People v. Williams
| Docket Number | Ind. No. 70029-23 |
| Decision Date | 08 May 2023 |
| Citation | 188 N.Y.S.3d 417 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Charles WILLIAMS, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
P. David Soares, District Attorney (Bryanne Perlanski Brucato, Esq. of counsel), for the People.
Francisco Calderon, Esq., Albany, NY for defendant.
Thomas Marcelle, J.
Defendant moves to suppress certain cell phone records and data that he claims the police seized in violation of his rights. In particular, he argues that the warrant issuing judge lacked probable cause to allow the police to search his phone and seize information found on it. In addition, he argues that the judge failed to comply with the requirements of CPL § 690.20 (2).
The prosecution, at the suppression hearing, alleged the following:1 The victim and defendant had an intimate relationship that did not end well. The victim told defendant that she wanted to break up. Defendant did not like this; he went to the victim's home in Albany where he proceeded to choke and beat her. Upon ending his assault, defendant cautioned the victim that he would kill her if the police got involved. Nevertheless, the victim reported the incident to the police; then went to a domestic violence shelter and ultimately moved from Albany to Cohoes—all to get away from the defendant.
About six weeks later, on November 13, while the victim was waiting for her mother, a car pulled up in front of the house. It was defendant. He repeatedly commanded the victim to get into the vehicle. After considering fleeing (and the consequences that might result to her for attempting to do so), the victim decided it best to get in the car and talk.
After stepping into the vehicle, she observed a handgun on defendant's lap. For the next six hours defendant held the victim prisoner. At one point, defendant drove to the Hudson River. There he forced the victim to strip naked and to walk to the end of a dock. He then tried to throw her into the river, but the victim pancaked her body to the ground; so, defendant pulled her by the hair and assaulted her, promising the victim that she was going to die. Ultimately, defendant allowed the victim to reclothe and then ushered her back to the car.
Defendant drove around for a few more hours. Finally, while parked at a Burger King restaurant, defendant presented the victim with an option to evade death—namely, to recant her story to the police. Gaining the victim's consent to the condition, defendant released her. The kidnapping escapade lasted almost six hours from about 2 a.m. to well after dawn.
The victim went to the police on the following day (November 14) to report the whole affair. Albany Police Detective Haggarty was assigned to the case. As part of his investigation, the Detective wanted access to defendant's cell phone records. To obtain the records, he requested that the Albany City Court issue a search warrant. This request was granted.
The warrant permitted the police to seize defendant's cell phone records maintained by AT&T mobile from the dates November 6, 2022 to November 20, 2022. The data included virtually everything that a cell phone could store, capture, record and reflect from its use. Defendant wants to suppress information and evidence gathered from the search warrant. He makes several arguments, some better than others, in support of his motion to suppress.
Both the United States and the New York State Constitutions require search warrants to be issued only upon probable cause: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized" ( US Const Amend IV ; NY Const Art I, § 12 ).
To establish probable cause, a search warrant application must provide sufficient information "to support a reasonable belief that evidence of a crime may be found in a certain place" ( People v. Schaefer , 163 A.D.3d 1179, 1180, 82 N.Y.S.3d 197 [3d Dept. 2018] [internal citations and quotation marks omitted]). So, initially, it must be reasonable that the cell number in the search warrant belonged to defendant. Detective Haggarty's affidavit supplied such support. His affidavit recounts that the victim told him she had been together with defendant for a year. Of course, during that time, defendant had contacted her via cell phone. The victim, consequently, was able to deliver the Detective defendant's cell number.
It seems obvious that the victim's statement established a reasonable basis to believe that the number was defendant's. Nevertheless, defendant protests. He says that the victim's statement is hearsay, and that her statement fails to satisfy the two-part Aguilar—Spinelli test.2
The Aguilar-Spinelli test applies where the warrant issuing magistrate has no sworn statement emanating directly from a witness with personal knowledge ( People v. Hicks , 38 N.Y.2d 90, 93, 378 N.Y.S.2d 660, 341 N.E.2d 227 [1975] ). In such a situation, the test requires a showing that the person who provided the hearsay is reliable and has a basis of knowledge for the information that she imparted ( People v. Bahr , 35 A.D.3d 909, 910, 825 N.Y.S.2d 809 [3d Dept. 2006] ).
Here, the burden imposed by Aguilar—Spinelli is easily met. Under the first part of the test (reliability), the hearsay statement comes from the victim who is a citizen and not a police informant. "[I]nformation provided by private citizen informants ... is presumed to be reliable, thus satisfying the first part of the Aguilar—Spinelli test" ( People v. Cazeau , 192 A.D.3d 1388, 1389, 145 N.Y.S.3d 191 [3d Dept. 2021] [internal citations and quotation marks omitted]). With respect to the second part of the test (basis of knowledge), the victim had the ability to identify defendant's cell phone number. The two had dated for a year, and during that time they communicated with each other via his cell phone. No question, therefore, the Albany City Court properly concluded that the victim's statement provided probable cause.
Next defendant argues that there is no reason to believe evidence of a crime could be found on his cell phone. The court will separate the analysis into two parts. First, it will deal with calls and texts that defendant made and received, pictures and/or videos that he took or recorded, applications (e.g., emails and social media) that he accessed or used, and web searches that he made or web sites that he visited—in short, any information contained or stored on the phone. Defendant argues that the Detective's affidavit made no connection between the information on his cell phone and evidence about the kidnapping—this argument has force.
In his affidavit, the Detective says that in his experience and training that suspects use their cell phones to record and communicate about events associated with criminal activity. This certainly makes sense—at least generally. However, it is but speculation if and how a person employs a cell phone at a specific moment to record and communicate about a particular event. Accordingly, "common sense alone does not establish probable cause to search a person's cell phone" ( People v. Jemmott , 164 A.D.3d 953, 954, 82 N.Y.S.3d 657 [3d Dept. 2018] ).
Rather, the warrant application must demonstrate that the defendant used the cell phone in some way that connects the phone to the crime. For example, if police have information that a defendant texted the victim or that a defendant posted on social media a picture of himself and the victim together at a relevant time or relevant place, such information would provide a reasonable belief that evidence of the crime is contained in the cell phone's records (see People v. Vergara , ––– Misc.3d ––––, ––––, 186 N.Y.S.3d 809 [Sup. Ct., Richmond Co. 2023] ) [collecting cases showing that probable cause to search the contents of a cell phone occurs only where a nexus exists between the criminal activity and a cell phone]).
In this case, the warrant application does not allege that defendant operated the cell phone at all during, or in close temporal proximity to, the charged crime.
Therefore, the application lacks information to support a reasonable belief that evidence of a crime could be found on defendant's cell phone. Consequently, the court will suppress any evidence of calls and texts that defendant made and/or received, pictures and/or videos that he took or recorded, applications (e.g., emails and social media) that he accessed or used, web searches that he made or web sites that he visited, information that he stored and similar type data generated as a result of defendant's use of his cell phone.
This brings the case to the seizure of cell phone records that reflect defendant's whereabouts.3 Defendant says this too must be suppressed and argues that the warrant in this case was overbroad and insufficiently particularized. Overbroad and insufficiently particularized are two conceptually distinct but related constitutional infirmities ( People v. Alexander , 207 A.D.3d 878, 879, 172 N.Y.S.3d 516 [3d Dept. 2022] ).
First, the Fourth Amendment requires that warrants must describe with particularity the places where the police are permitted to search. ( People v. Gordon , 36 N.Y.3d 420, 429, 142 N.Y.S.3d 440, 166 N.E.3d 514 [2021] [internal citations and quotation marks omitted]). Here, the warrant was quite detailed in exactly which data, records and information were sought. Consequently, the warrant's thorough description met the particularity requirement and left nothing to the discretion of the executing officers—in this regard it passes constitutional...
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