People v. Williams

• Citation: 63 Cal.2d 452,406 P.2d 647,47 Cal.Rptr. 7
• Decision Date: 22 October 1965
• Docket Number: Cr. 8644
• Parties: , 406 P.2d 647 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Randolf WILLIAMS and Nathaniel Hendrix, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 7

47 Cal.Rptr. 7

63 Cal.2d 452, 406 P.2d 647

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Randolf WILLIAMS and Nathaniel Hendrix, Defendants and Appellants.

Cr. 8644.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Oct. 22, 1965.

Donald C. Duchow, San Francisco, for defendants and appellants.

Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attys. Gen., Albert W. Harris, Jr., and Robert R. Granucci, Deputy Attys.Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

TOBRINER, Justice.

A jury found defendants guilty of second degree murder in connection with the stabbing of George Mack. They appeal from the judgment of conviction.

George Mack died as a result of a knife wound shortly after an affray with defendants on the morning of May 26, 1963. Defendants, residents of Oakland, drove to San Francisco on Saturday, May 25. They visited various parts of the city, ending up at Third and Tehama Streets late on Sunday morning. There they saw Mack whom they knew as a supplier of methedrine. Apparently Mack owed Hendrix some money; defendants attempted either to obtain methedrine from Mack in discharge of the debt or to convince Mack to repay the money that he owed Hendrix. The discussion relating to these matters degenerated into an affray which resulted in Mack's death.

The record does not spell out the exact sequence of events. In essence defendants contend that Mack pulled out a knife, that they used their knives only to defend themselves, and that in the struggle which ensued Mack was stabbed. No prosecution witnesses saw the beginning of the affray. After the stabbing defendants left the scene and returned to Oakland. The following day they turned themselves over to the police.

Defendants contend that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that they acted in self-defense; that the trial court erred in instructing the jury in several respects; that certain of the trial judge's remarks were prejudicial, and that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence statements which were obtained in violation of defendants' rights to counsel and to remain silent.

As we explain below, we conclude that the evidence does not demonstrate self-defense as a matter of law; we further hold that the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury that it must find defendants guilty of second degree murder if the killing occurred during a conspiracy to obtain methedrine; we finally direct that on retrial the trial court inquire into the circumstances surrounding defendants' statements to determine whether those statements were taken in violation of the principles enunciated in Escobedo v. State of Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, and People v. Dorado (1965) 62 A.C. 350, 42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361. We need not consider whether the trial court's remarks to the jury were prejudicial.

I. Sufficiency of the evidence

We cannot accept defendants' first contention that the evidence, as a matter of law, establishes that they acted in self-defense. Defendants argue that their extrajudicial statements to the police, which the prosecution introduced at trial, showed that they acted in self-defense and that the prosecution is 'bound ' by these statements. ¹

In People v. Acosta (1955) 45 Cal.2d 538, 542-543, 290 P.2d 1, 4, we stated the rule for determining if the prosecution is 'bound' by extrajudicial statements it introduces: '* * * if there is prosecution evidence which tends to disprove criminality and other prosecution evidence which tends to prove criminality, it is the function of the trier of fact to determine which version is to be believed. (Citations.) The courts may sometimes say that the prosecution is 'bound by' extrajudicial statements of defendant which are introduced by the prosecution and which are irreconcilable with guilt, but this concept is applicable only where there is no other competent and substantial evidence which could establish guilt. (Citations.)'

In this case other 'competent and substantial evidence' tends to prove that the defendants did not act in self-defense. Admittedly the prosecution introduced no direct evidence which explained how the argument degenerated into physical violence. But from the circumstances, including the fact that both defendants were physically larger men than Mack, the jury could have found that defendants did not kill Mack as a result of their reasonable fear of a present danger of great bodily injury. (See Pen.Code, § 197, subd. 3.)

The prosecution witness, Mr. Miles, testified that he was about 200 feet from the altercation; that he saw a crowd watching a commotion; that when the crowd backed up he saw Williams kick Mack, who was then 'sliding down the the wall.' Mr. Cotney, standing fairly close to the affray, testified that he saw defendants 'scuffling' with Mack and that the defendants 'had him down.' He heard Mack say, 'I will give it to you.' He also testified that the only knife he saw was in Williams' hand. ²

Mrs. Ritchie, landlady at the Yukon Hotel, testified that she heard Rose Johnson scream from the street,'why don't you two people let this man alone. You are going to kill him.' She later looked down from her window in the hotel and saw, on the sidewalk beneath the window, the defendants on either side of Mack. She stated that they were all standing up and that Mack 'looked like he was helpless.' She testified she saw a 'knife come out like that in a thrust with the blood dripping from it.'

Defendants apparently recognize the damaging effect of Mrs. Ritchie's testimony. They contend that the jury must have rejected her testimony because they did not find defendants guilty of first degree murder under the felony-murder doctrine. (Pen.Code, § 189.) Although some of Mrs. Ritchie's testimony tended to show that defendants were robbing Mack, that is not the only inference the jury might have drawn from the evidence. Defendants' contention must therefore fail.

II. Erroneous instructions

Defendants object to the trial court's rulings on proffered instructions as to the law of self-defense and on the rendered instructions as to the second degree murder rule; we shall explain why we have concluded that defendants' latter contention compels reversal. As to the former we need only state that the court's instructions on self-defense adequately apprised the jury of the matters which defendants' suggested instructions sought to present; the court did not err in rejecting them.

As to the latter, the trial court instructed the jury that the defendants would be guilty of murder in the second degree if 'the killing (was) done in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a violation of section 245(a) of the Penal Code, assault with a deadly weapon, or in the violation of Section 182 of the Penal Code, conspiracy.' ³ This instruction unduly broadens the felony-second-degree-murder rule and does not accord with our recent cases.

This court has expressed the nature and extent of the felony-second-degree-murder rule in People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 795, 36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 635, 388 P.2d 892, 907: 'A homicide that is a direct causal result of the commission of a felony inherently dangerous to human life (other than the six felonies enumerated in Pen.Code, § 189) constitutes at least second degree murder. (People v. Poindexter (1958) 51 Cal.2d 142, 149(5, 6), 330 P.2d 763 (administering narcotics to a minor); People v. Powell (1949) 34 Cal.2d 196, 205(7), 208 P.2d 974 (abortion); cf. People v. McIntyre (1931) 213 Cal. 50, 56(4), 1 P.2d 443 (drunk driving).)' See also the recent cases of People v. Schader (1965) 62 A.C. 751, 767, 44 Cal.Rptr. 193, 401 P.2d 665, and People v. Washington (1965) 62 A.C. 824, 827-828, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130, in which we approved anf followed the Ford formulation. ⁴

The felony involved in this case, conspiracy to possess methedrine, is surely not, as such, inherently dangerous. The trial court erred, therefore, in instructing the jury it might convict the defendants of second degree murder on the basis of the felony. ⁵

Furthermore, the erroneous instruction caused prejudice to defendants. Although the jury, even in the absence of the erroneous instructions, would probably not have completely exculpated defendants, it could well have found defendants guilty of voluntary manslaughter.

The record convinces us that, if the court had not given the questionable instruction, the jury would have found defendants guilty of at least some offense. The court adequately instructed the jury on self-defense; the jury's guilty verdict demonstrated that it did not accept that exoneration. Nor could the jury have exculpated defendants upon the basis of section 195, subdivision 2 of the PenalCode which excuses homicides 'upon a sudden combat when no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon used'; defendants, in the combat, here, used knives.

The prejudicial vice of the instruction lay in the fact that it precluded the jury from finding defendants guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The trial judge instructed the jury that 'if (the conspiracy to possess methedrine) is being perpetrated and there is a killing in connection with it, it is second degree murder, even though the killing was accidental.' Voluntary manslaughter consists of the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, 'upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.' Thus, if defendants had engaged in a conspiracy to possess methedrine and killed Mack only 'upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion,' they would have been guilty of voluntary manslaughter only. Yet, under the instruction, ⁶ if the jury found only such a conspiracy, it would have been compelled to find defendants guilty of second degree murder: defendants would have perpetrated a killing 'in connection with' the conspiracy to obtain methedrine even though a sudden quarrel or heat of passion propelled the killing.

We cannot say that in the absence of the erroneous instruction it is not...