People v. Williams, Cr. 5785

• Decision Date: 21 May 1957
• Docket Number: Cr. 5785
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert E. WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 117

311 P.2d 117

151 Cal.App.2d 173

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert E. WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 5785.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

May 21, 1957.

Gladys Towles Root, Eugene V. McPherson and Joseph A. Armstrong, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Henry K. Workman, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

ASHBURN, Justice.

Defendant, having been convicted of first degree murder with recommendation of punishment by imprisonment in the State prison for life and having been sentenced accordingly, appeals from the judgment. Counsel make three claims of error warranting a reversal, (1) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of murder, (2) that it is insufficient to establish murder in the first degree, and (3) that prejudicial error was committed in the exclusion of declarations of defendant which contradicted his confessions.

The guiding rule of review is stated in People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678, 681, 104 P.2d 778, 780: "[B]efore the verdict of the jury, which has been approved by the trial court, can be set aside on appeal upon the ground' of insufficiency of the evidence, 'it must be made clearly to appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the conclusion reached in the court below. The determination of a charge in a criminal case involves proof of two distinct propositions: First, that the offense charged was committed, and second, that it was perpetrated by the person or persons accused thereof. * * * We must assume in favor of the verdict the existence of every fact which the jury could have reasonably deduced from the evidence, and then determine whether such facts are sufficient to support the verdict.' If the circumstances reasonably justify the verdict of the jury, the opinion of the reviewing court that those circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with the innocence of the defendant will not warrant interference with the determination of the jury.'

Essentially the argument in support of appellant's first claim is that there is nothing to connect defendant with the crime except his own statements, and that they are unreliable because he was proved by expert testimony to be a pathological liar. The second claim is that, as the first degree murder finding must rest upon a showing that the homicide was committed during the perpetration of a robbery, there must be independent proof of the robbery as a part of the corpus delicti and that there is no such evidence here except defendant's confessions.

Proof of the corpus delicti in a murder case 'consists of two elements, the death of the alleged victim[s] and the existence of some criminal agency as the cause, either or both of which may be proved circumstantially or inferentially. * * * Proof of the corpus delicti does not require identity of the perpetrators. It is not necessary that it connect the defendant with the commission of the crime although it may do so. * * * It is the settled rule, however, that the corpus delicti must be established independently of admissions of the defendant. Conviction cannot be had on his extra-judicial admissions or confessions without proof aliunde of the corpus delicti; but full proof of the body of the crime, sufficient to convince the jury of its conclusive character, is not necessary before the admissions may be received. A prima facie showing that the alleged victim[s] met death by a criminal agency is all that is required. The defendant's extrajudicial statements are then admissible, the order of proof being discretionary, and together with the prima facie showing must satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.' People v. Cullen, 37 Cal.2d 614, 624-625, 234 P.2d 1, 6. Accord: People v. Amaya, 40 Cal.2d 70, 75-76, 251 P.2d 324; People v. Cobb, 45 Cal.2d 158, 161, 287 P.2d 752.

Where the homicide is committed in the course of a robbery it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove the fact of robbery as part of the corpus delicti; the degree of the crime is not part thereof; it may be proved by defendant's own statements after a prima facie showing of homicide has been made by other proof. 'In this connection, Miller apparently contends that the prosecution was bound to establish by independent evidence the corpus delicti of the crime of attempted robbery, as well as the corpus delicti of the crime of murder, before his extra-judicial statements concerning the planning and execution of the attempted robbery could be used to prove the degree of the murder which was admittedly committed. He cites no authority to sustain his contention, and it appears to be without merit. The corpus delicti of the crime of murder having been established by independent evidence, both reason and authority indicate that the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime can be shown by the extra-judicial statements of the accused, and that such evidence of the surrounding circumstances may be used to establish the degree of the crime committed.' People v. Miller, 37 Cal.2d 801, 806, 236 P.2d 137, 139. See, also, People v. Amaya, supra, 40 Cal.2d 70, 80, 251 P.2d 324.

The evidence, viewed in the light of the rule of the Newland case, supra, establishes independently of defendant's own extra-judicial statements the following facts. Matt Manestar, the victim of the crime, was the owner of Rose Motel, located at 1345 West Pacific Coast Highway, in the Wilmington or Harbor City area. He was 'well-to-do,' and locally was reputed to have 'quite a bit of money.' One of his sons testified that '[w]e were asked about it quite a few times. * * * on the dock * * * they kept calling us money bags.' On the night of January 22-23, 1956, Matt Manestar was in charge of the office or lobby of the motel; he had relieved his son Leonard at about 12:45 a. m. on the 23rd, a Monday; he was alone at the time. In one of the drawers of a table in the office was currency amounting to $27; in a box on the counter were some small coins for use for television. On the preceding Saturday $30 in currency had been delivered to Mr. Manestar. At 10:00 a. m. on Monday, the 23rd, another son, Emil, arrived at the office. No member of the family had seen Matt after Leonard left him and before Emil arrived. He found the doors unlocked, the lights on; Matt's hat, coat and glasses were on the counter; the table drawer was partially open and the $27 of currency was gone; the coin box had also disappeared. There was no evidence of a struggle.

On January 25th, about 4:00 p. m., Officer Schmitz of the Los Angeles Police Department saw Matt's body on a ledge of a cliff about 75 feet below the road near Point Firmin Park, several miles from the motel. There were no shoes, hat or glasses on the body. No automobile or other form of conveyance was near. An autopsy disclosed that the cause of death 'was gunshot wound in the head and of the abdomen with hemorrhage and injuries to the brain.' Also: 'The point of entrance was in the left occipital region, which is back of the head on the left side. The bullet pierced the brain more or less diagonally and edged through the right eyelid. * * * The other wound was in the region of the abdomen, rather closely between the edge of the ribs and I think a little to the right, two or three inches to the right of the mid-line, being in this position (indicating). That bullet lodged posteriorly toward the back and had gone through the right lung and terminated under the skin of the back, from which point a bullet was recovered and saved.' The police were unable to discover any clue to the identity of the criminal until they talked with defendant on April 17th.

There can be no doubt that the foregoing makes a prima facie showing of homicide. Of course, that is enough to afford a basis for the use of defendant's confirmatory confessions. People v. Cullen, supra, 37 Cal.2d 614, 624, 234 P.2d 1; People v. Powell, 34 Cal.2d 196, 203, 208 P.2d 974. 'To prove a prima facie case of corpus delicti, all that was required was to show a reasonable probability that a criminal act of another had been the direct cause of the death * * *.' People v. Ives, 17 Cal.2d 459, 464, 110 P.2d 408, 411. In People v. Mehaffey, 32 Cal.2d 535, 545, 197 P.2d 12, 17, the court, speaking of the use of extrajudicial declarations and statements of a defendant, said: '[I]t is likewise well settled that to authorize their reception in evidence and consideration by the jury, the prosecution is not required to establish the corpus delicti by proof as clear and convincing as is necessary to establish the fact of guilt; rather slight or prima facie proof is sufficient for such purpose. [Citations.] It may be proved by circumstantial evidence and by inferences reasonably drawn therefrom. [Citations.] Direct or positive evidence is not essential [citations], nor is it necessary at this point to connect the defendant with the perpetration of the offense.'

The possibility that decedent voluntarily walked or rode from the motel to the edge of the cliff several miles away, there shot himself and fell over the cliff was not suggested by anything in evidence. A mere possibility affords no evidence whatever. See Robinson v. Board of Retirement, 140 Cal.App.2d 115, 118, 294 P.2d 724, and authorities therein cited. The reasonable inference is death by violence. Basis is thus afforded for use of defendant's confessions for completion of the proof.

Defendant made two written and signed confessions, another which was taken down on a tape recorder, and numerous other oral statements pointing to himself as the perpetrator of a robbery resulting in the killing of Manestar.

On March 30, 1956, defendant, who apparently had been on parole from the Deuel Vocational Institution at Tracy, was returned for some infraction of rules not connected with this case. Within a week he went to Ralph...