People v. Williams, A116980 (Cal. App. 4/23/2008)
| Decision Date | 23 April 2008 |
| Docket Number | A116980 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DUSHAY WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant. |
Appeal from the San Francisco County, Super. Ct. No. 196305.
Dushay Williams challenges his conviction for possession of cocaine base for sale on the ground that the narcotics evidence used against him was the product of an unreasonable parole search.
On March 28, 2005, shortly after midnight, San Francisco Police Officer Angel Lozano observed Dushay Williams cross a street against a red light. Lozano and his partner detained Williams for jaywalking. Lozano's partner knew from prior contacts that Williams was on parole, he ran a computer check at the scene to confirm Williams' parole status, and Williams acknowledged he was on parole. The officers performed a quick search of Williams for weapons, which disclosed no evidence of criminal activity or a parole violation. Williams was not cited for jaywalking, but he was handcuffed, placed in a patrol car, and transported to the local police station for a full search.
At the station, the officers searched Williams and recovered car keys. Williams told the officers his car was not in the area. At some point, he told the officers he had a Park Avenue car. The car registered to Williams was located two and one-half blocks from where he was detained. The keys recovered from Williams unlocked the car, and inside the officers found 27 packets of crack cocaine.
Williams was charged by felony complaint with possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5.), plus two prior convictions for drug offenses within the meanings of Health and Safety Code section 11370, subdivisions (a) and (c), Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, and Penal Code section 1203.07, subdivision (a)(11). The complaint also alleged that he had served two prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).
On May 2, 2005, Williams filed a motion to suppress the narcotics seized from his car, arguing it was obtained as a result of an unlawful warrantless search. The prosecution contended the police had the right to stop and question Williams since he was observed to be jaywalking, and the police had the further right to search him and his car once it was determined Williams was on parole. Following a preliminary hearing at which Williams was held to answer on the charged offense, his motion to suppress was denied. The information that was filed included the same charge and allegations as the complaint.
On October 21, 2005, Williams moved to set aside the information pursuant to Penal Code section 995 on the ground the narcotics evidence was the product of an unlawful search. He claimed the search was unjustified by his parole search condition since it was arbitrary and capricious and not supported by reasonable suspicion. The issue of whether a parole search needed to be supported by reasonable suspicion was then pending before the United States Supreme Court. (People v. Samson (Oct. 14, 2004, A102394) [nonpub. opn.], rev. denied (Jan. 12, 2005, S129509), cert. granted Sept. 27, 2005 sub nom. Samson v. California, 545 U.S. 1165.) After the trial court denied Williams' section 995 motion, he filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in this court, which we denied. (Williams v. Superior Court, A112037, Nov. 22, 2005.)
Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, Williams pled guilty to the charged offense on February 1, 2006. Conditions of his plea were that the charges would be dismissed if Samson v.California was decided favorably to Williams, and he would be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial if there was an unfavorable result. Williams was released on his own recognizance pending sentencing or his withdrawal of the guilty plea. Samson v. California (2006) 547 U.S. 843 (Samson), decided on June 19, 2006, held that warrantless parole searches were constitutional even in the absence of any individualized suspicion. (Id. at p. 857.) Williams then withdrew his guilty plea and the matter was scheduled for trial.
On August 7, 2006, Williams again pled guilty to a violation of Health & Safety Code, Section 11351.5 and admitted one of the prior felony special allegations. Williams received a suspended prison sentence. He was placed on probation on the condition that he serve an additional year in the county jail, which could be served through a residential drug treatment program. This appeal followed.
Williams' sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the narcotics that were recovered from his car. Because this appeal is from a Penal Code section 995 review and denial of Williams' motion to suppress at the preliminary hearing, we review the determination of the magistrate. (People v. McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521, 529.) We must draw all presumptions in favor of the magistrate's factual determinations and uphold the magistrate's express or implied findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. (Ibid.) We will independently assess the legality of the search by measuring the facts as found true by the magistrate against the constitutional standard of reasonableness. (Ibid. )
In People v. Reyes, the California Supreme Court held that a warrantless search pursuant to a parole search condition is permitted under California law even in the absence of particularized suspicion of criminal activity by the parolee, as long as the search is not arbitrary or capricious, made for an improper purpose, or conducted in an unreasonable manner. (People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 753-754 (Reyes).) As mentioned, the United States Supreme Court has concluded in Samson v. California that a search conducted pursuant to Reyes was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (Samson, supra, 547 U.S. at pp. 846-847, 856-857 & fn. 5.) Evidence lawfully seized pursuant to such a search is therefore admissible in a criminal proceeding. (See People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1184; Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d).)
Williams maintains that the narcotics recovered from his vehicle should have been excluded because the parole search was arbitrary. He concedes the legitimacy of the initial search conducted by officers at the scene of his detention, since he was observed to be jaywalking and was subject to a parole search condition. According to Williams, the search became unreasonable at two separate stages: first, when the officers handcuffed and transported him to a police station for a "full search," and second, when his car was searched.
Williams first argues the search was arbitrary as it was not carried out for a legitimate rehabilitative or law enforcement purpose. He points out that jaywalking was neither an arrestable offense nor a violation of his parole. This demonstrates, Williams reasons, the arbitrariness of the officers' decision to transport him to the police station. He claims the search of his vehicle was likewise flawed since the officers never observed him near it and had no reason to believe they would find evidence of a crime or parole violation in the car. In making these argument, Williams errs by equating legitimate rehabilitative or law enforcement objectives with particularized suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity or in violation of his parole.
Reyes and Samson clearly hold that reasonable suspicion is not a prerequisite to a legitimate parole search. (Reyes, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 756; Samson, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 857.) The purpose of a parole search is to deter crime and protect the public "and the effectiveness of the deterrent is enhanced by the potential for random searches." (Reyes, at p. 753, italics added.) Reyes favorably cited In re Anthony S., where officers conducted probation searches of several gang members just because, in the trial court's words, " `this would be a convenient day to search gang members.' " (In re Anthony S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1003; Reyes, at p. 754.) The court of appeal found the search to be reasonable because "the officers were motivated by a law enforcement purpose, i.e., to look for stolen property, alcohol, weapons, and gang paraphernalia at the homes of [the gang] members." (In re Anthony S., at p. 1004.) As an example of an illegitimate motivation, the court of appeal identified a search motivated by personal animosity, which was not established in that case. (Ibid.) Reyes also favorably cites United States v. Follette, which held that "[a]ny search by a parole officer in good faith to determine whether a paroled prisoner is complying with the conditions of his release would in my opinion be reasonable," and People v. Bremmer, which similarly held, "Absent obvious harassment a probation officer's search is directed toward the legitimate objective of probationer's reformation and rehabilitation and hence qualifies as reasonable . . . ." (United States v. Follette (S.D.N.Y. 1968) 282 F.Supp. 10, 13, italics added; People v. Bremmer (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 1058, 1065, italics added (Bremmer); Reyes, at p. 754.)1 That is, the simple objective of determining whether a parolee is complying with the law — at any place or time — is a legitimate law enforcement purpose for conducting a parole search under Reyes. Williams brings to our attention no evidence that the officers who conducted his search were motivated by any other purpose.
Williams also suggests his parole search was unreasonably prolonged in time and extent. The facts and the law do not support his position. He cites McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d 577, for the proposition that an investigatory detention may (McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 586.) McGaughran is a...
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