People v. Williams
Decision Date | 13 May 1983 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 58466 |
Citation | 123 Mich.App. 752,333 N.W.2d 577 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harold James WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Fred R. Hunter, III, Pros. Atty., and Michael A. Nickerson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, for the People.
James R. Neuhard, State Appellate Defender by P.E. Bennett, Asst. State Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.
Before MacKENZIE, P.J., and MAHER and SIMON *, JJ.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, M.C.L. Sec. 750.316; M.S.A. Sec. 28.548. Defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for two concurrent life terms and appeals by right.
A key prosecution witness was Jeffrey Pippins, an accomplice of defendant. On direct examination of Pippins by the prosecutor, the following exchange occurred:
Defendant argues that this reference to a plea agreement containing a promise of truthfulness impermissibly bolstered the credibility of the prosecution witness. However, defendant made no objection to this testimony at trial, and under such circumstances we will reverse only if presented with manifest and serious error resulting in fundamental injustice. See, for example, People v. Therrien, 97 Mich.App. 633, 634, 296 N.W.2d 8 (1979).
The prosecution has a duty to disclose promises made to obtain an accomplice's testimony. People v. Atkins, 397 Mich. 163, 173, 243 N.W.2d 292 (1976). This was not a case like People v. Lytal, 415 Mich. 603, 329 N.W.2d 738 (1982), in which evidence of an accomplice's conviction was admitted ostensibly to show that no consideration was given to obtain the testimony. People v. Buschard, 109 Mich.App. 306, 316, 311 N.W.2d 759 (1981), like the case now before us, involved a plea agreement containing a promise of truthfulness. The Court concluded that whether reversal was required depended on the circumstances of the particular case:
(Emphasis in original.)
Defendant points to the following remarks by the prosecutor in rebuttal to defendant's closing argument, to which, however, defendant made no objection:
In his closing argument, counsel for defendant contended that Pippins should not be believed in view of his plea bargain and suggested that Pippins himself had been the killer. The prosecutor's rebuttal argument referred to the promise of truthfulness contained in the plea agreement, but the prosecutor did not suggest that he had some special knowledge, unknown to the jury, that Pippins was testifying truthfully. Instead, the prosecutor emphasized that Pippins' testimony was consistent with the statement he made to the police and that the statement was against Pippins' penal interest. No manifest and serious error resulting in fundamental injustice is presented.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by declining to admit evidence of the results of a polygraph examination taken by Pippins. Testimony on a separate record showed that the polygraph indicated that Pippins was deceptive in answering in the negative to the following questions: "Did you pull the trigger?", "Did you help in any way to cause these individuals' deaths?", and "Are you deliberately withholding any information?"
Testimony concerning the results of polygraph examinations is inadmissible because polygraphs are not generally accepted as reliable by the scientific community. People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 377, 255 N.W.2d 171 (1977). Defendant relies on cases such as Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1972), and Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), in which state rules rendering certain types of evidence inadmissible were held to deny criminal defendants the due process of law guaranteed by U.S. Const. Am. XIV, because the rules in question prevented defendants from presenting evidence which would have been relevant and material to their defense and prevented defendants from effectively cross-examining and impeaching adverse witnesses. The distinction between those cases and the one now before us is best shown by Chambers. In that case, the confession of another man to the crimes with which defendant was charged was excluded as hearsay under a state rule which recognized an exception to the hearsay rule for declarations against pecuniary interest but not for declarations against penal interest. The Court held, 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. at 1049:
Because it was precisely the untrustworthiness of the results of polygraph examinations which led to the rule in Barbara, application of that rule here did not deny defendant due process. Compare People v. Paquette, 114 Mich.App. 773, 776-779, 319 N.W.2d 390 (1982).
Defendant complains that the trial judge misstated the evidence in response to a question by the jury. The testimony of Jeffrey Pippins contains the following exchange:
However, during its deliberations, the jury sent two questions to the judge. The following then took place:
The inadvertent misstatement by the trial judge of testimony regarding an important question of fact has been held to be reversible error in a civil case. See, for example, Hammock v. Sims, 313 Mich. 248, 256-257, 21 N.W.2d 118 (1946). Here, however, counsel for defendant agreed that the trial judge had stated the testimony correctly. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the question of whether Pippins had an attorney when he gave his original statement to the police can be regarded as important. Defendant suggests that it might have influenced the jury's decision as to Pippins' credibility, but since nothing in the record suggests that the statement given to the police differed in any way from the statements made after appointment of counsel and plea bargaining, we cannot see how it could have such an effect. Any error in this regard was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
At a pretrial hearing on his competence to stand trial, defendant exercised his right under M.C.L. Sec. 330.2030(3); M.S.A. Sec. 14.800(1030)(3) to object to the introduction of the report prepared by the Center for Forensic Psychiatry pursuant to M.C.L. Sec. 330.2028; M.S.A. Sec. 14.800(1028). The prosecution therefore called as a witness the psychologist who prepared the report. The psychologist was not personally present in the courtroom, but was examined and cross-examined, despite defendant's objection, through a conference telephone call. Defendant argues that this procedure denied him his right, under U.S. Const., Ams. VI, XIV, and ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
People v. Bahoda
...so and you completely testified, you would be allowed to plead to a charge of manslaughter or unarmed robbery, is that correct?" [Id. at 755, 333 N.W.2d 577.]No objection was made. In rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor further stated the following:"You know, he agreed to tell the tru......
-
Thomas v. State
...to a competency hearing. In fact, there is authority to the contrary. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1117 (1989) (citing People v. Williams, 123 Mich.App. 752, 333 N.W.2d 577 (1983)). Accord Sangster v. State, 70 Md.App. 456, 464-68, 521 A.2d 811, 815-17 (1987), aff'd, 312 Md. 560, 541 A.2d 637 (......
-
Sangster v. State
...(hearing to determine competency is nonadversarial and is best characterized as investigatory in nature); People v. Williams, 123 Mich.App. 752, 333 N.W.2d 577, 581 (1983) (constitutional right of confrontation does not extend to pretrial hearings on competency to stand trial); Commonwealth......
-
People v. Kegler
...polygraph evidence is not admissible because not generally accepted as reliable by the scientific community. (People v. Williams (1983) 123 Mich.App. 752, 333 N.W.2d 577, 580.) Some states focus on the risk of confusion and prejudice to the jury from polygraph evidence, and exclude it becau......