People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 22 February 1972
• Docket Number: Docket No. 9903,No. 2,2
• Citation: 196 N.W.2d 327,38 Mich.App. 370
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sherman WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 327

196 N.W.2d 327

38 Mich.App. 370

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sherman WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 9903.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 2.

Feb. 22, 1972.

Released for Publication April 24, 1972.

William A. Shaheen, Jr., Flint, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Robert F. Leonard, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before DANHOF, P.J., and T. M. BURNS and O'HARA, ^* JJ.

O'HARA, Judge.

On May 1, 1970, defendant was found guilty of second-degree murder. He raises but one issue on appeal. It is of serious import to the trial courts of this State.

On April 16, 1970, little more than a week before the scheduled starting date for the trial, the defense counsel filed a praecipe motion requesting that the court order a psychiatric examination of the defendant to determine his mental competency to stand trial. On April 20, 1970, the court held a hearing upon the motion at which time the following transpired:

'The Court: The record will show now that Attorney Ronald Black is in the courtroom.

'You may proceed.

'Mr. Ruhala (for defendant): Yes, your Honor. I have brought this motion before the Court this morning as a result primarily of the latest findings of the Walker hearing, ¹ which was held on the 15th, which was last Wednesday.

'I have had considerable difficulty in working with this individual and obtaining information, names, things that happened; getting a coherent statement from him as to what transpired on the night that a shooting occurred at the Giant Ballroom.

'Reading over the statements that was (sic) given to the police, I find they had the very same problem with this man. He's inconsistent; he is incoherent at times; he does not have the sufficient ability to supply me with witnesses' names, although he says he has witnesses. All he can supply me with is the name of Dude or a nickname. It's remarkable a boy eighteen years of age wouldn't know somebody by their last name. Or if he knows a street, that he wouldn't know a street number. I can't subpoena people like this. I can't get any help from him.

'And after the Walker hearing and we went into his educational background and so forth, and listening to him testify on the stand again, I have come to the conclusion that this gentleman should be examined by a psychiatrist to find out whether or not he is capable of assisting me in his own defense. I feel that he is not, your Honor.

'The Court: Attorney Black?

'Mr. Black (assistant prosecutor): Well, as usual the prosecutor's placed in a precarious position. The People are ready to proceed with the trial of this case. It is in the process of being subpoenaed. But on the other hand, if there is the possibility that he may be incompetent to assist his attorney, maybe he should be examined.

'The Court: All right. Thank you, counsel. This matter's now scheduled for trial on Friday, April 24, 1970, as case number two. It's an important case to the defendant, it's an important case to the people, and it's a case that has been scheduled for some considerable period of time. At the Criminal Call there was no indication that such a motion would be filed.

'The defendant did appear and did testify at the Walker hearing, at which time counsel and the Court asked questions of the defendant, and the responses, in the Court's opinion, were appropriate under the circumstances and did not indicate any lack of ability to comprehend.

'The motion is not timely made. It would be impossible for us to schedule an appointment at the Center for Forensic Psychiatry within a time that would make it possible for us to have a report before Friday of this week.

'The Court will deny the motion.'

Defendant renewed his motion on the day trial was scheduled to begin. Again the motion was denied, the court then saying:

'The Court: No, there's no suggestion that counsel has waited improperly as a trial tactic. I'm just saying that it could be used improperly if the statutes and the Court Rule were read as defense counsel wants the Court to read it.

'It is my interpretation of the statute and the Court Rule that the Court still has the right to exercise a discretion as to whether a competency hearing can be ordered, and the matters which this Court has weighed in making the decision in denying your motion originally was, first of all, that it was too late, and, secondly, that the Court has had the opportunity to hear this witness testify and has watched him testify and is satisfied that his answers were clear and direct * * * that he appears to be able to assist counsel, except that he appears willing to admit that the statements given by him to the police were voluntarily and knowingly, understandingly given with a waiver of his constitutional rights.

'Now, if we have to start presuming that a person who voluntarily admits on the stand that he's guilty of an offense is not competent to stand trial, I think we're carrying things a little too far, and I'm sure that's not the rule in this State.

'The motion will be again denied.'

Subsequently, the court suggested, and the parties Agreed, that a local psychiatrist examine the defendant. The case was adjourned for four days, after which time the local psychiatrist reported his finding that the defendant was competent to stand trial. Trial was thereupon commenced and completed.

The issue before this Court is whether or not the trial court committed error in not granting the defendant's motion made prior to trial for a psychiatric commitment pursuant to M.C.L.A. § 767.27a; M.S.A. § 28.966(11), as supplemented by GCR 1963, 786.

M.C.L.A. § 767.27a; M.S.A. § 28.966(11) is originally 1966 P.A. 266. This act repealed and replaced M.C.L.A. § 767.27; M.S.A. § 28.967, whose ancestral roots reach back [38 Mich.App. 375] to 1883. The pertinent language of the original act, 1883 P.A. 190, § 18, read:

'If any person in confinement, under indictment of (for) the crime of arson, or murder, or attempt at murder, rape, or attempt at rape, or highway robbery, Shall appear to be insane, the judge of the judge of the circuit court of the county where he is confined shall institute a careful investigation; he shall call two or more respectable physicians, and other credible witnesses, and the prosecuting attorney to aid in the examination, and if it be deemed necessary to call a jury for that purpose, is fully empowered to compel the attendance of witnesses and jurors. If it is satisfactorily proved that such person is insane, said judge may discharge such person from imprisonment, and order his safe custody and removal to one of the State asylums, or to the Michigan asylum for insane criminals, after the latter institution is open for the reception of patients, at the discretion of such judge, where such person shall remain until restored to his right mind; and then if the said judge shall have so directed, the superintendent of the said asylum shall inform the said judge and prosecuting attorney so that the person so confined may, within sixty days thereafter, be remanded to prison and criminal proceedings be resumed or otherwise discharged.' (Emphasis supplied.)

In 1929 the language was changed slightly, 1929 P.A. 24, Ch. VII, § 27, but the concept remained the same. Thus, immediately prior to 1966 the existing statute invested substantial discretion in the trial judge whenever an issue of competency was raised. A hearing on the issue was held only when the defendant Appeared to be insane. Commitment was ordered only if incompetency was satisfactorily proven. Under these earlier statutes a mere request for a competency hearing made by the defense attorney was insufficient to generate these proceedings, People v. Wilson, 11 Mich.App. 721, 162 N.W.2d 161 (1968), as the court was not obligated by statute to grant such a request. ²

The trial judge's discretion however was not so broad as to allow him to deny summarily an investigation into the competency of the accused in all cases. The U.S. Supreme Court, recognizing that a fair trial cannot be had if the defendant is mentally incompetent ³, held in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966), that a sanity hearing must be held 'where the evidence raises a 'bona fide doubt' as to a defendant's competence to stand trial.' See People v. Russell, 20 Mich.App. 47, 173 N.W.2d 816 (1969). Thus, even under the earlier statutes a trial judge was required to conduct a competency hearing not only when the accused appeared to be insane but whenever the evidence before the court was such as to raise a bona fide doubt as to the mental competency of the defendant.

The 1966 act did not alter the basic law with regard to mental competency to stand trial but did enact significant procedural changes. We note initially, for example, that under the present scheme the issue of competency to stand trial is covered by a statute separate from that dealing with proceedings generated by an acquittal by reason of insanity, (which is now M.C.L.A. § 767.27b; M.S.A. § 28.966(12)). Thus, the procedure for determining the issue of mental competency no longer resides in two or three short sentences, as was the case with the earlier statutes noted above. Rather it is laid out in nine, somewhat detailed, sections, as well as in a court rule to be discussed further.

Section 1 of the statute continues the definition of incompetency from the earlier acts. Simply, a person is incompetent to stand trial if incapable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings against him, of comprehending his own condition in reference to the proceedings, or of assisting in his defense in a reasonable or rational manner.

Section 2 first lists the persons who may petition the court for a competency proceeding and then defers matters of form and time to the court rules:

'The issue of competence to stand trial may be raised by the prosecuting attorney,...