the officers' attempts to pull him over and engaged them in a high-speed chase on University Avenue, a well-traveled street in the Bronx. The Mazda, which accelerated to a speed of 60 miles per hour in a thirty-five-mile per hour speed zone, ran several red lights. At University Avenue and 174th Street, the Mazda barely missed two pedestrians, who, walking in the crosswalk, had to jump out of the way. The vehicle changed lanes repeatedly, weaving in and out of traffic. Finally, defendant turned into Shakespeare Avenue, where he jumped from the car and fled. Eventually defendant was apprehended. In all, the chase lasted five minutes.

Defendant's conviction must be upheld if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, a rational fact finder could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (See, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932.) "A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person." (Penal Law sec. 120.25.) The statute's penal proscription is not attuned to a particular outcome. The risk of injury alone sustains the prosecution. (People v. Davis, 72 N.Y.2d 32, 36, 530 N.Y.S.2d 529, 526 N.E.2d 20.) The determination of whether a crime was committed entails "an objective assessment of the degree of risk presented by [the actor's] reckless conduct." (People v. Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270, 277, 469 N.Y.S.2d 599, 457 N.E.2d 704, cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953, 104 S.Ct. 2159, 80 L.Ed.2d 544.)

In our view, defendant's conduct during the high-speed chase supports the finding of guilt. After running a red light on a well-traveled Bronx thoroughfare at 8:00 p.m., defendant ignored the pursuing patrol car's red emergency light and horn. Eventually, he accelerated his vehicle to a speed of 60 miles per hour in a 35 mile zone, ran another red light and barely missed two pedestrians who, already in the intersection, were able to jump out of the path of the oncoming car. Such conduct on defendant's part demonstrates an abandonment of any concern for those who were exposed to such reckless behavior. The degree of risk undertaken by defendant clearly presented a...