People v. Williams
| Decision Date | 01 July 1969 |
| Citation | 250 N.E.2d 201,302 N.Y.S.2d 780,25 N.Y.2d 86 |
| Parties | , 250 N.E.2d 201 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Lester WILLIAMS, Vicki Morris, Raymond G. Gardner, Elizabeth Elkind and Willie Blackman, Appellants. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
M. James Spitzer, Jr. and Carl Rachlin, New York City, for appellants.
Frank S. Hogan, Dist. Atty. (Jerry Slater and Michael R. Juviler, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.
During July, 1963 representatives of the Joint Committee on Equal Opportunity sought to have Governor Rockefeller cease construction on State buildings until such time as the unions working at these construction sites admitted as apprentices in their organizations members of minority groups. In furtherance of their protest the committee obtained permission from Governor Rockefeller to (1) have up to nine members of their group remain in the press room of the Governor's New York City office (the Governor is the owner of the building); (2) replace from time to time members of the group who were in the office; and (3) use telephones and lavatories in the building.
Approximately three weeks later a group of seven members of the committee, including one Jeffrey Glick, one Steven Frieder, and the five appellants herein, sought to gain entrance into the Governor's office. They were informed by a security guard that, since there were already three members of the committee inside, one out of the now ten visitors would have to leave. The seven new arrivals refused and sat down upon the stairs at the entrance to the building. The Governor was called and he ordered the group's removal from the building. The police were summoned and asked all seven to leave. When they refused the security guard asked the police to place them under arrest. Thereupon the police told all seven they were under arrest. Frieder and Glick voluntarily left the building. The appellants, however, refused to get up from the stairs thereby requiring the police to physically carry them out of the building.
Frieder, Glick and the appellants were convicted of unlawful intrusion on real property (former Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40, § 2036), and appellants were also convicted of resisting a public officer in the discharge of his duty (former Penal Law § 1851).
On appeal to the Appellate Term, the People conceded under the authority of People v. Lawson, 16 N.Y.2d 552, 260 N.Y.S.2d 661, 208 N.E.2d 466, that the convictions for unlawful intrusion must be reversed because the original entry into the building was lawful. The Appellate Term, however, affirmed the appellants' convictions of resisting a public officer in the discharge of his duty. It is from the affirmance of those convictions that the appellants have appealed pursuant to permission granted by a Judge of this court.
Prior to July 1, 1963 section 177 (subd. 1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided that a peace officer could not effectuate a lawful arrest, without a warrant, unless a crime was being committed or attempted in his presence. Therefore, a person could use reasonable force to resist an arrest (People v. Cherry, 307 N.Y. 308, 121 N.E.2d 238) by a peace officer without suffering repercussions under section 1851 of the former Penal Law so long as he was not convicted of the underlying crime (People v. Dreares, 15 A.D.2d 204, 221 N.Y.S.2d 819, affd. 11 N.Y.2d 906, 228 N.Y.S.2d 467, 182 N.E.2d 812).
In Dreares, two plain-clothes transit officers observed the defendant for about 15 minutes standing near the ladies' room on the mezzanine between two train platforms. When asked what he was doing, the defendant replied it was none of their business. After the officers revealed their identity, the defendant stated he was waiting for a train. When asked why he was not waiting for the train on the platform, he merely shrugged his shoulders. At this point the officers placed the defendant under arrest. Although the defendant successfully broke away from their grasp, he was later subdued after inflicting a minor injury upon one of the officers.
The defendant was charged with loitering and assault in the third degree resulting from his alleged unlawful resistance to the arrest. After being acquitted of the loitering charge, the defendant appealed the assault--third conviction.
In reversing the conviction, the Appellate Division stated:
'The prior acquittal for loitering, which is not disputed, is determinative that defendant was not guilty of the underlying offense for which he was arrested * * *.
(People v. Dreares, at p. 206, 221 N.Y.S.2d, at p. 821.)
Apparently reacting to the result reached in Dreares, the Legislature amended section 177 (subd. 1) effective July 1,...
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