People v. Williams
Decision Date | 20 February 1975 |
Docket Number | Cr. 18028 |
Citation | 119 Cal.Rptr. 210,13 Cal.3d 559,531 P.2d 778 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | , 531 P.2d 778 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Leola WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant. In Bank |
Ruth Ohanessian, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Norman H. Sokolow, Howard J. Schwab, Juliet H. Swoboda and Beverly K. Falk, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
Defendant appeals from judgment entered on a jury verdict convicting her of involuntary manslaughter. (Pen.Code, § 192, subd. 2.) We affirm the judgment.
After living together for two years, Elijah Turner decided one evening to leave defendant. When Elijah's brother Aubrey, defendant's sister Viola and Viola's boyfriend David arrived to help Elijah move, defendant told them to leave so that she could speak to Elijah privately.
According to Aubrey, defendant added that Elijah was 'not going anywhere.' A police officer testified Viola told him defendant called Elijah an obscene name and said he was 'not going anywhere.' At trial, however, Viola denied having made that statement.
Moments after stepping outside, Aubrey, Viola and David heard a 'bumping' sound. Aubrey testified he reentered the apartment in time to see defendant stab Elijah in the chest as the victim gestured to her to stop. Viola and David contradicted Aubrey's claim that he reentered the apartment, but agreed with him that Elijah stumbled outdoors saying that defendant had stabbed him. The wound was fatal.
Defendant gave the following account: She told the others to leave because she was embarassed by the necessity of asking Elijah for money to buy food and diapers for her infant daughter. Elijah replied that was solely her problem. Defendant responded, 'If that is the way you feel about it, you are not taking anything out of here but your clothes.' As he had on numerous prior occasions, Elijah then beat and kicked defendant, causing her to drop the baby. Defendant shouted at Elijah to stop, then grabbed a knife and 'hit him with it,' 'to stop him from hurting me.' Defendant did not intend to kill Elijah.
Defendant denied Aubrey witnessed the stabbing and also denied having made the following statements attributed to her by police officers testifying on rebuttal: Officer Howe testified that when he arrived at the scene defendant--kneeling over her victim--looked up and said, Detective Pierce testified that when he asked where she stabbed the victim, defendant replied that she did not know but that the detective should ask Aubrey because 'He saw the stabbing when he entered the door.' 1
Defendant contends the misdemeanor-manslaughter instruction was prejudicially erroneous because 'misdemeanor' was not defined.
In addition to instructions on first and second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, as well as the right of self-defense, the jury was instructed:
As defendant contends, this instruction must be supplemented by defining the inherently-dangerous-to-human-life misdemeanor or misdemeanors involved and by specifying what conduct under the evidence could constitute such misdemeanor or misdemeanors. (People v. Failla (1966) 64 Cal.2d 560, 564, 51 Cal.Rptr. 103, 414 P.2d 39; People v. McManis (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 608, 614, 102 Cal.Rptr. 889; People v. Escarcega (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 853, 859--860, 78 Cal.Rptr. 785; People v. Lilliock (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 419, 427--430, 71 Cal.Rptr. 434; Use Note to CAL-JIC No. 8.45 (1972 Revision).)
In People v. Failla, Supra, 64 Cal.2d 560, 51 Cal.Rptr. 103, 414 P.2d 39, the jury was instructed that entering an apartment with intent to commit theft 'or any felony' is burglary, and that such a specific intent is a necessary element of burglary. No other instructions on burglary were requested or given. This court held: (Id., at p. 564, 51 Cal.Rptr. at p. 106, 414 P.2d at p. 42.)
In People v. McManis, Supra, 26 Cal.App.3d 608, 102 Cal.Rptr. 889, the Court of Appeal relied on Failla in holding that 'An instruction defining misdemeanor within the context of a misdemeanor-manslaughter instruction must be given Sua sponte.' (Id. at p. 614, 102 Cal.Rptr. at p. 892.)
Defendant relied on McManis in moving for a new trial. The trial court admitted its error, but denied the motion on the ground it had not resulted in a miscarriage of justice--the position respondent adopts here.
(People v. Gordon (1973) 10 Cal.3d 460, 470, 110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298.)
This error was held harmless in the circumstances of McManis, the Court of Appeal there stating: (26 Cal.App.3d at p. 616, 102 Cal.Rptr. at p. 893; citations omitted.)
Similarly, it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached in the absence of the error here. Although defendant does not suggest which misdemeanor or misdemeanors should have been defined, the evidence suggests battery. 'A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.' (Pen.Code, § 242.) Defendant admitted willfully using force and violence upon Elijah. The only question was whether she did so unlawfully or in lawful self-defense. Having been fully and properly instructed on self-defense, as defendant expressly conceded at oral argument, the jury resolved the issue against defendant. Therefore, the error was harmless.
Defendant next contends the trial court erred by refusing to permit her to cross-examine a witness concerning the remainder of an extrajudicial conversation partially disclosed by the People.
As has been stated above, Aubrey Turner testified he reentered the apartment in time to witness the stabbing. Defendant testified to the contrary, denying she made a prior inconsistent statement to Detective Pierce. On rebuttal, Detective Pierce testified that when he asked where she stabbed the victim, defendant replied she did not know but that the detective should ask Aubrey because 'He saw the stabbing when he entered the door.' On cross-examination, defendant asked Detective Pierce, 'What was the whole conversation you had with Mrs. Williams?' The People's objection that the question called for Hearsay was sustained.
Section 356 of the Evidence Code provides in pertinent part: 'Where part of an act, declaration, coversation or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse party . . ..'
Therefore, the hearsay objection was not sustainable. "In the event a statement admitted in evidence constitutes part of a conversation or correspondence, the opponent is entitled to have placed in evidence all that was said or written by or to the declarant in the course of such conversation or correspondence, provided the other statements have some bearing upon, or connection with, the admission or declaration in evidence and are not excluded by a rule of law Other than the hearsay rule." (People v. Ketchel (1963) 59 Cal.2d 503, 536, 30 Cal.Rptr. 538, 555, 381 P.2d 394, 411, quoting...
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