People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 05 October 1978
• Docket Number: Docket No. 77-3327
• Citation: 287 N.W.2d 184,93 Mich.App. 236
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Randall B. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. 93 Mich.App. 236, 287 N.W.2d 184
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 184

287 N.W.2d 184

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Randall B. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 77-3327.

93 Mich.App. 236, 287 N.W.2d 184

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Oct. 5, 1978.

Released for Publication Jan. 29, 1980.

[93 MICHAPP 238] Matthew R. Rumora, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

[93 MICHAPP 237] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., E. Reilly Wilson, III, App. Chief, Asst. Pros. [93 MICHAPP 238] Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before KAUFMAN, P. J., and MAHER and RILEY, JJ.

RILEY, Judge.

On February 4, 1977, defendant was convicted by a jury of manslaughter, M.C.L. § 750.321; M.S.A. § 28.553, and sentenced to a prison term of 5 to 15 years.

He assigns as error four trial court rulings, of which the most significant pertains to an admission of a prior misdemeanor conviction for impeachment purposes. In his opening statement, defense counsel stated his client had "an unblemished record". On direct examination defendant testified that he had never been convicted of any offense, and on cross-examination he again denied any convictions. Subsequently, the prosecution produced a witness, officer Robert Black, who testified that defendant had previously been convicted of the misdemeanor of larceny under $100, M.C.L. § 750.356; M.S.A. § 28.588. Defendant argues that allowing the misdemeanor conviction into evidence directly contravenes People v. Renno, 392 Mich. 45, 219 N.W.2d 422 (1974). Renno held that prior municipal ordinance or misdemeanor convictions are inadmissible at trial if intended solely for impeachment purposes. Defendant Renno, on direct examination, testified that he had previously been convicted of certain drunk and disorderly charges. On cross-examination the prosecutor repeatedly attempted to expose the underlying factual circumstances behind those charges. In construing two statutes bearing on the propriety of impeaching[93 MICHAPP 239] a witness by prior convictions, the Court declared that:

"The original legislative purpose behind these statutes is obvious. They were passed to allow persons, historically disqualified at common law from testifying in a case, to testify. A compromise, however, was worked out whereby these disqualified persons could still have their credibility attacked by those prior convictions Which formerly had disqualified them from tesifying.

"Not all crimes at common law disqualified a witness. Only Infamous crimes disqualified a witness, and our statutes were originally intended only to allow impeachment by use of that type of criminal conviction.

"Defendant in this case was impeached by the prosecutor's use of his prior municipal ordinance violations and convictions. As set forth in (People v. ) Hanrahan, supra, (75 Mich. 611, 620-621, 42 N.W. 1124 (1889)), and (Ex parte ) Wilson, supra, (114 U.S. 417, 5 S.Ct. 935, 29 L.Ed. 89 (1885)) these are not the type of crimes which historically would have disqualified a witness from testifying. Our legislature saw fit to pass these statutes and to confer upon the accused a right he previously did not have at common law, that of testifying on his own behalf. The legislature also saw fit to limit this right, permitting the defendant's credibility to be attacked in the discretion of the trial court by these prior disqualifying convictions. These statutes were passed to give rights to an accused defendant, not to take rights away from him. Allowing the use of municipal ordinance convictions for impeachment purposes does just that it takes away rights the accused formerly had at common law." (Emphasis in original.) Renno, supra, at 53, 55, 219 N.W.2d at 424-25.

Thus, it is apparent from the above excerpt that the Renno Court was concerned primarily with the general "bad character" of the witness as it pertained to his ability to testify before a jury in a [93 MICHAPP 240] credible manner. The witness was allowed to take the stand, but, at the same time, the jury was permitted to evaluate his communicative reliability through the admission of crimes serious enough (I. e., infamous crimes) to warrant certain inferences as to his overall character.

We deal here with a dissimilar situation, namely, the correction of false and perjured testimony. The misdemeanor conviction was not offered for the purpose mentioned in Renno, but rather to negate defendant's express contention on direct examination that he was never before convicted.

Although no Michigan cases deal with this exact issue, reference to other analogous decisions is instructive. In People v. Bouchee, 62 Mich.App. 132, 233 N.W.2d 503 (1975), Rev'd on other grounds, 400 Mich. 253, 253 N.W.2d 626 (1977), defense counsel in his opening statement vouched for the defendant's nonexistent criminal record; defendant further testified as much on direct examination, whereupon the prosecution introduced evidence of a prior military conviction which was defective for lack of counsel. See Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 480, 92 S.Ct. 1014, 31 L.Ed.2d 374 (1972). The Bouchee Court determined that reference to the prior conviction was not permitted for the general purpose of denigrating defendant's character, but rather was admissible for the special and narrow purpose of demonstrating that defendant had given false testimony on direct examination.

"We believe that the record reflects that the defendant offered false testimony and that the prosecutor was allowed to show that defendant misrepresented his record in an attempt to mislead the jury. The defendant's testimony opened the door to rebuttal testimony, or what McCormick calls 'fighting fire with fire'. McCormick,[93 MICHAPP 241] Evidence (2d ed.), § 57, pp. 131, 132." Bouchee, supra, 62 Mich.App. at 136, 233 N.W.2d at 505.

See People v. Jackson, 77 Mich.App. 392, 258 N.W.2d 89 (1977); People v. Eroh, 47 Mich.App. 669, 209 N.W.2d 832 (1973). Cf., People v. Bobo, 390 Mich. 355, 212 N.W.2d 190 (1973).

While Bouchee did not reach the question of prior misdemeanor convictions, its reasoning touches the present case. For the trial court to have excluded the prior larceny conviction would allow the defendant to hide behind the purportedly expansive shield of Renno, thereby granting him free license to commit perjury and mislead the jury. This we cannot sanction, nor do we feel the Renno Court intended such a dubious result.

The United States Supreme Court in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 645-66, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), addressed an analogous issue concerning the use for impeachment of an otherwise inadmissible confession which violated Miranda v. Arizona : ¹

"Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. * * * Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. * * * "The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. We hold, therefore, that petitioner's credibility was appropriately impeached by use of his earlier conflicting statements." (Citations omitted.)

[93 MICHAPP 242] Our Supreme Court in People v. Graham, 386 Mich. 452, 192 N.W.2d 255 (1971), adopted the Harris rationale in affirming a conviction where the defendant had been impeached by evidence of his prior silence during a police interrogation. At trial he testified on direct examination that he repeatedly tried to inform the police what had happened. The Court cautioned, however, that the "defendant's refusal to speak during interrogation is admissible only to impeach his own inconsistent statements at trial". Graham, supra at 458, 192 N.W.2d at 258.

These decisions illustrate that when a defendant seeks to controvert the truth-seeking functions of a criminal trial, the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence is permissible to contradict his false testimony. Accordingly, we hold that...